The Challenge of Governing Natural Resources : A Social Network Analysis of Actors’ Collaboration in Ghana’s Petroleum Sector by Rapp, Johanna
The Challenge of Governing Natural Resources
–
A Social Network Analysis of Actors’ Collaboration
in Ghana’s Petroleum Sector
Inaugural-Dissertation











Gedruckt mit der Genehmigung der Philosophischen Fakulta¨t
der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universita¨t Bonn
Zusammensetzung der Pru¨fungskommission:
Prof. Dr. Jo¨rg Blasius
(Vorsitzender)
Prof. Dr. Conrad Schetter
(Betreuer und Gutachter)
Prof. Dr. Simon Fink
(Gutachter)
Prof. Dr. Eva Youkhana
(weiteres pru¨fungsberechtigtes Mitglied)
Tag der mu¨ndlichen Pru¨fung: 31.05.2017
ii
Acknowledgments
Experience of the last three and a half years shows that the second draft is always better
than the first. As a result, I am not too upset about deleting the first draft of these
acknowledgements. They are only the final step on a long road. As most important guides
on this road, I first want to thank each and every interviewee who has dedicated her or his
knowledge and time to this research. Needless to say that without their contributions, this
work would have been impossible and it is unfortunate that I am the one who benefits.
For the financial support, I would like to acknowledge the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
(FES). The first persons to thank namely are my supervisors Prof. Dr. Conrad Schetter
and Prof. Dr. Simon Fink. Conrad taught me to think outside mainstream European
literature and Simon justly challenged every word I wrote. Both encouraged me with their
knowledge, curiosity and passion for science and I am sincerely grateful. At the Center
for Development Research (ZEF), I particularly want to thank Dr. Wolfram Laube, Dr.
Epifania Amoo-Adare and Dr. Irit Eguavoen. I am also grateful to Prof. Dr. Thomas
Saalfeld who supported me throughout my studies at the University of Bamberg, during
the scholarship application process and much beyond.
My field research in Ghana would have been impossible without Justice Nana Inkoom,
Cephas Asare, Daniel Nii Doku Nortey, and Justice Camillus Mensah. They shaped the
research as much as I did and I cannot thank them enough. Besides them, I am grateful
to everyone at Hεn Mpoano. Among the various other great people I met in Takoradi, I
want to express my sincere gratitude to Rebecca King, Stefanie Simon and Richard and
Joann Adupong for their support and friendship.
It is no exaggeration that other friends and my family were the fundament for writing
this thesis. Therefore, I would like to thank Till Deininger, Maurice Do¨ring, Liela Glu¨ck-
ert, Hanna Kriebel, Barbara Liebel, Elisa Machese, Okka Lou Mathis, Nelli Nokkala,
Anna Schriefl, and Anieke Walter. I owe sincere gratitude to Johanna Scho¨nho¨fer and
Daniel Bischof for their tireless advice and to Homa Maddah for her inspiration and guid-
ance. Most importantly, I would like to thank my parents Reingard and Werner Rapp
and my siblings Benjamin and Rebecca for their support and love. Finally, I want to




This PhD thesis sets out to investigate the extent of collaboration among actors in Ghana’s
petroleum sector. Previous research has either focused on the socio-economic changes
enforced upon local communities in close proximity to the offshore petroleum fields, or
on the institutional framework that aims to govern the petroleum industry. While the
first strand of literature criticizes the negative impacts on local communities, analyses
of the second strand overwhelmingly praise Ghana as a role model for “good” petroleum
governance as the government aims to include non-state actors as advisory and controlling
bodies in resource governance. In development literature and international development
collaboration, such multi-actor approaches are argued to increase the effectiveness in
governing natural resources and to better address communities’ interests considering the
role of non-state actors as citizens’ representatives beyond the state.
Yet, so far, a conceptual argument why state and non-state actors should collaborate
and an empirical investigation how they collaborate are outstanding. At the same time,
it remains unclear which actors involved in petroleum governance are perceived as repre-
sentatives by affected communities. This thesis is a first attempt to address these gaps.
Based on exchange theory, the thesis scrutinizes (1) which actors in Ghana’s petroleum
sector (aim to) steer petroleum resources and deriving revenues, (2) which of these actors
affected communities perceive as representatives of their interests and (3) to what extent
these actors attain their proclaimed goal to collaboratively govern the petroleum sector.
The analysis of two novel data sets tackle these questions. Primary survey data com-
piled with 333 expropriated land owners and farmers are used to investigate the abilities
of petroleum actors to represent affected communities’ interests. The extent of collabo-
ration among petroleum actors is methodically appropriated with Social Network Anal-
ysis (SNA). The necessary network data were generated by the means of a structured
questionnaire testing six different means of collaboration among 29 actors from the public,
private, donor, traditional, civil society and media sector.
Based on the triangulation of qualitative and quantitative data analysis, I argue that
effective representation and collaboration is constrained by an executive dominance, a
deviation between communities’ interests and actors’ goals in petroleum governance, con-
testation rather than collaboration among non-state actors, and a lack of long-term, col-
laborative strategies among all actors. Hence, while Ghana is far from experiencing the
devastating consequences of the so-called ‘resource curse’, actors so far fall short of their




Die vorliegende Dissertation untersucht ob und, wenn ja, wie Akteure im ghanaischen
O¨lsektor miteinander kollaborieren. Bisherige Forschung konzentriert sich vor allem auf
die sozio-o¨konomischen Auswirkungen der O¨lindustrie auf die Bewohner entlang der Ku¨ste
und den institutionellen Rahmen, der im Zuge des O¨lfundes 2007 aufgespannt wurde.
Wa¨hrend die Auswirkungen auf die Lokalbevo¨lkerung vorrangig kritisch diskutiert wer-
den, wird Ghana zusehends als Paradebeispiel fu¨r “gutes” O¨lmanagement auf der institu-
tionellen Ebene genannt, vor allem da die Regierung versucht, nicht-staatliche Akteure als
Beratungs- und Kontrollorgane in das Management der O¨lressourcen mit einzubeziehen.
Dieses Ziel wird nicht nur verfolgt, um den O¨lsektor mo¨glichst demokratisch zu gestal-
ten, sondern auch unter der Annahme, dass nicht-staatliche Akteure die Interessen der
Lokalbevo¨lkerung vertreten.
Bisher ungepru¨ft ist jedoch, inwiefern diese Zusammenarbeit nur hehres Ziel oder
tatsa¨chliches Kennzeichen des ghanaischen O¨lmanagements ist. Gleichzeitig ist unbeant-
wortet, welche Akteure das Vertrauen betroffener Gemeinden genießen. Die vorliegende
Arbeit mo¨chte diese Forschungslu¨cken schließen. Basierend auf austauschtheoretischen
Argumenten untersucht die Dissertation welche Akteure die Steuerung der O¨lressourcen
und -einnahmen beeinflussen, welche Akteure die Interessen der Lokalbevo¨lkerung repra¨-
sentieren und wie stark staatliche und nicht-staatliche Akteure miteinander kollaborieren.
Die Analysen zweier neu generierter Datensets beantworten diese Fragen. Umfrage-
daten mit 333 enteigneten Landbesitzern und Farmer pru¨fen die Fa¨higkeiten der Petro-
leumakteure, die Interessen betroffener Gemeinden zu repra¨sentieren. Das Ausmaß von
Kollaboration wird anhand Methoden der Sozialen Netzwerkanalyse untersucht. Die er-
forderlichen Daten wurden durch Interviews mit 29 Akteuren aus dem staatlichen, pri-
vaten, entwicklungspolitischen, traditionellen, zivilgesellschaftlichen und medialen Sektor
gewonnen.
Basierend auf den Analyseergebnissen argumentiert die Arbeit, dass Akteure im O¨lsek-
tor bislang fast ausschließlich interagieren statt zu kollaborieren: Tatsa¨chliche Kollabo-
ration wird marginalisiert durch die Dominanz der Exekutive, dem Auseinanderdriften
von Interessen der Lokalbevo¨lkerung auf der einen und Akteuren auf der anderen Seite,
Konkurrenz statt Zusammenarbeit zwischen nicht-staatlichen Akteuren, sowie dem Fehlen
langfristiger Strategien zur Umsetzung kollaborativer Ansa¨tze bei allen Akteuren. Wa¨h-
rend Ghana somit weit davon entfernt ist, die ha¨ufig angefu¨hrte These des ‘Ressourcen-
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1 Introduction
“Natural resources are neither a curse nor a blessing.
They are simply a source of opportunity.”
– Kofi Annan (2013)
The discovery of oil and gas in commercial quantities offshore Ghana’s west coast in 2007
affords Ghana the opportunity to accelerate development. The Ghanaian government has
taken this chance through the inclusion and engagement of non-state actors. The kickoff
for the articulated goal to steer petroleum resources ‘collaboratively’ was the “National
Forum on Oil and Gas” held in Accra in February 2008. The Forum gathered public
institutions on the national, regional and district level, private companies, donor agencies,
traditional authorities, civil society, media representatives, and citizens to solicit views
on how to govern the recently discovered petroleum resources and to discuss the way
forward. What unifies all these actors is the shared belief that the petroleum wealth has
to benefit the Ghanaian people and that the so-called ‘resource curse’1 has to be averted
by all means. Due to this joint belief, the odds are not bad that Ghana succeeds in
collaboratively governing the petroleum sector.
With the aim of jointly steering the petroleum sector, Ghana follows scholars who argue
that collaborative, horizontal steering of natural resources by a diverse set of political and
societal actors (i. e., ‘natural resource governance’) exceeds unilateral, vertical steering by
government authorities. This argument arises from the (largely normative) assumption
that natural resource governance is more inclusive, more participatory and, hence, a more
effective way of governing natural resources.
From this perspective, natural resource governance is a seductive idea not only for
natural resource-rich countries but also for development practitioners who often tend to
imagine how processes in developing countries ought to look like. Yet, it remains unclear
whether the idea is able to deliver its capacity in practice. Other open questions are how
actors can implement ‘collaborative steering’ in light of diverse agendas, mistrust and the
complexity of governing natural resources, what forms of exchange determine ‘collabora-
tive steering’, and to what extent actors use these forms as a means to collaborate. The
present thesis answers these questions in the example of Ghana’s petroleum sector.
1 The ‘resource curse’ refers to the paradox that resource-rich countries’ economies tend to grow more
slowly than countries with fewer natural resources (Auty 1993, 2001; Sachs and Warner 1995).
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In sum, the study argues that Ghanaian actors, so far, lack effective coalition formation,
dedication to multi-actor initiatives, systematic exchanges, and long-term strategies to
collaboratively govern the petroleum sector. While the country is far from experiencing
the devastating consequences of the ‘resource curse’ and is deservedly praised for its
petroleum management on the institutional level, actors fall short of their objective to
jointly govern the sector.
Unlike many other publications in the field of natural resources, this research does
not aim to normatively or morally evaluate the significance of collaboration in natural
resource governance. Rather, the thesis sets out to empirically scrutinize how actors col-
laborate through the exchange of tangible and intangible resources. By focusing on what
is rather than what ought to be, the present study critically questions the practicability of
collaborative approaches in regard to natural resources and cautions against the eupho-
ria these approaches receive both in development research and international development
cooperation.
1.1 Overview of the Petroleum Sector
Ghana’s petroleum industry dates back to the late 19th century with the ‘West African
Oil and Fuel Company’ drilling the first wells between 1896-1903. Until the late 1990s, an
estimated hundred exploration wells were drilled with no significant discovery.2 Finally
in 2007, the Cape Three Points and Tano Fields, commonly referred to as ‘Jubilee Field’,
became the long-desired game changer. The field is located approximately 65 km offshore
Ghana’s west coast and has estimated reserves of 490 million barrels high quality oil which
put Ghana at par with Cameroon (400 million barrels) but much below Nigeria (43,200
million barrels). Despite the comparably low amount of petroleum, the discovery threw
the country into a “state of ecstasy” (Osei-Tutu 2012: 2) as an interviewee reports:
“[...] politically there were some very strong, powerful statements by the then
President, in the sense of “We are doing so well without oil and now that we found
oil, we are going to fly” [...] And most of our problems were blamed on oil so, as
we found our own oil, people had all sorts of expectations. They thought that with
the oil, all our problems will come to an end” (Interview Transcript V, page 1).
Indeed, then President John Atta Mills explained during his 2008 electoral campaign:
“Oil is money, and we need money to do the schools, the roads, the hospitals. If you
find oil, you manage it well, can you complain about that?” (BBC News 2007). Citizens
immediately took up this euphoria:
“Initially, everyone thought that when the oil comes, the economy will be alright.
And everybody will get money. You wake up in the morning and your pockets are
2 Except for the small Saltpond Fields in 1978 (Annan and Edu-Afful 2015: 7).
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full of money. That is what everyone thought” (Interview Transcript II, page 9).
However, the petroleum sector has, so far, not met these expectations. On the macro
level, symptoms of the Dutch disease3 increase with a growing non-agricultural sector and
the country’s dependence on gold exports, remittances and development assistance. A
ballooning wage bill,4 a total debt stock of 70.90% of the country’s GDP, high inflation,
and a significant depreciation of the local currency have slowed down economic growth.
Since 2012, a serious energy crisis is troubling the country and up to date, an International
Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout credit, equivalent to over $900 million, has failed to boost
the economy. Moreover, the government embarked on a spending spree after the oil
discovery: According to newspaper reports, government officials’ salaries almost doubled
since the beginning of oil production and terminated in Ministers’ monthly salaries over
US $10,000 (Lary 2016; Sarpong 2014).
On the micro level, the petroleum poses serious challenges to communities in the West-
ern Region neighboring to the Jubilee Field. The Western Region is the country’s largest
producer of cocoa, rubber, coconut, palm oil and timber, and often tendered as Ghana’s
‘food basket’. But despite its relevance for the national economy, the region has been
neglected over the years which gives inhabitants the feeling of not being ‘state priority’
(personal conversations).
The deep and rapid changes currently taking place as a consequence of the oil discovery
are also not in favor of the general public: The rush for land along the coast by foreign
investors and rich Ghanaians increased land and housing prices and crowds out the local
population.5 The area along the road between the regional capital Sekondi-Takoradi in
the east and Atuabo in the west (see Map 4.1, page 51) – which was untouched some years
ago or only used for subsistence farming from neighboring villages –, continuously has to
give way to transportation infrastructure, storage halls and housing. These changes cause
a loss of homes and farmlands and deprive local people of their incomes, socio-economic
opportunities and personal networks. An interviewee at the Western Region’s Regional
Planning Coordinating Unit explains:
“With the advent of the oil exploration, there was a perception nationwide about
people coming to the city [Takoradi] to seek for oil-related jobs. And that influx put
3 The Dutch disease is a situation in which the excessive reliance on trade in natural resources leads
to a neglect of other economical sectors (e. g. manufacture or agriculture) and a value increase of
the local currency that renders other sectors in the country uncompetitive (Andrews 2013: 57). The
name traces back to the occurrences in the Netherlands in the 1970s when the booming North Sea gas
exports jacked up the Dutch currency, exposed Dutch manufacturers to higher foreign competition
and raised the unemployment rate tremendously (Le Billon 2001; Watts 2004).
4 The National Patriotic Party (NPP) government (2008–2012) left behind the highest budget deficit
(24.2%) in Ghana’s history. Financing this deficit was the major challenge for the new National
Democratic Congress (NDC) government under John Atta Mills (2009–2012) and John D. Mahama
(2012–2016).
5 In some cases the prices for land increased by 500% (Business Day Ghana 2014).
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pressure on the few resources that maintain the city [...] For the past five years there
has been an increase in search, a rush for offices and residential accommodation, to
the extent that people who were previously in the city centre and who could not
bare the increase in rent, had to move to the periphery, making way for the big time
players in the oil sector” (Interview Transcript IX, page 2).
The influx of Ghanaians from the north, neighboring countries and international expats
changes the social fabric of the region and brings along new challenges such as an increase
in crime rates and prostitution (Norad Evaluation Department 2012). The growing pop-
ulation also challenges the water supply of Sekondi-Takoradi. As nearby water bodies
decreasingly provide fresh water, it is projected that the additional demand for water will
soon outstrip the supply. While international expats and wealthy Ghanaians already have
their own water tanks, this will, again, burden the lives of less affluent Ghanaians.
Due to the high yet unmet expectations, the rapid changes and attached challenges, it
comes as no surprise that the petroleum sector sparks the interest of a diverse set of actors:
government authorities, private investors, donor agencies, traditional authorities, civil
society, media representatives, and, last but not least, citizens themselves. Whereas some
of these actors may hope for easy and fast money, others view the petroleum discovery
as Ghana’s final stepping stone to becoming a middle income country. Still others fear
dangers for the environment, the social peace or Ghana’s democracy overall.
Accordingly, the developing petroleum sector provides actors with diverse starting
points to realize their goal of governing the petroleum industry for the ‘benefit of the
people’ through collaboration. In order to test whether petroleum governance is really
as collaborative as various actors in Ghana’s petroleum governance aim and claim it to
be, this thesis scrutinizes the framework of institutions and policies related to petroleum
governance, actors’ relations among each other and in regard to affected communities, as
well as their collaboration networks. The emphasis on networks originates from the the-
sis’ central argument that in order to understand natural resource governance sufficiently,
the focus needs to lie on the relations between those actors who aim to govern natural
resources, their incentives to engage in exchanges and their different means to collaborate.
1.2 Relevance
Understanding natural resource governance is pivotal as natural resources embark a para-
doxical situation to states all over the world: On the one hand, they can play a crucial role
in alleviating poverty, sparking innovations and promoting socio-economic development
(Boserup 1965; Barbier 2003; Sanginga, Ochola, and Bekalo 2010). On the other hand,
if mismanaged, natural resources can undermine development efforts, fuel conflicts and
deprive people of their own means (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Le Billon 2001; Obi 2009;
Ross 2004; Sachs and Warner 1995; Watts 2004). In this paradoxical situation, institu-
4
1.2 Relevance
tions, policies and actors are argued to play a critical role (Bhattacharyya and Hodler
2010; Ostrom 1990; Lockwood 2010; Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier 2006). For exam-
ple, most literature argues that democratic regimes are more likely to manage natural
resources for the good of the country if compared to autocratic regimes (Cabrales and
Hauk 2007; Ross 2001). A new generation of scholars maintains that beyond the analysis
of institutions, policies and actors, it is necessary to focus on the relations between in-
stitutions, policies and actors (Davies and White 2012; Paletto, Hamunen, and De Meo
2015). They appraise horizontal, multi-actor steering as a means to turn natural resources
into a country’s blessing. This thesis makes an empirical, methodological and conceptual
contribution to this novel approach to natural resource governance.
Empirically, the thesis is relevant for both development researchers and practitioners
as it infuses multi-actor analysis with citizens’ feeling of being represented. It offers the
first attempt of mapping and evaluating actors’ interactions in Ghana’s petroleum sector
beyond a purely institutional analysis by moving the focus from actors to relations, from
unilateral actions and reactions to reciprocal interactions, and from bounded groups to
boundless networks. Moreover, it provides the first systematic insights in how citizens who
are directly affected by the developing petroleum sector evaluate petroleum governance in
general and the performance of state and non-state actors in particular. Due to this focus
on relations, the thesis moves the attention away from the socio-economic and ecological
changes taking play in communities along the coast in the Western Region (Boohene and
Peprah 2011; Eduful and Hooper 2015; Osei-Tutu 2012; Sakyi et al. 2012) and provides
a link between communities’ perceptions and actors’ agendas through the mechanism of
representation. The deriving results hereby challenge the inversion of the argument that
actors who are generally well accepted as representatives in Ghanaian politics are also
legitimized as representatives in petroleum governance (see, for example, Gyampo 2010).
With its mixed-method approach and its aim to use Social Network Analysis (SNA)
in a novel environment like the petroleum sector in Ghana, the study also makes several
methodological contributions. The novel primary network data capture the interactions
of 29 actors in Ghana’s petroleum sector across six variants of collaboration and, hence,
adds to the limited literature of generating, preparing and applying primary social net-
work data. As the collected data set includes both incoming and outgoing network ties,
the thesis is able to show strong deviations in respondents’ answering behaviors during
network interviews. The result that, on average, only 30% of claimed relations are con-
firmed by both sender and addressee of a tie, adds to research that critically questions the
accuracy of SNA studies. Besides the network data, the thesis provides insights into the
political attitudes of communities directly affected by the developing oil and gas sector.
These insights originate from a survey conducted with 333 farmers and landowners who
have been expropriated due to the construction of a gas pipeline in the Western Region.
Due to its random cluster sampling approach, the survey aims to provide a representative
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sample of citizens’ attitudes towards the petroleum sector in the Western Region.
In using arguments put forward by exchange theory, the thesis also adds to the limited
conceptual reasoning behind natural resource governance on the one hand and SNA on the
other hand. While natural resource governance literature uses networks predominantly as
metaphors, SNA research focuses on application and methodical advancement rather than
theory building. Though the conceptual arguments in this thesis are not without their
weaknesses, they are a genuine attempt to conceptually understand potential collaboration
in natural resource governance.
1.3 Synopsis of the Thesis
The thesis makes these contributions based on the following synopsis: Chapter 2, “Fram-
ing Natural Resource Governance”, defines natural resource governance as interactions
between interdependent and power-asymmetric actors who aim to steer natural resources
as well as the institutions and policies that embed these interactions. This definition
highlights both the complexity of governing natural resources and the multi-actor con-
stellations arising from this complexity. Apart from that, the chapter contextualizes
natural resource governance by discussing recent literature and it criticizes scholars’ nor-
mative reasoning about how natural resource governance should look like. Contrary to this
reasoning, the present study aims to abstain from romanticizing about natural resource
governance in conveying a relational perspective. Such a relational approach moves the
focus from actors to relations, from unilateral actions to interactions, and from bounded
groups to boundless networks.
The point of departure of Chapter 3, “Conceptual Approach: Steering Through Ex-
change”, is the argument that both natural resource governance and SNA research over-
whelmingly lack theoretical arguments as to why actors should collaborate in natural
resource governance. In order to fill this gap, the study uses arguments put forward by
exchange theory which maintains that exchanges forge relations, maintain social bonds
and are the core element of collaboration. Based on the rather simplistic mechanism of
exchange, the thesis builds a conceptual framework that structures the empirical analyses
(see Figure 3.1, page 24). Hereby, the framework emphasizes that even though exchanges
are the core element of collaboration, collaborative steering is by no means an automatic
outcome of exchanges. Rather, exchanges are also actors’ means to exploit and contest
each other.
Chapter 4, “Research Design: Case Study, Methods and Triangulation”, discusses the
data collection process. The data were mainly gained by semi-structured interviews, a
survey questionnaire and network interviews during a field research stay in Ghana be-
tween May 2014 and March 2015. The semi-structured interviews are used to support the
interpretation of quantitative data. The survey targets the anticipation of representation
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among those individuals who are directly affected by the petroleum industry. ‘Direct
affectedness’ is hereby defined as having lost lands or crops due to the construction of
a petroleum infrastructure. The investigation of representation is mainly motivated by
the recurrent claim of most petroleum actors to ‘speak with the voice of the people’.
Yet, empirical insights into feelings of representation do, so far, not exist. To investi-
gate the kind and amount of collaboration, the study uses primary social network data
as Social Network Analysis (SNA) is the most suitable research technique to scrutinize
relations and interactions between social entities. To obtain the network data, 29 actors
active in petroleum governance were interviewed with a structured network questionnaire
that includes both relational and attributional network questions. In sum, the chapter
summarizes the rationale behind these different data collection methods, highlights the
challenges in gaining the data and discusses ethical requirements necessary to meet. It
further gives reasons for the strengths of triangulation, that is mixing different methods
of data collection and analysis under the assumption that different methodical strategies
are complementary rather than mutually exclusive.
The empirical analysis starts with Chapter 5, “The Structural Embedding of Petroleum
Governance in Ghana”. It first investigates how previous experiences in the mining sec-
tor shape actors’ interdependencies in the petroleum sector. Subsequently, the chapter
discusses the institutional framework in petroleum governance and gives insights into how
affected communities perceive those actors that are institutionally entitled to play a role
in petroleum governance. Moreover, the chapter examines the policy environment that
embeds actors’ interactions. Together, past experiences, institutions and policies are ar-
gued to enable and constrain actors’ abilities to exchange resources. The diversity of
actors aiming to influence petroleum governance identified in this chapter further reveals
the need to go beyond a purely institutional analysis in order to understand petroleum
governance in Ghana.
Based on this judgement, Chapter 6, “The Network Embedding of Actors in Petroleum
Governance”, focuses on the network structures that embed actors’ relations, actors’
legitimacy to claim to ‘speak with the voice of affected communities’ and the goals the
individual actors pursue with their engagement in the petroleum sector. On the one
hand, the chapter highlights the interconnectivity and density of network structures which
provide the necessary relations to collaboratively steer the sector. On the other hand, the
aspiration to represent or, at least, to acknowledge communities’ interests, is identified
as a core similarity that glues the 29 investigated network actors together. However, the
chapter concludes that actors have, so far, not been able to realize these citizen-related
goals. This failure might explain the gap between communities’ general feelings of being
represented and the feeling of being represented in the oil and gas sector.
Chapter 7, “Resource Exchanges in Petroleum Governance”, scrutinizes the extent of
actors’ collaboration through exchanges. The different networks investigated in this chap-
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ter suggest that collaborative steering is hampered by a divide of civil society in Accra-
based and Western Region-based NGOs, the lack of advice exchanges which could help
to fill knowledge gaps, the lack of reciprocal relations which could foster trust, the lack
of subgroups that would promote efficient collaboration, and low network centralization
which could help to efficiently coordinate joint strategies.
The subsequent Chapter 8, “Network Practices and Exchange Outcomes in Petroleum
Governance” investigates potential causes for the limited amount of exchanges in shape
of dominant network practices and the mismatch of relational and attributional network
data in regard to power and trust. By applying the discussed practices – ‘knocking’, ‘oth-
ering’ and ‘eye services’ –, petroleum actors are argued to perpetuate superficial relating
rather than effective collaborating. Furthermore, the attributional network data suggest
a divergence in actors’ exchanges and actors’ perceptions: For example, actors that are
particularly active in handing out advice to others are not seen as useful partners to con-
sult over oil and gas matters. Equally, high degree centralities across all networks do not
replicate in assignments as influential actor.
The last Chapter 9, “Concluding Remarks”, summarizes the study’s key results, its
limitations and its contribution to current research about Ghana’s petroleum industry.
The chapter further evaluates whether SNA is a useful tool for development research.
Based on these conclusive remarks, the thesis closes with an impetus for future research.
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Development researchers and practitioners increasingly hail natural resource governance
as more inclusive, more participatory, and, hence, as a more effective, successful or sustain-
able6 way to govern natural resource wealth. This appraisal fundamentally rests upon the
assumption that spatially and temporally unbounded phenomena like natural resources
necessitate collaborative governance arrangements among actors beyond the state. Fur-
ther, it is argued that through the inclusion of a diverse set of actors, natural resource
governance is better able to represent the interest of those who are often most directly
affected by natural resources extractions (i. e., nearby communities).
This chapter reviews key publications that support and oppose the thesis’ central ar-
gument that in order to elaborate and understand natural resource governance suffi-
ciently, the focus needs to be on the relations between those actors that aim to govern the
petroleum resources. The first two sections conceptualize and contextualize natural re-
source governance. Thereinafter, the chapter identifies several weaknesses of the concept
before it summarizes how a relational perspective helps to address these critical aspects.
It ends with insights into Social Network Analysis (SNA) as the most suitable methodical
tool-kit to approach the relational perspective on natural resource governance.
2.1 Governing Complex Systems
For centuries, scientists discuss the paradoxical relationship between natural resources
and human beings. Starting with Malthus (1798)7 over Hardin (1968)8 and Karl (1997),9
literature broaches the destructive power of human beings on natural resources. Then
again, scholars observe how resource discoveries curse countries and their citizens. The
landmark study of Sachs and Warner (1995) set the ball rolling for those researchers who
proclaim an inverse relationship between natural resource wealth and socio-economic de-
velopment. Under the broad scope of the so-called ‘resource curse’, different perspectives
6 Natural resource governance is ‘sustainable’ if resources are governed to meet the needs of present
generations without compromising the needs of future generations. This understanding is adopted
from the concept of ‘sustainable development’ as defined by the UN Brundtland Commission in 1987.
7 Malthus (1798) warns against natural depletion due to population growth (‘the principles of popula-
tion’).
8 Building on Malthus’ argument, Hardin (1968) maintains that resource depletion is the self-acting
consequence of a prisoner’s dilemma constellation in which actors play a non-cooperative game under
minimal institutional control (‘tragedy of the commons’).
9 Karl (1997) argues that fiscal reliance on petroleum revenues weakens state institutions and creates
political instability and economic decline (‘paradox of plenty’).
9
2 Framing Natural Resource Governance
evolved. For example, the ‘rentier state’10 literature stipulates two major arguments: that
oil wealth makes states less democratic and that it leads governments to fail in promoting
economic development (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz 2007;
Ross 1999, 2001; Ulfelder 2007; Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke 2009). Other researchers
focus on the struggles over controlling natural resources and on how these struggles led
to devastating conflicts in resource-rich countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia or the
Democratic Republic of Congo. Hereby, they maintain that the unilateral allocation of
resource rents by elites often makes it rational for local actors to resist natural resource
regimes (Auty 1993, 2001; Bannon and Collier 2003; Bates 1981; Collier and Hoeffler
2005; Eguavoen and Laube 2010; Le Billon 2001; Scott 1976).11
In social sciences, one research area focuses on institutions, policies and actors as in-
tervening variables between natural resource wealth and its country-specific appearances.
Here, the aim is to unravel institutions and policy-making bodies, often treated as ‘black
boxes’, through the identification of institutional failures and policy-making weaknesses
(Bhattacharyya and Hodler 2010; Cabrales and Hauk 2007; Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier
2006; Ross 1999, 2001; Tadjoeddin 2007).Yet, Ascher (1999) illustrates how governments
as actors simply waste resources due to failed policies and not because of “[...] greed,
power, stupidity or ignorance [...]” (Ascher 1999: ix) as the ‘resource curse’ literature
stipulates. He argues that instead of failing to plan, institutions often plan to fail: Igno-
rance and weak capacity are the deliberate outcomes of policies that enable governments
to evade criticism.
Despite different foci, all these scholars share the belief that natural resources are
complex to govern. This complexity arises from the “wickedness” of natural resources
(Rittel and Webber 1973). They are wicked in the sense that their management relies on
elusive political judgments which are hardly ‘true’ or ‘false’ but – if anything – ‘better’ or
‘worse’ (see also Mollinga 2010). Based on this complexity, the concept of natural resource
governance emerged as a new concept.
2.1.1 Conceptualizing Natural Resource Governance
According to Gerring (1999: 357-358), the formulation of a concept necessitates a definien-
dum (the event to defined), a definiens (attributes defining the event) and a label (the
term). A ‘good’ concept is, among other things, parsimonious, internally coherent and
externally differentiated.12 A concept is coherent and parsimonious if it defines the core
10 A ‘rentier state’ is characterized by its high dependence on external rents, typically generated from nat-
ural resource exploitation and not from production (labor), investments (interest) or risk management
(profit) (Jensen and Wantchekon 2004: 814).
11 Scott (1976) argues that confrontational forms of ‘class struggle’ are not viable due to the repressive
forces of modern agrarian classes and the states supporting them. Rather, peasants violently attack
the state when it is perceived as disorganized or weak.
12 The other criteria are familiarity (the concept does not clash with established usages), resonance (it
includes a “cognitive click”), depth (it bundles a number of properties), theoretical utility (it aids
10
2.1 Governing Complex Systems
meaning of an event by identifying a limited number of attributes, and it is externally
differentiated if it is bonded to certain phenomena only (and, by that, different from
other concepts). These remarks are considered while conceptualizing natural resource
governance in the following.
Natural resources are here understood as non-artificial products found in nature that
possess value to mankind (Alao 2007). This value is situational, temporal and changes
over time which accelerates the complexity of governing natural resources. Governance
describes collective steering by interdependent and power-asymmetric actors and “[...] en-
compasses the institutions, systems, “rules of the game” and other factors that determine
how political and economic interactions are structured and how decisions are made and
resources allocated” (Grindle 2008: 2). Whereas the concept was used to refer to ‘govern-
ment in process’ in the past, a scholarly and paradigmatic switch enforced the rethinking
towards steering (du Preez 2015: 26).13 Steering is central, “[...] with the basic idea
being that there must be some mechanism for making and implementing collective goals
for society” (Peters 2002: 3).
This processual understanding of governance emphasizes the horizontal interdependen-
cies among actors and, hence, their need to interact in order to govern complex systems.
Moreover, the need to interact is perpetuated by the institutions and policies that char-
acterize a society. Following these two definitions, natural resource governance means
the
interactions between interdependent and power-asymmetric actors that (aim to)
steer natural resources (i. e., non-artificial products found in nature) and deriving
revenues, as well as the institutions and policies that embed these interactions.14
In practical terms, natural resource governance involves the configuration and organi-
zation of natural resource sectors, actors’ communication and decision-making as well as
the institutions and policies that shape actors’ steering (or are a result thereof). It differs
from two neighboring concepts – government and natural resource management: If in
theoretical formulations), and field utility (it enhances the utility of neighboring concepts, Gerring
1999: 367-384).
13 The concept of ‘governance’ is contested as it became a panacea for explaining outstanding social and
political development in various developing countries. This is particularly the case in regard to the
concept of ‘good governance’ which “[...] has far outpaced its capacity to deliver” (Grindle 2008: 1).
Kofi Annan, while serving as UN Secretary General, called good governance the single most important
factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development. Yet, many scholars argue that the term
has become an empty shell, an additive rather than analytical concept, due to its infinite number
of ‘defining’ variables (Grindle 2004). For further reading see Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009),
Chibba (2009), Grindle (2004, 2007, 2008), and du Preez (2015).
14 This definition is in line with the understanding of Bodin and Crona (2009), two of the currently
most influential researchers in the field, who understand natural resource governance as “[...] the
management of natural resources, as well as the structures and processes that provide the social
and institutional environment in which the management can take place” (Bodin and Crona 2009:
366). Others refer to natural resource governance as ‘co-management’ or extend it to ‘adaptive co-
management’ (Armitage 2009; Carlsson and Berkes 2005).
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government one designated actor (the state and its different representatives) is at play,
in governance a multitude of actors tackles problems with the authority to do so (Hall
and Biersteker 2002). This authority originates from legal entitlement, public commis-
sion (representation) or de facto influence (e.g., through historical heritage or (ascribed)
power). Contrary to the vertical view as in government, governance therefore pressurizes
a horizontal and less institutionalized view of power distribution, rule-making and reso-
lution finding (Bodin et al. 2011: 6; Lockwood 2010: 987-989).15 It hereby highlights the
“[...] continuous problem-solving process, rather than a fixed state, involving extensive
deliberation, negotiation and joint learning within problem-solving networks” (Carlsson
and Berkes 2005: 65).
Natural resource governance also differs from natural resource management. Some
scholars argue that natural resource management is broader than natural resource gover-
nance as it includes the biophysical perspective on natural resources (Bodin et al. 2011;
Davies and White 2012). Other authors use the concept of natural resource management
to describe specific actions related to natural resources, such as agricultural experiments
to increase crop yield. Contrary to this, governance is conceptualized to cover the insti-
tutions which embed such management actions (Crona 2011: 45).
The concept of natural resource governance as it is understood here opposes constructs
of ‘network governance of natural resources’. According to researchers such as Christopou-
los (2008) and Grant et al. (2015), network governance of natural resources is a product
of actors’ relations. Yet, the very idea of natural resource governance is about and only
starts with steering through interacting. Methodologically, involved actors can be under-
stood as a network but as a concept, ‘network governance’, to the present understanding,
does not carry additional benefit. Rather, the thesis understands ‘network governance’
as part of the ‘binary metaphorical approach’ in which “[...] networks are often treated
as a metaphor [...] [and] as a quite unspecified binary variable; either there is a network
or not, and the internal structural characteristics of these networks [...] are not explicitly
addressed” (Bodin et al. 2011: 17). The fallacy of networks as metaphors particularly
dominates African studies where networks are currently rarely mapped or even modelled
(Walther 2015: 2). This gap motivates the thesis’ approach to map and investigate dif-
ferent networks among those actors that aim to steer resources and revenues in Ghana’s
developing petroleum sector.
15 Hereby, the demand for controllability through governance instruments occurs on all five stages of
the value chain in natural resource extraction: Award of contracts and licenses, regulation and mon-
itoring of operations, collection of taxes and royalties, revenue management and allocation, and the
implementation of sustainable development policies (Alba 2009). The present thesis tackles patterns
of interactions – and problems within these interactions – on the last two stages of this value chain.
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2.1.2 Contextualizing Natural Resource Governance
Most scholars praise natural resource governance as having several advantages over hi-
erarchical management: It is said to better identify challenges and appropriate ways to
invest resource rents due to the inclusion of divergent actors and their respective knowl-
edge; reduce conflict among stakeholders;16 build social capital;17 decrease environmental
hazards and make benefits more inclusive for society as a whole (Innes 1996; Bernard and
Young 1997; Brick, Snow, and Bates 2000; Weber 2000; Bodin and Crona 2008; Davies
and White 2012). Hence, governance as horizontal steering is a normative term that is
argued to exceed vertical steering.
Supporters of horizontal steering implemented the idea across countries and resource
sectors, for example among the Menominee Indians in Wisconsin (Bernard and Young
1997), in sustainable park management in the UK (Prell, Hubacek, and Reed 2009) or
Vietnam (Polet 2003), in wetland management in Tanzania (Mahonge 2010), coastal
management in postwar Sri Lanka (Siriwardane 2015) or in fisheries co-management in
South Africa and Ghana (Hauck and Sowman 2003). Hauck (2010) investigates the re-
silience of the ‘rural poor’ against environmental disturbances in the Upper East Region of
Ghana by scrutinizing the potentials of collaborative fisheries in small reservoirs. Therein,
she emphasizes that the horizontal exchange of information and knowledge about fishing
methods and trainings flows easily across ethnic and communal borders, even between
conflictual ethnicities (Hauck 2010: 195). However, the free spread of knowledge does
not extend to technologies externally introduced to the communities such as the use of
hapas.18 Additionally, she looks beyond SNA results in the case of trust and social cap-
ital. Although her network analysis reveals strong support networks among fishermen,
deep distrust nevertheless characterizes the communities. She suggests that in order to
identify causes for this mistrust, it is necessary to look beyond networks and focus on the
roles and characteristics of actors as well as their past experiences (Hauck 2010: 196).
Among the various proclaimed benefits, this thesis ties up four distinct features: the
acknowledgement of complexities in natural resource, the concept’s pliant fit to decentral-
ization literature, the sensitization for redistributive justice questions, and its topicality
in international development cooperation. Firstly, natural resource governance acknowl-
edges the complexity and contestation in the context of natural resources. Complexity and
contestation arise from the multiple problems attached to natural resources, the divergent
16 The term ‘stakeholder’ originates from business research and describes “[...] any group or individual
who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (Freeman 1984:
46). Applied to petroleum governance, stakeholders are those actors that affect or are affected by
problems, rule-settings or policy-implementations within the context of petroleum resources. The
term is synonymously used for ‘actors’.
17 In principle, ‘social capital’ are resources arising from social relations. See Section 3.1 for further
details.
18 ‘Hapas’ are net enclosure in which broodfish are kept to protect them from older fishes and to monitor
their sprawling.
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perspectives on how to solve these problems, different strategies to implement solutions
to these problem, the need for institutional arrangements to coordinate these strategies
across spatial and jurisdictional domains, and divergent views on how to invest resulting
revenues (Lockwood 2010: 986-989). The concept further stresses the intertwined char-
acter of collective action problems (e.g., non-excludability and free-riding but also the
reduction of transaction costs) and the need to tackle these problems by multi-layered
solutions (Olson 1975). Governance, hence, can provide the arena for collaboration that
is necessary for conflict resolution (Prell 2012: 32).
The concept is secondly fruitful as it inherently connects to discussions about decentral-
ization which became a major topic in development research and, thereinafter, in natural
resource governance literature.19 Decentralization is the transfer of (decision-making)
power from a higher to a lower level.20 As centralized, top-down approaches are often
perceived to have failed in governing natural resources (Berkes and Folke 1998; Holling
and Meffe 1996; Ostrom 1990; Pretty and Ward 2001), proponents of decentralized policies
argue that decentralization improves resource allocation, accountability, transparency, ef-
ficiency and sustainability in natural resource sectors (Andersson, Gibson, and Lehoucq
2004; Hobley 1996; Larson and Soto 2008). Therein, two strands of literature dominate:
The first strand of literature argues that decentralizing natural resource policies con-
tributes to poverty alleviation, development, ‘good governance’, and, hence, favorable
changes on society level (Andersson, Gibson, and Lehoucq 2004; Larson and Soto 2008;
Hirons 2013). Scholz and Wang (2006: 92) even argue that local governance can be more
important for rule enforcement and compliance within natural resource governance than
central institutions if local structures complement state regulations and “[...] enhanc[e]
bureaucratic outputs and compliance outcomes [...] that otherwise tend to undermine
enforcement efforts”. The second strand of literature maintains that decentralization pro-
motes the inclusion of local rights and knowledge, and is better able to mobilize citizens
(Agrawal and Ostrom 2001; Blaikie 2006; Toulmin 2009). Natural resource governance
and decentralization, hence, intersect at the conviction that disseminating (decision-
making) power and promoting horizontal rather than vertical steering benefits society
overall.
19 This literature strand particularly evolves around forestry. As Larson and Soto (2008: 231) argue
“[h]igh-value nonrenewable subsoil resources, such as important minerals and petroleum, are almost
always centrally owned and managed and are rarely even considered for decentralization, although
local communities may receive compensation for exploration or exploitation on their lands”. Never-
theless, this thesis aims to provide complete insights to current discussions around natural resource
governance and, thus, cannot ignore decentralization.
20 Decentralization may take different forms: ‘Deconcentration’ transfers responsibilities to local entities
to implement directives of the central authority while the latter still has the decision-making power.
Contrary to this, the central authority legally confers some power to lower entities in ‘devolution’
systems. Finally, ‘delegation’ fully enables sub-national authorities to independent decision-making
(Ahwoi 2010b; To¨temeyer 2010 ). In Ghana, local governance is largely deconcentrated but also knows
elements of deconcentration and devolution. See Section 5.2.1 for more information.
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Related to decentralization, proponents of collaborative governance approaches thirdly
argue that multi-actor interactions are better able to solve struggles over material re-
distribution and social justice (Hickey and Mohan 2005; Larson and Soto 2008). In the
context of natural resources, material redistribution and social justice is disputed in all
domains, for example regarding communities in close proximity to resource extraction,
local vs. national government agencies or resource-rich vs. resource-poor regions. While
for example, the Government of Ghana perceives the petroleum resources as national
wealth and consequently invests petroleum revenues into projects across the country, tra-
ditional authorities in the Western Region perceive it as a local wealth of their region and,
thus, strive for exclusive regional benefits. The redistributive and social tensions arising
from these different perspectives and strategies need to be solved based on interactions
and, potentially, collaborative steering among conflicting parties.21 In consequence, it is
necessary to scrutinize how petroleum actors in Ghana appropriate struggles of material
redistribution and social justice together or in opposition to each other (see Chapter 6
and 7).
Finally, natural resource governance is a fruitful concept for investigation as develop-
ment practitioners increasingly implement its logic in the framework of so-called ‘multi-
stakeholder platforms’. Such initiatives bring together representatives of different sectors
(government, civil society, private companies, media etc.) to broaden discussions, to
gather and disseminate knowledge and information, or to overcome stalemates between
conflicting parties (Chibba 2009; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009; Sreide and Truex
2013; Warner 2005, 2007).22 Yet, even though multi-actor platforms are increasingly
viewed as panacea against the resource curse in development discourses (both in research
and practice), this appraisal is largely done without first understanding the internal mech-
anisms and potential drawbacks. This concerns, for example, questions of legitimate
representation, power asymmetries, lack of transparency, and the danger of discharging
governments or companies from their responsibilities. These fallacies are mostly ignored
in a literature that is highly normative and tends to argue what ought to be rather than
what is. This argument, together with the unchallenged questioning of legitimate rep-
resentation and power, suggest that natural resource governance as a concept requires a
critical evaluation. This is what the next section will explore.
21 This is more a problem in offshore petroleum extraction which affects communities only indirectly and
raises distributional tensions concerning the question who is ‘the most affected’ (Thorp 2012: 8).
22 One of the most prominent multi-actor initiatives is the Kimberley Process to make diamonds and other
minerals conflict-free. Since recently, the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
(OECD) and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) plan
to realize the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with the help of multi-actor platforms.
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2.1.3 Criticizing Natural Resource Governance
The first critical remark – out of four – concerns the lack of debate and, henceforth,
definition of ‘successful’ natural resource governance. The majority of researchers and
practitioners rather focuses on favorable variables assumed to benefit ‘successful’ resource
governance. For example, Lockwood (2010: 991-997) itemizes eight dimensions as a
“guidance” for natural resource governance: Legitimacy, transparency, accountability, in-
clusiveness, fairness, integration, capability, and adaptability.23 Though these dimensions
might be the means to achieve successful resource governance, I argue that they do not
define its success per se. Admittedly, successful natural resource governance is hard to
define because of its complexity, wickedness and context-dependency. From a develop-
mental24 perspective, the present thesis suggests to consider natural resource governance
as ‘successful’ if interactions between the interdependent and power-asymmetric actors
who aim to (collectively) steer natural resources prevent the overexploitation of natural
resources, the waste of deriving revenues, and contribute to the socio-economic develop-
ment of the country. Moreover, the success hinges on meeting the objectives set by the
respective country.
Secondly, scholars and practitioners tend to overlook potential vagaries and to romanti-
cize governance as automatically better than centralized management. Conley and Moote
(2003: 382) get to the heart of this over-optimism by stating that they are “[...] unnerved
by the ways in which these processes [collaborative approaches] have been portrayed as
a cure-all”. Indeed, only few authors – and no actor in Ghana’s petroleum sector in-
terviewed for this thesis – discuss the several weaknesses inherent to natural resource
governance: the normative foundation, the erosion of democratic processes, the entrench-
ment of local power elites, the potential necessity of government rather than governance to
solve question of material redistribution and social justice, or the inducement of irrecon-
cilable values which may fuel conflicts instead of preventing or solving them (Andersson,
Gibson, and Lehoucq 2004; Coggins 1999; Davies and White 2012; McClosky 1999; Lock-
wood 2010). For example, based on their study of environmental politics in the Brazilian
Amazon, Brown and Purcell (2005) argue that literature and practice of natural resource
governance provide a “[...] “local trap” that leads researchers to assume that the key to
environmental sustainability, social justice, and democracy [...] is devolution of power to
local-scale actors and organizations” (Brown and Purcell 2005: 608). Lacking the hierar-
chical structure of government instruments and, in democratic regimes, a public mandate
for non-state actors, horizontal steering faces challenges of legitimacy, transparency and
23 These dimensions are replicated in other facets of the governance concept such as good governance,
see for example Grindle (2007, 2008).
24 ‘Development’ provides an ideological frame to describe and explain economic, social and cultural
differences on a global scale since World War II (Yarrow 2011: 3). On an abstract level it can be
understood as “[...] a bundle of interconnected and normatively positive processes which took place
in some parts of the earth but not in others” (Ziai 2012: 4).
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accountability (Carlsson and Berkes 2005; Larson and Soto 2008) and might, thus, miss
the outcomes it is imagined to bring in the first place.
Thirdly, Hickey and Mohan (2005) and Larson and Soto (2008: 231) confirm the “largely
disappointing” results of decentralizing natural resource policies, arguing that decentral-
ization barely leads to a greater participation of and social justice for marginalized groups.
They conclude that the transfer of power has little meaning and promotes confusion rather
than inclusion.25 Power differences are particularly critical as the concept’s supporters
often naively overestimate the ability of all stakeholders to effectively participate in the
steering (Eguavoen and Laube 2010: 6). While some actors are designed to participate
in resource governance by law, others seek influence independently and, hence, it severely
hinges on the agencies of actors whether or not they can steer resource governance. Stan-
dard literature about natural resource governance largely ignores all these factors. The
inherent problem is that academic and practical discussions mostly focus on arguing why
natural resource governance is preferable but do not scrutinize if and how it is imple-
mented (see, for example, Appiah-Adu 2013).
Finally, the present study argues that studies on natural resource governance often lack
the appropriate conceptual framework and research design. This criticism relates back
to the dominance of using networks as metaphors or heuristic devices rather than a me-
thodical tool-kit. If the concept’s core idea is joint steering by interdependent and power-
imbalanced actors through interaction, using theories and methods capable of scrutinizing
these interactions is pivotal. However, the primacy in natural resource governance still
lies with actors rather than relations and, subsequently, with actor-centered approaches
rather than relational approaches. Without neglecting the importance of such research,26
if we seek to study the core idea of natural resource governance (i. e., collective steering),
we need to rethink our conceptual approaches and methodical procedures. A relational
perspective on natural resource governance comprises theoretical arguments as to why ac-
tors should (not) interact and methodological arguments as to how they do (not) interact.
2.2 The Relational Perspective on Natural Resource Governance
The relational perspective on natural resource governance evolves naturally from the defi-
nition of natural resource governance as the attempt to collectively steer natural resources.
It is argued that different actors have an interest in collaboration as they possess differ-
ent resources and, hence, depend on each other: For example, research maintains that
state authorities have legal decision-making power, private companies economic capital,
25 Collaborative approaches are also said to terminate in the lowest common denominator solution rather
than in the most appropriate one (Coglianese 1999). In other cases, they might involve a trade-off, for
example between environmental sustainability on the one hand and households’ empowerment and
income generation on the other (Larson and Soto 2008).
26 In its broader conceptualization, the thesis’ conceptual argument is located in actor-centered institu-
tionalism (Scharpf 1997) as well.
17
2 Framing Natural Resource Governance
traditional authorities cultural capital,27 and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
popular legitimacy through representation. Moreover, actors’ necessity to relate arises
from the ‘wickedness’ of natural resources and the fact that “[...] dealing with wicked
problems is – to a large extent – a problem of interaction” (Van Bueren, Klijn, and Kop-
penjan 2003: 193). In fact, many of the goals actors pursue with their engagement in
natural resource governance may only be achieved through collaboration (Ostrom 1990).
2.2.1 Rethinking Natural Resource Governance
The focus on “problem[s] of interaction” (Van Bueren, Klijn, and Koppenjan 2003: 193)
advances the concept of natural resource governance in three ways: On the one hand, the
relational perspective goes beyond the static or atomistic understanding of human life
and acknowledges the boundless nature of human interactions across individuals, groups
and places (Desmond 2014: 551). It helps to focus on actors’ interdependencies and
inequalities rather than the actors themselves.
On the other hand, the dominating substantialism in natural resource governance which
concentrates on “[...] internally homogeneous and externally distinctive and bounded ob-
jects” (Wolf 1982: 6) often only presumes the existence of groups instead of acknowledging
networks which cross ‘group’ boundaries (Desmond 2014: 551). As this work will show, the
social construction of groups fails to adequately describe actors’ interactions in Ghana’s
petroleum sector. For example, NGOs do interact with the public and private sector as
much as they interact within ‘their’ civil society ‘group’. The relational perspective on
natural resource governance forces researchers to focus on relations between actors and
groups and concerns the habits and interactions across group boundaries (Castells 2010;
Wellman 1997).28
The relational perspective thirdly offers the framework to move beyond a purely institu-
tional analysis of actors and their roles in natural resource governance. While examining
the institutional setting in natural resource governance is necessary to understand the
structural embedding of actors’ relations, it is insufficient to understand what is really
going on in natural resource governance Consequently, this thesis argues that in order
27 The designation ‘traditional authorities’, in this thesis, refers to all those forms of social and political
authorities that have their historical origin in the pre-colonial society and that were incorporated by
the British colonialists into what is today Ghana. It includes chiefs, queen mothers, and tindaana
(‘land priests’). The Constitution defines chiefs as “[...] a person, who, hailing from the appropriate
family and lineage, has been validly nominated, elected, or selected and [...] installed as a chief or
queen mother in accordance with the relevant customary law and usage” (Art. 277). Queen mothers’
main function is to select a new chief after his / her predecessor has died or has been en-stooled.
Rivalries between the ‘legitimate’ successor for a vacant stool are recurring: For example, the stool of
the Sekondi Traditional Area is vacant since 2003 (see Interview Transcript II, page 4). For further
information on this case see Pichillo (2008).
28 Radcliffe-Brown (1940) made this argument regarding ‘culture’ and ‘class’: “We do not observe a
“culture”, since that word denotes not any concrete reality, but an abstraction, and as it is commonly
used as a vague abstraction. But direct observation does reveal to us that these human beings are
connected by a complex network of social relations” (Radcliffe-Brown 1940: 2, emphasis in original).
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to understand natural resource governance, it is necessary to move the focus from ac-
tors to relations, from actions and re-actions to interactions and from bounded groups to
boundless networks.
2.2.2 Social Network Analysis as a Tool in Development Research
Methodically, this study maintains that the relational perspective on natural resource
governance is best approached by Social Network Analysis (SNA). SNA traces back to
the 1940s when attention shifted from concepts of social structure and relatively static
cultural patterns to concepts of social organization, adaptation and adaptability (Whitten
Jr. and Wolfe 1973: 717). The psychiatrists Jacob Moreno is said to be the first to draw
what he called a ‘sociogram’ (among babies in a nursery) in the 1930s, giving birth
to graph theory. In parallel, anthropologists promoted the importance of relations and
reciprocity in kinship studies (Barnes 1954; Firth 1951; Fortes 1949; Le´vi-Strauss 1969;
Radcliffe-Brown 1952). John A. Barnes is esteemed as the godfather of the network term:
Each person is [...] in touch with a number of other people, some of whom are
directly in touch with each other and some of whom are not [...] I find it convenient
to talk of a social field of this kind as a network. The image I have is of a set of
points some of which are joined by lines. The points [...] are people, or sometimes
groups, and the lines indicate which people interact with each other [...] A network
of this kind has no external boundary, nor has it any clear-cut internal divisions.”
(Barnes 1954: 43-44, emphasis in original).
Barnes (1954) identifies the core characteristics of networks: individual or collective ac-
tors (“groups”) as “points” (nodes) connected by “lines” (ties). With this understanding,
he inspired the so-called “Manchester School” around Mitchell (1974) and Wellman (1997)
who used the network toolkit to object against structural functionalism (Parsons 1968).
They argue that social institutions derive from interpersonal relations and not from in-
dividually internalized values. Simultaneously, sociologists coined the field by developing
the most important concepts in SNA: homophily (Blau 1977),29 structural holes (Burt
1992, 2004, 2005),30 structural equivalence (White 1970; White, Boorman, and Breiger
29 ‘Homophily’ describes the tendency of similar actors to connect with each other.
30 ‘Structural holes’ denote a gap in a network that would, if present, create a bridge between two or
more unconnected alters. The structural hole argument builds upon Granovetter’s (1973) concept
of the ‘strength of weak ties’, Freeman’s (1979) ‘betweenness centrality’ and Cook’s and Emersons’
(1978) ‘benefits of exclusive exchange partners’. Simmel (1908) termed this effect as ‘tertius gaudens’,
the third who benefits.
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1976),31 and small worlds (Watts 1999, 2003).32 Diffusion33 is another “master idea”
(Kadushin 2012: 209) of social networks,particularly in combination with Granovetter’s
(1973) concept of the strength of weak ties. Granovetter (1973) argues that weak ties,
i. e., relations to acquaintances, are strong as they have a higher probability to provide
new and non-redundant information.Moreover, sociologists interlink the study of social
relations with ideas of trust (Cheshire, Gerbasi, and Cook 2010; Molm, Takahashi, and
Peterson 2000; Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007), social inequality (DiMaggio and Garip
2012), social capital (Lin 1999; Burt 2005; Putnam 2000), and social action (Coleman
1990).
Metaphorically (and partly theoretically), political scientists promote the idea of policy
networks since the 1970s as a decentralized concept of social organization on which actors
rely to reduce the costs of establishing new or maintaining existing social contacts (Knoke
1990, 2011; Leifeld and Schneider 2012).34 Taking the network perspective, political
scientists aim to explain and predict collective policy decisions, to explore how networks
form, persist, and change over time, and to include complex and ‘informal’ relationships
beyond the analysis of ‘formal’ institutional arrangements (Kenis and Schneider 1991;
Knoke 1990).35
Most importantly for this work, the intersection between natural resource governance
and social network analysis has drawn increasing scholarly attention since Tompkins and
Adger (2004) argued that networks can build community resilience and increase the adap-
tive capacity for environmental change. Subsequently, other scholars established links be-
tween chances and challenges of governing natural resources and social network structures
(Prell, Hubacek, and Reed 2007, 2009; Bodin and Crona 2008, 2009; Bodin et al. 2011;
Crona and Hubacek 2010; Crona 2011; Ramirez-Sanchez and Pinkerton 2009).
For example, Bodin and Crona (2009) show how networks’ reachability and density af-
fects actors’ ability to collaborate. In a study about fishermen’s information-sharing net-
works in Mexico, Ramirez-Sanchez and Pinkerton (2009) conclude that fishermen share
information following a ‘friendship - kinship - acquaintance’ order of importance. Here-
with, they contradict social capital literature which generally assumes that actors have
a preference order of ‘kinship (bonding capital) - friendship (bridging capital) - acquain-
31 Actors are ‘structurally equivalent’ if they have exactly the same ties to the same alters. Such network
actors occupy similar network positions and roles (Lorrain and White 1971).
32 ‘Small worlds’ describe the phenomenon that heterogenous actors are connected through a small
number of intermediaries. An early experiment using chain letters to reach a designated target person
found the famous ‘six degrees of separation’ (Milgram 1967).
33 ‘Diffusion’ is a process in which strategies or policies are interdependent whereas ‘convergence’ is
the outcome of increased similarities in strategies or policies. Diffusion can cause convergence but
convergence can also be induced by other processes (Fink 2013: 630).
34 ‘Policy networks’ are “[...] integrated hybrid structures of political governance. Their integrative
logic cannot be reduced to any single logic such as bureaucracy, market, community or corporatist
association, but is characterized by the capacity for mixing different combinations of them” (Kenis
and Schneider 1991: 42, emphasis in original).
35 The artificial dichotomy between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ institutions is discussed in Section 3.2.
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tances (linking capital)’. Other studies caution against low network cohesion, i. e., the
existence of many subgroups,36 which tends to undermine joint actions to govern resources
(Oh, Chung, and Labianca 2004).
Yet, so far, the emphasis at this intersection still lies with application rather than
theory building and with treating collaboration as a binary variable rather than a multi-
dimensional phenomenon. As the overall aim of this thesis is to better understand how
actors’ interactions contribute to collaboration in natural resource governance, it is im-
portant to discuss theoretical reasons for potential collaboration in natural resource gov-
ernance. This is the aim of the next chapter.
2.3 Summary
Governance is a complex process and some may argue that because of the ‘wickedness’ in-
herent to natural resources, natural resource governance is a even more complex process.
It is defined as interactions between interdependent and power-asymmetric actors who
(aim to) steer natural resources and derive revenues (collectively) as well as the institu-
tions and policies that embed these interactions. With this definition, the thesis touches
on four recent streams in natural resources governance literature: complexity, decentral-
ization, redistributive justice, and multi-actor constellations. The definition deliberately
excludes normative concepts to evade the danger of romanticizing natural resource gov-
ernance as cure-all. The given definition forms the basis of the relational perspective on
natural resource governance which focusses on relations rather than actors, on interactions
rather than unilateral actions and on boundless networks rather than bounded groups.
Naturally, such a clear focus goes at the expense of illuminating other phenomena, for
example in-depth insights into institutions. The most suitable methodical tool to apply
this thinking is Social Network Analysis (SNA) which roots in an interdisciplinary com-
bination from anthropology, sociology, psychology and, increasingly, political science and
political ecology. All this provides the background to understand how actors’ interactions
affect outcomes in petroleum governance in Ghana and, therefore, the central aim of this
thesis.
36 A ‘subgroup’ exists if there are significantly more ties between group members than relations with
non-group members (Wasserman and Faust 1994).
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The central argument of this thesis is that in order to understand natural resources gover-
nance, the central unit of analysis has to be the relations between those actors who (aim
to collectively) steer natural resources. Precisely, to understand petroleum governance
in Ghana as the dependent phenomenon, this study focuses on exchanges among actors
who aim to influence processes and decisions in Ghana’s petroleum sector. As structural
characteristics constrain and enable actors’ agency to exchange, the research also takes
into consideration the institutions and policies which embed actors’ relations.
Based on exchange theory, I argue that exchanges are the core of collaboration. In
the tradition of Blau (1964, 1986) and Molm (1997a) (see also Molm and Cook 1995;
Molm, Takahashi, and Peterson 2000), the conceptual approach understands exchange as
a voluntary social action that is contingent on rewarding reactions from others. These re-
warding reactions are the provision of resources. In this research, such resources comprise
economic capital (financial resources), human capital (an actors’ capabilities or talents),
social capital (resources provided through social relations), and legitimacy through the
order to represent others in exchanges. Successful exchanges are assumed to benefit col-
laboration. However, as actors can also use their economic, human and social capital or
their legitimacy to exploit each other, collaboration is by no means an automatic outcome
of exchanges. Rather, contestation is equally likely.
Exchange theory has its interdisciplinary roots in sociology (Homans 1961; Blau 1964,
1986; Emerson 1962, 1972a,b; Molm and Cook 1995; Molm 1997a; Molm, Takahashi, and
Peterson 2000), behavioral psychology (Thibaut and Kelley 1959; Kelley and Thibaut
1978), anthropology (Malinowski 2013 (1922; Mauss 1966; Le´vi-Strauss 1969; Sahlins
1972), and rational-choice theory (Coleman 1990; Bienenstock and Bonacich 1993; Diek-
mann et al. 2014).37 It taps the cornerstone of societies, i. e., that actors need others to
achieve valued outcomes. Its key goal is to understand how relations develop and change,
how these relations create social structures and in which ways these social structures en-
able and restrict actors’ agency (Cook and Rice 2003: 53; Molm and Cook 1995: 209).
The strength of exchange theory is not only this simplicity but also its ability to shed
light on how the simple mechanism of exchange is “[...] forging relationships, maintain-
ing social bonds, creating obligations and debt, gaining status and social position, and
obtaining resources needed [...]” (Hill 2012).
37 For a thorough review of exchange theory’s historical evolution and recent trends see Cook and Rice
(2001, 2003).
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Figure 3.1 visualizes the conceptual approach which structures the subsequent theoret-
ical discussion and the empirical analysis of petroleum governance in Ghana.
Figure 3.1: Conceptual Approach: Natural Resource Governance
Given Environment 
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Accordingly, this chapter begins with the argument that complex inequalities and in-
terdependencies – resulting from social contact and the unequal accumulation of capital
in the past – necessitate interactions (Section 3.1). It continues with discussing how in-
stitutions and policies embed actors’ networks and, by that, structure their interactions
(Section 3.2).38 Section 3.3.1 then takes a closer look at actors in exchange while Section
3.3.2 scrutinizes different forms of interactions (economic exchanges, social exchanges and
practices). In Section 3.3.3, power and trust as two important relational constellations
assumed to result from exchanges are discussed. As exchange theory argues that the
opportunity to exchange depends both on actors’ positions within a network and the net-
work’s overall shape, Section 3.3.4 elaborates potential effects of network characteristics
on collective steering. The last two parts discuss these conceptual considerations in regard
to unilateral, collaborative or contentious steering (Section 3.4), elaborate limitations of
the conceptual approach and summarize potential implications for the petroleum sector
38 It stands to reason that in their interactions, actors do also influence institutions and policies. Yet,
this thesis focuses on the structural embedding of actors’ social conduct and, consequently, the figure
includes one-directional arrows only.
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in Ghana (Section 3.5).
Overall, the present chapter aims to fulfill three goals: (1) To conceptually explain the
need for and the different kinds of actors’ interactions in natural resource governance,
(2) to provide a theoretical contribution to the study of networks and (3) to guide the
subsequent empirical analysis of petroleum governance in Ghana.
3.1 The Need for Exchange: Inequalities and Interdependencies
As Figure 3.1 indicates, the conceptual approach builds on the assumption that actors’
inequalities and interdependencies necessitate interactions. These two factors originate
from past social contact and the resulting unequal distributions of capital (i. e., actors’
resources)39 among actors. Bourdieu (1997: 46) defines capital as accumulated labor
(materialized or embodied) that enables actors to accrete this labor if it is appropriated
on an exclusive basis. It is both an inherent force (vis insita) and an immanent principle
(lex insita) underlying the social world. Capital is, once accumulated, to a certain degree
self-pertaining, heritable and is, thus, the sharp opposite of “[...] this imaginary universe
of perfect competition or perfect equality of opportunity” (Bourdieu 1997: 46).
All forms of capital are productive, that is, they enable actors to achieve certain ends
or, if absent, deny this achievement (Coleman 1988: 98): Economic capital are finan-
cial resources whereas cultural capital describes all forms of cultural competences and
know-how.40 Human capital is commonly defined as an actor’s capabilities or talents
while social capital contains the actual or potential resources provided by social relations
(Bourdieu 1997: 51). As the “Wild West” in academia (Burt 2005: 5), an infinite number
of scholars have defined and discussed social capital (see, for example, Coleman 1988;
Fukuyama 1996; Hardin 1999; Lin 2004; Putnam 2000). Burt (2005) gives a simple and
clear definition:
“The human capital explanation of the inequality is that people who do better [...]
are more intelligent, more attractive, more articulate, more skilled. Social capital
is the contextual complement to human capital in explaining [...] how people do
better because they are somehow better connected with other people [...] One’s
position in the structure of these exchanges can be an asset in its own right. That
asset is social capital” (Burt 2005: 4).
However, scholars tend to ignore potential downsides of social capital (Browning 2009).
For Portes’ (1998: 15) this is a result of “[...] our sociological bias to see good things
39 In this thesis, the term ‘resources’ is used as a collective for all capabilities an actor possibly possesses.
These capabilities enclose the different forms of capitals as well as legitimacy through representation.
See Section 3.3.2 for further details.
40 These are, in Bourdieu’s (1997: 47-51) thinking, cognitive competences (embodied cultural capital),
transferrable assets (objectified cultural capital) and the objectification of these competences and
know-how (institutionalized cultural capital).
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emerging from sociability; bad things are more commonly associated with the behavior
of homo economicus”. Potential negative consequences can range from the exclusion of
outsiders to the enforcement of certain “do’s and dont’s” which imply restrictions on
personal freedoms (Portes 1998: 15-18). In the present case, negative impacts on natural
resource governance could emerge from social capital if, for example, interactions between
state authorities and private companies systematically rule out civil society actors or the
interests of communities.
Applied to natural resource governance, it is argued that actors attained different kinds
and amounts of capital through past social contact making them interdependent (though
not equally important) for governing natural resources. For example, private investors
are likely to possess large amounts of economic capital and human capital (in the form of
knowledge about managing natural resources) but may lack the local knowledge necessary
to find suitable staff, gain support for their policies or attain trust within the resource-
rich country. Contrary to this, local NGOs may possess exactly this kind of cultural and
social capital while lacking sufficient economic resources. The assumption then holds that
all actors are aware of their respective talents, weaknesses and mutual dependencies and,
thus, are aware of the necessity to engage with each other or the possibility to exploit
each other.41
3.2 The Structural Embedding of Exchange: Institutions and Policies
While inequalities and interdependencies are assumed to perpetuate actors’ need for ex-
change, the institutional framework and/or the policy environment may even force actors
to interact: the second step of the conceptual approach suggests that structures – pro-
vided by institutions and policies – constrain, enable and, sometimes, even demand actors
to interact. In parallel, actors’ ability to pursue exchanges, withdraw rewards, punish ex-
change partners, or refuse exchanges overall (i. e., their agency), provides them with the
possibility to set and pursue different agendas within this structural embedding.
Various scholars have appropriated the structure-agency-debate but for this thesis only
the assumption that structure and agency are interdependent and reinforce each other
is crucial (Giddens 1989).42 While structure can ‘act back’ on actors, they themselves
can change the more or less stable configuration of institutions, policies and resulting
relations through their agency (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Lawler and Yoon 1996,
1998; Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2000; Uzzi 1996).
41 Legitimacy through representation is another resource that actors possess in exchange. Yet, it is
discussed as a mechanism in Section 3.3.1 as indicated by the conceptual framework in Figure 3.1.
42 Blau (1975) differs two major strands in social science: To perceive social structure as a fundamental
underlying everyday life or as a multidimensional space of different social positions in a collectivity
(see also Cook and Whitmeyer (1992) and King (2010)). Prominently, Giddens’ (1989) structuration
theory argues that structures and agency are not separate entities but exist in an imperceptible,
coexisting and mutually reinforcing duality which conflate in ‘social practices’.
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Institutions are a contested concept in social sciences. Prominent scholars such as North
(1990), Ostrom (1992) and Scharpf (1997) narrowly define institutions as sanctionable
rules that structure actors’ courses of action and, by that, influence actors’ cost-benefit-
rationales. For the aim of this thesis, it seems yet necessary to use a broader understanding
that goes beyond the system of sanctionable rules: Accordingly, institutions specify the
rules under which policies are made and set constraints to actors’ behavior while shaping
their goal orientations and navigating their goal implementation. Institutions further
make behavior and interactions understandable and – to a certain degree – predictable for
those who share the same institutional perception (Scharpf 1997: 40). Shared knowledge
about valid institutions is, thus, decisive in social interactions.43
Beyond defining institutions, social science literature often separates institutions into
formal and informal institutions (Ostrom 1992).44 In research about African politics,
the dichotomy is mostly used to negatively ascribe an alleged lack of statehood or state
enforcement (Azarya and Chazan 1987; Helmke and Levitsky 2004; Hyden 2006; Liebert
and Lauth 1999; Tripp 1997). Yet, the dichotomy is problematic in at least three ways:
Firstly, it is often used to describe phenomena which are highly formalized but simply
do not fit ‘Western’ standards of written codification. Though scholars revealed the com-
plexity of African social and cultural realities in the past two decades, these realities
often tumble normative Western distinctions and, hence, are put aside in an ‘informality
box’ (Mamdani 1996; Yarrow 2011). Secondly, the dichotomy confines institutions, ac-
tors or relations at least rhetorically (close) to the area of illegality. Thirdly and most
importantly, the dichotomy imposes an artificial rivalry between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’
institutions which fails to adequately describe the complex and coinciding realities in most
African countries and elsewhere. Hence, if it is necessary to use the dichotomy in order to
articulate an argument in the course of this thesis, I understand ‘informal’ as closed and
invisible rather than simply unwritten (Boone 2005). As MacLean (2010: 24-25) empha-
sizes: “The key is not whether these rules are actually written, but the degree to which
knowledge of the rules is open, visible, and transparent. Public codification is essential
for formal institutions, but that codification process may be oral and not written.”
Policies, on the other hand, are intentional and collectively binding decisions that are
enforceable by selected actors in particular political regimes. Applied to natural resource
governance it is assumed that institutions and policies enable, constrain or demand actors’
interactions in steering natural resources and deriving revenues.
43 Ethnographers urge that this characteristic necessitates a sensitive assessment by those outsiders who
do not share the same institutional perceptions as it is the case for me in doing research in Ghana.
44 Having the same in mind, Cleaver (1999) differs ‘organizational’ vs. ‘socially embedded’ institutions
whereas Giddens (1984) separates between ‘rules’ vs. ‘norms/values’.
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3.3 The Relational Embedding of Exchange: Actors’ Networks
The third major theoretical argument is that institutions and policies influence the net-
work embedding in which actors pursue their agendas (see Figure 3.1, page 24). Network
structures and, within them, the configuration of relations, shape actors’ behavior by
creating opportunities and access to these opportunities (Lawler and Yoon 1996, 1998;
Lawler, Thye, and Yoon 2000; Uzzi 1996). Granovetter (1985: 485) summarizes this view:
“Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they
adhere slavishly to a script written for them by the particular intersection of social
categories that they happen to occupy. Their attempts at purposive action are
instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations”
Consequently, inequalities and interdependencies due to past exchanges, institutions
and policies shape the network’s structural embedding and the overall network structure
determines how actors engage in natural resource governance. Yet, within the network,
actors still have the agency to exchange or not. Hence, it is necessary to move one step
further to actors in exchange.
3.3.1 Actors in Exchange
Actors are defined as any individual or collective players that are capable of making pur-
poseful choices among alternative courses of action (Scharpf 1997: 7). They are assumed
to pursue their agendas with bounded rationality. Bounded rationality sees actors as be-
ing motivated for exchange by weighing out costs and benefits of alternative interactions
with limited knowledge, limited possibilities to process this knowledge and limited time to
make decisions based on this knowledge (Rubinstein 1998; Simon 1984; Wittek, Snijders,
and Nee 2013). Actors behave rationally to the extent that they repeat successful (ben-
eficial) exchanges and to revoke unsuccessful (costly) exchanges (Molm, Takahashi, and
Peterson 2000; Cook and Rice 2003). They interact to obtain rewards (financial means,
projects or reputation) or to avoid costs (penalties, reputation loss, or legal sanctions).45
Assuming bounded rationality neither implies benefit-maximization (selfish actors with
full information engaged in atomized interactions as often assumed by rational-choice
theory) nor does it contradict potential collective steering.46 First, due to existing in-
equalities, interdependencies and the “double embeddedness” (Kadushin 2012: 202),47
45 Costs have a two-folded meaning in exchange theory: Contrary to the purely utilitarian assumption
of opportunity costs (lost rewards) in economics, exchange theory also takes into account aversive
stimuli potentially induced by exchange (Emerson 1976: 349). Opposing this rational assessment of
means to achieve goals, scholars such as Schu¨tz (1971a,b) and Esser (1990) argue that actors seek to
stabilize a ‘structure of relevance’ (“Relevanzstruktur”) which preconditions meaningful action.
46 For a recent account of rational-choice thinking see Wittek, Snijders, and Nee (2013).
47 ‘Double embeddedness’ refers to institutions and policies on the one hand and network structures and
practices on the other (Kadushin 2012).
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maximizing benefits is – voluntary or involuntary – bounded. Second, as part of a larger
network, actors may purposefully choose to not strive for utility maximization. Finally,
actors often try to serve their self-interests through collaboration (Axelrod and Hamilton
1981).
Representation
Chapter 2 argues that in governance, a multitude of actors engage with the authority to do
so. This authority originates from legal entitlement through institutions or policies, public
commissioning (representation) or de facto influence. Though representation is inherently
tied to exchange, exchange theory sweeps over this particular form of exchange. Emerson
(1962) only discusses the concept in regard to ‘corporate group’ constellations: Actors
nominate one group member – or an outsider – to exchange resources with others on
behalf of the group (e.g., because the actor is perceived as more powerful).
Contrary to its minor role in exchange theory, representation receives major attention
within political science literature, at the latest with Pitkin’s (1967) differentiation of for-
malistic, descriptive, symbolic, and substantive representation.48 Representation in this
thesis comes close to substantive representation, that is, to what extent the represented
view that representatives act in their interests. Various scholars reviewed, added, and
revised Pitkin’s work.49 Amongst them, Mansbridge (2003) understands representation
as simple principle-agent-relationship (commissioning).50 Williams (1998) develops the
concept further by understanding representation as mediation. She argues that actors
need to mediate constituents’ interests in a sound way in order to act as representatives.
Moreover, she understands mediation as a precondition for building trust in that relation-
ship. The importance of trust derives from the probability that the representative will
behave in an expected way (Gambetta 1990).
In addition to representation as principle-agent-relations or mediation, Urbinati (2000)
links representation to advocacy consisting of two components: “the representative’s “pas-
sionate” link to the electors’ cause and the representative’s relative autonomy of judg-
ment” (Urbinati 2000: 773). Though this thesis aims to scrutinize representation as
advocacy, this study goes beyond ‘electors’ and views representation to also take place
beyond the institutionalized space of elections. With this view, the thesis follows Rehfeld
(2006) who asks:
“What could “political representation” be if it does not necessarily depend on
notions of accountability, authorization, and “acting for another’s interest”? [...]
Political representation, I argue, results from an audience’s judgment that some
48 ‘Formalistic’ representation are the institutional arrangements that precede and initiate representa-
tion, ‘descriptive’ representation is the way representatives ‘stand for’ the represented, and ‘symbolic’
representative means the extent to which the representatives resemble the represented (Pitkin 1967).
49 For a summary of their theories see Dovi (2014).
50 See also Arrow (1985) and Moe (1984).
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individual, rather than some other, stands in for a group in order to perform a
specific function [...] Thus, political representation, per se, is not a particularly
democratic phenomenon at all” (Rehfeld 2006: 2).
Representation is important in natural resource governance as it is the mechanism that
provides actors with the legitimacy to claim influence. Quite pathetically, Heller (2013)
evinces the importance of shedding light on citizens’ representation in natural resource
extraction:
“Where citizens lack information on how their governments are managing resources
and what is being done with the money generated by extraction, corruption is left to
fester in darkness. Where policy makers do not feel the need to answer to their pub-
lic, decisions are too easily guided by narrow or short-term considerations. Where
there is no effective mechanism for communities directly impacted by extraction to
express their concerns, their risks of violence skyrocket (Heller 2013: 90).”
Therefore, representing others’ interest gives actors legitimacy to act or interact in
natural resource governance.
Actors’ Agendas
Exchange theory assumes that actors are motivated by the agendas (goals) they are
pursuing in a particular situation (‘principle of motivation’, Blau 1968).51 The question
as to how actors form these goals remains, yet, unclear. Erickson (1988: 99) maintains
that attitudes “[...] are made, maintained, or modified primarily through interpersonal
processes [...] [which] occur largely within the boundaries of social networks”.
If alternative exchange partners (i. e., those offering similar resources) are available, ex-
change theory assumes that actors drag on exchanges among homophile actors (‘principle
of alternatives’, Blau (1968)). Homophily maintains that actors with similar character-
istics share related views, have similar goals and are, thus, likely to collaborate. This
probability is strengthened as exchanges among ‘equals’ are assumed to reduce uncer-
tainty and to decrease power differences inherent to exchange (Allan 2010: 104; Burt
2005: 12).
In sum, the conceptual framework assumes that actors are motivated for exchange by
their legal mandate, their mandate to interact on behalf of others and their aim to pursue
their respective agendas in the governance process. Hereby, these different motivations
do not exclude but rather occur in parallel to each other. The necessary precondition for
such exchange is the provision of resources that are valued by others.
51 Appadurai (2013) refers to this as ‘aspirations’. In his understanding, aspirations are necessary to
navigate outcomes and shape the future.
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3.3.2 Interactions
The next step in the conceptual approach (see Figure 3.1, page 24) looks more closely at
how actors actually interact. Blau (1964, 1968, 1977) is one of the few exchange theorists
who acknowledges different forms of interactions. He maintains that the pervasiveness of
exchange
“[...] makes it tempting to explore the fruitfulness of the concept by trying to
apply it to all social conduct. But the concept of exchange loses its distinctive mean-
ing and becomes tautological if all behavior in interpersonal relations is subsumed
under it. Although much of social conduct is oriented toward expected returns from
others – indeed, more than we usually think – not all of it is” (Blau 1968: 453).
According to Blau (1968), social conduct occurs in four different forms: physical coer-
cion, irrationality, exchange and internalized norms.52
Economic and Social Exchange
Exchange refers to “[...] voluntary social actions that are contingent on rewarding re-
actions from others and that cease when these expected reactions are not forthcoming”
(Blau 1968: 454). It is the act of giving and receiving resources and the reinforcing
obligations that result from this act. Every relation mediated through exchange carries
three obligations: The obligation to give, the obligation to receive and the obligation
to reciprocate.53 As discussed in Section 3.1, resources are capabilities (possessions or
behavioral skills) that are valued by others (Emerson 1976: 347). ‘Valued by others’ is
important: Though resources are actors’ individual attributes, they unfold their potential
(‘operating force’) only if others value them (Molm and Cook 1995: 216; Emerson 1976:
347).54 Thereby, resources are either tangible (e.g., money) or intangible (e.g., advice or
social support).
Exchange theory differs between two forms of exchange. In economic exchanges, explicit
agreements about the ‘terms of trade’ are negotiated before the exchange takes place.
Explicit agreements such as contracts or memorandums of understanding include written
rules, monitoring systems and/or sanction mechanisms which decrease the necessity of
trust among exchange partners. Social exchanges lack this explicit understanding about
the terms of trade and are ‘only’ based on two norms: reciprocity as the norm to get back
to someone who was beneficial in the past and fairness as the norm to be honest and
52 Physical coercion literally means the use of force (or the threat to do so) while irrationality refers to
completely asocial behavior. Both forms are excluded in the following.
53 Mauss (1966) explicitly looks at gift-giving and gift-receiving as an exchange relation enforcing the
necessity to reward, if only gratefulness, to the giver. Contrary to this, Blau (1968: 453) argues
that “[...] there are men who selflessly work for others without thought of reward and even without
expecting gratitude, but these are virtually saints, and saints are rare”.
54 Molm and Cook (1995: 216) note that also “[a] mother’s capability to offer approval is a resource in
her relation with her child but may not be in her relation with someone else’s child”.
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free from fraud. The logic of social exchange appears in other social science literature.
For example, parallels between ‘equality matching’ in the understanding of Fiske (1991,
1992) and social exchange become concrete in “[t]he idea [...] that each person is entitled
to the same amount as each other person in the relationship, and that the direction
and magnitude of an imbalance are meaningful” (Fiske 1992: 691). Imbalance (i. e.,
outstanding exchanges) create obligations and, consequently, power (Blau 1968: 455).
In natural resource governance, collective steering therefore will only take place if actors
possess resources that are valued by others and if they are able and willing to exchange
these resources. Because of the diverse set of actors, their respective capitals and different
agendas, economic and social exchanges are likely to occur in parallel. While economic
exchanges foster predictability and, by that, can ease collective steering, social exchanges
first necessitate some amount of trust. If successful (i. e., reciprocated and fair), social
exchanges are likely to boost trust formation and the probability of collaboration.
Practices as ‘Internalized Norms’
Besides exchanges, Blau (1968) identifies ‘internalized norms’ as a further form of inter-
actions (or, in his terms, ‘social conduct’). Internalized norms are values that demand
some ‘righteous’ behavior and are not governed by the interest in rewards as exchange
is (Blau 1986; Waldman 1972). While Blau (1968) speaks of internalized norms, others
refer to ‘practices’ or ‘frames’.
The purpose of this thesis is neither to scrutinize Ghanaian practices in the understand-
ing of Bourdieu’s (1990) habitus nor in Reckwitz’s (2002) theory of practice nor in the
details of Holtz’s (2014) coherence.55 The sole aim here is to look behind the orally or
visibly expressed and to discuss how different practices (more in the sense of routinized
behaviour (Reckwitz 2002) or political trends) coin network interactions in petroleum
governance in Ghana by shaping actors’ interactions in a way that benefits or impedes
collective steering of petroleum revenues (Fine and Kleinman 1983; Pachucki and Breiger
2010; Sewell 1992).
Network researchers such as McLean (1998) and White (1992) highlight the necessity
to scrutinize network practices as “[...] stories are the essential vehicle for elaborating
networks” (White 1992: 67). Practices can act as important drivers to mobilize recogni-
tion for certain topics in natural resource governance, and, thereinafter, in constructing
collective identities (Crona 2011; Ernstson and So¨rlin 2009: 1461).56 Also Fuhse (2009)
55 Holtz (2014) suggests that coherence is necessary for a practice to persist and to spread. Coherence
includes cognitive consistency, i. e., the absence of a (strong) cognitive dissonance against performing
the practice, and performing a practice based on habits (behavior which is efficiently, effortlessly, and
unconsciously repeated) rather than based on conscious decisions. Giddens’ (1984; 1989) argues that
practices are the glue between structure and agency as they mediate between both.
56 Latour (2005) pushed this view with his Actor-Network Theory (ANT) which assigns agency to non-
human entities (‘actants’). ANT aims to rebuild social theory out of networks and intrigues with its
innovative character. Yet, it is criticized for assuming agency of non-human entities and for being
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argues that networks are composed of observable communicative processes (‘transactions’)
and a ‘meaning’ structure (expectations, symbols, or cultural practices embodied in in-
terpersonal structures). While transactions draw attention to what happens in networks,
the meaning structure asks why exchanges and, in turn, unilateral, collaborative or con-
tentious steering occurs (see also McLean 1998). Therefore, scrutinizing such practices –
and particularly the actors constructing or contesting them – helps to understand natural
resource governance in more depth.
3.3.3 Relational Constellations in Interactions
As already mentioned, exchange can lead to power (through unreciprocated exchanges)
and trust (through iterated, reciprocal exchanges). Power and trust are ‘relational’ as
actors have power over and trust in other actors.
Conceptually, they entail a kind of ‘chicken-and-egg’-problem: For example, due to
historical interdependencies and inequalities, power is inherent to exchanges but exchanges
make actors also more or less powerful. Similar, successful social exchanges increase trust
among involved actors whereas unsuccessful (non-reciprocated) exchanges decrease it. But
trust is also an input to exchange: the more two actors trust each other, the more they are
assumed to exchange resources, particularly in social exchanges which lack a contractual
model and a sanction mechanism in case of defection. The assumption upheld here is that
if two actors interact for the first time, exchange precedes power and trust. In this sense,
in some kind of ‘state of nature’, these relational variables are first an outcome and then
an input to exchange.
Power in Social Relations
Power is here understood as a dependence structure between two actors: An actor is
powerful as much as others depend on the rewards handed out by this actor (Emerson
1962). A relation is balanced if two actors equally depend on each others’ resources and
imbalanced if one actor depends more on the other.57
In examining the extensive literature on power, it is helpful to differentiate between
three consecutive perspectives: (1) The (here-called) ‘resource’ perspective, which con-
ceptualizes power as an actor’s attribute due to its exceptional capabilities or resources,58
(2) the ‘attributive’ approach, which views power as an attribution assigned by others,
constructivist and descriptive rather than analytical (Elder-Vass 2008: 471). Still, it helps to underline
the importance of analyzing how different actors shape discussions in natural resource governance by
constructing and applying certain practices that, in turn, influence actors’ interactions.
57 Based on Emerson’s (1972a; 1972b) concept of power, Molm (1990, 1997a, 2003) differentiates between
two types of power: ‘reward power’ in which actors engage in mutually contingent but not necessarily
equal exchanges of rewards, and ‘coercion power’ in which one actor provides rewards for the other’s
withholding (Molm 1997b: 115). For a through discussion about power see Han (2005).
58 Rodney (1982: 224) defines power as “[...] the ability to defend one’s interests and if necessary to
impose one’s will [...]”.
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and (3) the ‘positional’ perspective, which understands power as a positional advantage in
a larger network structure. Thus, the decisive difference between these three approaches
is the focal examination unit: ‘resource’ approaches focus on the individual level, ‘at-
tributive’ approaches on the dyadic level and ‘positional’ approaches on the triadic or
multi-actor level. These three perspectives are consecutive by building on each other:
Without resources, there would neither be attributions nor positions in a larger network
structure.
The question how exchanges create power differences and, in turn, how power shapes
exchange relations has a long and disputable tradition in exchange theory. Scholars agree
with Mauss (1966) that power is innate to exchange. In consequence, power is also
inherent in relations among actors who (aim to) steer natural resources and revenues
(collectively). Yet, its role is theoretically inconsistent: powerful actors can boost col-
lective actions in natural resource governance as much as they are able to impede such
outcomes. This theoretical inconsistency demands the need to consider actors’ agendas,
strategies and practices as discussed in the previous sections.
Theoretically consistent is the assumption that power differences in dyadic relations
are only a temporal state as actors aim towards power balance. To decrease power im-
balances four types of ‘balancing operations’ exist (Emerson 1962; Cook and Gillmore
1984). They become easier to understand if discussed with a concrete example: A donor
organization aims to support petroleum affected communities by providing funds to local
NGOs to implement an alternative livelihood project. One of these NGO needs these
funds to ensure its organizational survival (which, in fact, holds true for most NGOs in
Ghana). The NGO, thus, depends more on the donor than the latter depends on the
NGO as other suitable NGOs exist. In this scenario, the NGO has four options: (1) to in-
crease its portfolio and, thus, make the donor more dependent on its work (giving status),
(2) to devalue the donor money and decrease its own expenses to survive (withdrawal),
(3) to look out for alternative donor funds (network extension), or (4) to decrease the
number of alternatives NGOs available to the donor (coalition formation) (Emerson 1962:
35). Among these power-balancing options, coalition formation is argued to be the most
rational means to counterbalance power dominance (Cook and Gillmore 1984).
Overall, power is an outcome of and an influencing variable in interactions. It is a
resource that depends on institutions, policies and the network structure that embeds
actors, and unfolds its operating force only with actors who value the resources of more
powerful actors. In natural resource governance, power is decisive as the aim of collectively
steering natural resources severely hinges on the agendas and strategies of powerful actors.
At the same time, actors have the agency to balance power and, thereby, to shape natural
resource governance in new directions.
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Trust in Social Relations
Besides power, trust is decisive in exchange and, thereinafter, collaborative or contentious
outcomes. Generally, trust ascribes
“[...] the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the action of another party
[...] irrespective of the ability to monitor or control the other party” (Mayer, Davis,
and Schoorman 1995: 712).
It is an expectation that arises from continued, sincere and collaborative behavior
(Fukuyama 1996: 26) and, hence, in exchange terminology, from reciprocated and fair
exchange behavior.59 Actors develop trust (or, as an attribute, trustworthiness) through
repeated successful interactions which allow them to collect information about their ex-
change partners and to make behavior more predictable.60 Actors typically start with
risk-free exchanges that demand low trust and exchanges become more serious – and
more useful, i. e., less costly – if actors repeatedly adhere to the norms of reciprocity and
fairness. Little by little, social exchanges consequently build trust and actors are able
to expand their trustworthiness and reputation as reliable exchange partners (Blau 1968:
454; Cook and Rice 2001: 702). In stark contrast, economic exchanges do not lead to
the production of trust as it is formalized through monitoring and sanction mechanisms
(Cook and Rice 2001: 702).
In natural resource governance, trust is efficient because it reduces transaction costs
in exchanges, facilitates the development of rules and compliance with these rules, and
increases the tendency to share knowledge and mutual learning processes (Crona 2011:
58). In fact, Fukuyama (1996) argues that hierarchies only emerge if actors cannot be
trusted and explicit rules and sanctions need to coerce them to oblige to institutional ar-
rangements. But such explicit rules and sanctions are costly as the have to be negotiated,
agreed upon, litigated and enforced (Levi 2000). Contrary to this, trust is “[...] a very
important lubricant of a social system, [...] extremely efficient [and] it saves a lot of trou-
ble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people’s word” (Arrow 1974: 151). Buskens
and Weesie (2000) further argue that reputation as a trustworthy partner can promote
collaboration in particularly dense networks as sanctions against untrustworthy exchange
partners cannot only be executed by the damaged actor but also by others in the net-
work. Furthermore, having the reputation as a trustworthy partner in resource governance
makes actors more popular and increases their attractiveness as exchange partners (Cook
59 Exchange theory, hence, leaves out culture as an explanation for the formation of trust. Whereas
for example Fukuyama (1996: 153) maintains that trust emerges when actors share common moral
values, exchange theory argues that trust arises and increases with successful (iterated) exchanges.
60 With the ‘principle of marginal utilities’, Blau (1968) argues that exchanges with the same actor have a
satiation point by providing redundant information. This would lead actors to end partnerships after
a number of reciprocated exchanges. In that, this proposition contradicts literature about trust and
commitment. The principle of marginal utilities seems only likely in situations of pure information
exchanges under the assumption that actors have no means to gain new (non-redundant) information.
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and Rice 2001). Consequently, where literature about power in governance is ambivalent,
trust is viewed as a purely positive factor for collective steering.
3.3.4 Network Characteristics
As already indicated in the beginning of this chapter, actors do not interact as atoms
outside a social context but they are embedded in larger network structures. The following
section summarizes some network characteristics argued to influence actors’ abilities to
exchange.
The first fundamental network characteristic is the number of actors that compose a
network. As discussed in the second chapter, natural resource governance starts from
the perspective that a multitude of actors (aim to) tackle collective problems with the
authority to do so (Hall and Biersteker 2002). This authority either stems from legal
entitlement through institutions and policies, public entitlement (representation) or de
facto influence. Thus, the sheer number of actors within a network and – in addition – the
quantity and quality of relations among them, influence potential outcomes. For example,
if only one actor holds all relations in the network (and all others are disconnected to each
other), collective steering of natural resources is highly unlikely.
Necessary is also a diverse number of connections between network actors. Many ties
can help to exchange resources rapidly with low transactions costs. However, as Everett
and Borgatti (2005) note, a highly interconnected network tends to provide similar and,
thus, redundant resources. For natural resources governance this could mean that in-
novative ideas about how to handle the incoming flow of natural resource rents do not
enter the network. Moreover, such highly connected networks can provide the mean to
disseminate wrong information or rumors which endanger the trust among actors and,
thus, the potential for collaborative outcomes.
Besides the number of actors and relations, literature discusses, among other things,
brokerage, reciprocity, transitivity, density, centralization, and reachability as important
network characteristics for natural resource governance. Appendix 1 (page 197) defines
these concepts and Table 3.1 (page 38) summarizes the concepts’ potential advantages
and disadvantages for natural resource governance.
Brokers are located between two or more disconnected actors. Through linking others,
brokers are generally assumed to have a positional advantage in networks. In natural
resource governance, brokerage provides four possible advantages to the broker: (1) It
provides access to a greater diversity of resources, (2) non-redundant resources are ear-
lier accessible to the broker, (3) the broker can control the diffusion of these resources
between two disconnected actors (‘tertius gaudens’), and (4) the broker can act as a
‘tertius iunges’ by navigating conflicting interests and, in that, enhancing its own repu-
tation as a reliable collaboration partner. Brokers can further boost collaboration if they
distribute critical information or knowledge, link unconnected actors who are necessary
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for collaboration (Burt 1992) or if they open up new sources of economic activity (Long
2001). Jansen (2003) additionally suggests that actors in this privileged position get the
chance for deviant behavior due to loosened peer pressure and consequently may play
an important role in processes of mobilization, modernization, innovation and diffusion.
She further emphasizes the ability of brokers to act against processes of exclusion and for
the integration of conflicting subgroups (Jansen 2003: 107). However, because of their
privileged position, brokers can also undermine collaborative efforts, for example by ex-
ploiting relations, by steering events for their own benefits or by acting as “professional
manipulators” (Boissevain 1968, 1974: 549, 148). This damages the aim to collectively
steer natural resources. Thus, brokers are not automatically favorable for natural resource
governance but only if they make use of their strategic position in a way that benefits
collaboration.61
Reciprocity and transitivity are said to generate trust, increase social control and, as
a consequence thereof, to broaden the compliance with mutual norms. Furthermore,
reciprocity in relations can help to monitor or identify deviant behavior and, thus, may
ensure that potential conflicts are dealt with (Ostrom 1990; Crona 2011: 56). Contrary
to this, unilateral relations (i. e., a more or less clear division between actors who give
and actors who take) endanger collaboration on eye level and decrease the likelihood of
joint decisions in resource governance. Moreover, high transitivity indicates the presence
of collaborative subgroups who are better able to steer collaboratively (Merrill-Matzner
2006).
Dense networks can help to exchange resources rapidly and with low transaction costs,
and are associated with holding collective action potential (Ward, Stovel, and Sacks 2011:
250). However, dense structures also tend to provide similar and, thus, redundant re-
sources. Contrary to this, low density can inhibit the spread of resources but natural
resource governance may profit from an increased diversity of governance practices and a
low risk of lock-ins.
High centralization in the context of natural resource governance can facilitate exchange
through efficient coordination, decision-making and task fulfillment as a few actors can
synthesize resources rapidly and ‘make things happen’. Similar, high centralization can
help in times of change by coordinating diverse interests and goals. Yet, high centralization
can reduce the diversity of accessible resources because all actors are closely connected to
the same few central actors (Janssen 2006). Low centralization, on the contrary, generates
an open atmosphere and potentially increases the efficiency in solving complex tasks, but
may lead to a confusion about responsibilities, a lack of control and accountability, and
inefficiency when solving simple tasks because coordinating actors are missing.
61 This argument finds confirmation in anthropological studies which argue that it depends on the goal
orientation as well as personal attributes whether or not a broker uses its positional advantage to
boost collaboration (Bierschenk, Chaveau, and Olivier de Sardan 2002: 21-23).
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Reachability – the number of steps maximally needed to reach from one actor to any
other actor in a network – can boost or impede exchange as well. On the one hand, high
reachability is linked with access to distant resources, an increased ability to respond to
change, and the possibility to form creative unions consisting of different actors to merge
their respective resources. Contrary to this, in case of false or misleading information
on important facts, high reachability can be highly problematic to natural resource gov-
ernance as gossip will spread fast and the perpetrator is hard to identify. On the other
hand, low reachability is positively linked with forming coherent and efficient subgroups.
Moreover, disturbances – for example harmful gossip – do not extent beyond these sub-
groups. However, the lacking access to distant resources may hamper collective steering in
networks with low reachability. Table 3.1 summarizes these theoretical graph level effects
on natural resource governance.
Table 3.1: Potential Network Effects on Natural Resource Governance
High ≥ 0.5 Advantages for NRG Disadvantages for NRG
Brokerage Link disconnected actors Exploit relations




Compliance with mutual norms
Transitivity Trust, social control, mutual norms
Collaborative sub-groups
Consistency in resource flows
Density Fast resource exchange Potential of resource redundancy
Fast diffusion of innovations Low diversity in governance practices
Potential lock-ins
Centralization Efficient synthesis of resources Limited diversity of resources
Efficient coordination Limited distribution of resources
Clear responsibilities Command and control / inequality
Beneficial in times of change Perception as undemocratic / unfair
Reachability Access to distant resources Spread of misleading information
Ability to respond to change No formation of efficient subgroups
Potential union of diverse actors High reach of disturbances
Source: Own graph based on Bodin, Crona, and Ernstson (2006), Janssen (2006), Merrill-Matzner
(2006) and Prell et al. (2010). For a definition of the network concepts see Appendix 1.
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Overall, this comparison of potential advantages and disadvantages of network charac-
teristics for natural resource governance aims towards three things: First, it introduces
and defines those network indicators that are discussed in the following empirical chap-
ters. Second, it links the concept of natural resource governance, exchange theory and
methods applied in the field with each other. And third, the conceptual approach shows
that despite discussing network characteristics, it is still pivotal to take actors’ agency
into consideration (Crona 2011; Hauck 2010; Janssen 2006).
3.4 Exchange Outcomes: Unilateral, Collaborative and Contentious
Steering
The last step of the conceptual approach (see Figure 3.1, page 24) summarizes how the
previous steps relate to unilateral, collaborative or contentious steering in natural resource
governance. In short, this thesis proposes that similar agendas, rule consistent exchanges,
power balance, high trust and collaboration-favoring brokers benefit collaborative steering
of natural resources if institutions and policies provide the necessary embedding for such
collaboration.
Competition is likely in natural resource governance if actors aspire the same resources
from similar exchange partners. Contestation, on the other hand, is the process of arguing
and is likely to occur if actors pursue opposing agendas. The likelihood of contestation is
assumed to increase in the case of power-imbalanced actors and if brokers use their po-
sitional advantages for unilateral exploitation rather than collective action. In contrast,
coordination occurs in situations in which actors have a common aversion (Stein 1982).
The averse outcome is (attempted to be) bypassed through coordinating respective ac-
tions. Actors can produce mutual gains but need to coordinate their actions to achieve
mutually consistent decisions (e.g., battle of sexes). Collaboration occurs if actors have a
common interest and are able and willing to contribute some reward in order to reach a
collectively beneficial outcome. If one party fails to contribute, it damages the collective
reward and the relational constellations (here, power trust) coining exchanges (Emerson
1976: 357; Molm and Cook 1995: 212).62
In regard to natural resource governance, reciprocated exchanges are assumed to benefit
collaboration as they reduce power imbalances and contribute to the formation of mutual
trust and commitment. Moreover, exchange theory argues that actors who trust each
other are likely to exchange a number of different material or immaterial resources. In
network terminology, such multi-dimensional exchanges are termed multiplex relations.
Following Crona (2011: 55), multiplex relations increase exchange values and priorities
62 Parallels to cooperation theory are obvious, namely in the game theoretical component of iterated
games. In ‘iterated games’, the games’ end is unclear so that actors have both the opportunity and
the incentive to develop cooperation based on reciprocity (Axelrod 2000). The ‘shadow of the future’
provides the basis for reciprocal collaboration even if only egoists participate.
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and, consequently, amplify the likelihood of collective action.
Finally, in exchanges beyond the dyadic level – and this is one of the finer points of
exchange theory – the creation of power and trust through exchanges moves the focus
back from agency to structure. Reciprocated and fair exchanges lead, on the structural
level, to the legitimization of power and trust whereas unrequited and unfair exchanges
lead to de-legitimization and social disapproval of the ones in power or trust.
3.5 Limitations and Summary
The inclusion of practices and frames already indicates that deriving the conceptual ap-
proach solely from exchange theory entails some limitations. A major criticism in lit-
erature targets the conceptualization of actors as rational agents weighing out the costs
and benefits of exchanges: While, for example, Adams (1965) argues that actors do not
always demand reciprocity in social relations, Miller (2005) accuses the theory to reduce
human interaction to purely rational processes. Other scholars challenge the assumption
that actors actually possess the cognitive awareness to weigh out costs and benefits with
a diverse set of different actors. Finally, some critics question the overall novelty of ex-
change theory as all claims trace back to the simple idea of the importance of exchange
in interpersonal relations already emphasized by Simmel in the 1920s (West and Turner
2014).
Besides this general critique, three caveats are pivotal for this thesis’ main objectives:
First, exchange theory is accused of being not testable. The problem of testability orig-
inates from the operational difficulty to separate between what actors value, what they
perceive as rewarding and how they behave as rewards, values and actions are defined
in dependence of individual exchange partners and not independently of them (West and
Turner 2014). The problem that actors pursue multiple goals depending on which ac-
tor they confront is a problem common to all relational approaches. In natural resource
governance, it is for example likely that NGOs pursue a different goal when relating to
each other than when facing government representatives. A second problem is the cir-
cular relationship between interactions and relational constellations (power and trust) as
the latter are both an output and an input of interactions. The third major criticism is
exchange theory’s ignorance of the cultural context in which exchanges take place. For
example, while actors may be motivated for social conduct to exchange resources in some
societies, actors in other societies may more frequently rely on internalized norms. This
also applies to actors’ bounded rationality as it is likely to be more pronounced in regard
to strangers than in regard to close allies.
Despite these limitations, the thesis argues that exchange theory helps to understand
actors’ relations by drawing attention to structural coercion, exchanges and practices.
The approach is further enhanced by its simplicity and its openness to additional propo-
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sitions. As Figure 3.1 illustrates, the presented conceptual approach substitutes exchange
reasoning with propositions of the structure-agency-debate, network research and litera-
ture on power and trust. It further considers propositions made by collaboration theory
while abstaining from the inclusion of game theory models. Moreover, the conceptual
approach links the structural and network embedding with actors’ agency.
Applied to petroleum governance in Ghana, these conceptual considerations could have
the following implications: Complex inequalities and interdependencies among Ghanaian
actors emerged because of past interactions and different allocations of capital in society
in general or natural resource sectors in particular. In order to better deal with these
interdependencies and inequalities, institutions and policies emerged that influence the
petroleum sector. This not only includes institutional regulations such as parliamentary
oversight or specific laws but also codes of conduct or traditions about how to interact in
regard to natural resource wealth. Both interdependencies and the structural embedding
influence network structures and actors’ positions within this structure. These positions
offer advantages or disadvantages for actors’ goal attainment. Actors’ attributes, par-
ticularly their agenda and legitimation through others, influence whether and how they
engage in natural resource governance.
If actors interact in the petroleum sector in Ghana, they have three basic choices:
They can force each other, they can exchange tangible or intangible resources or they
can interact based on practices. Interactions take place in an environment of mutual
dependence, either between power balanced (equally dependent) or power imbalanced
(unequally dependent) actors.
Actors are likely to collaborate if exchanges in the past were rule consistent. The dom-
inant form of exchange can change and may indeed do so, particularly from economic
to social exchanges parallel to the formation of trust among involved actors. Social ex-
changes promote the formation of trust whereas the failure to reciprocate damages it.
Brokers can exploit their positional advantage to increase their power. Similarly, actors
can weigh out power imbalances through exchanges, for example, by coalition formation.
These changes, in turn, coin future interactions.
In sum, the conceptual approach proposes to shed light on the following six subques-
tions: (1) To what extent do interdependencies and inequalities, resulting from past social
conduct and unequal distribution of capital, shape the overall context in which natural
resource governance takes place? (2) How do structures, provided by institutions and poli-
cies, enable or restrict actors’ interactions in governing natural resources? (3) Which goals
do actors pursue in natural resource governance and which of these actors can, hereby,
legitimately claim to represent the interests of others? (4) To what extent do actors en-
gage in economic exchanges, social exchanges and network practices to collectively steer
natural resources? (5) How do these exchanges and practices influence relational patterns
such as trust and power? And (6) to what extent do all these factors shape unilateral,
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collaborative or contentious steering of natural resources and deriving revenues?
By deriving these six subquestions, this thesis seeks to push forward theoretical con-
siderations in network studies. As stated in Section 2.2, network studies still focus on
method application rather than theory building. Although the here carved out arguments
are not without weaknesses, they are a genuine attempt to understand why actors interact
in natural resource governance, how they do so, to what extent they are therein enabled
and restricted by a larger relational and structural embedding, and to what extent these
interactions lead to collaboration or contestation in natural resource governance. The
following Chapter 4 explains how these six questions are approached methodically.
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The aim of this thesis is to scrutinize whether exchanges among diverse actors who (aim
to) steer petroleum resources in Ghana (collectively) result in collaborative petroleum gov-
ernance. The conceptual approach argues that similar agendas, rule consistent exchanges,
power balance, high trust and collaboration-favoring brokers benefit collaborative steer-
ing of natural resources if institutions and policies provide the necessary embedding for
collaboration. These theoretical assumptions necessitate a case study design that mixes
qualitative and quantitative research methods. Consequently, the present chapter begins
by explaining the rationale behind the case study approach. Section 4.2 sheds light on
the data collection through observations and explorative interviews, data quality measure-
ments and necessary ethical considerations. Afterwards, Section 4.3 outlines the reasons
for implementing a survey to measure representation, the sampling strategy, the ques-
tionnaire design and its application in the field. The last section, Section 4.4, outlines the
social network analysis approach. It explains how to sample networks, how to appropriate
them by the means of a self-employed structured SNA questionnaire and how the net-
work data were generated in the field. The chapter closes with theoretical, analytical and
practical reasons for triangulating exploratory and explanatory methods and a summary
of the methodical rapprochement of natural resource governance.
4.1 Case Study Approach
Gerring (2004) defines a case study “[...] as an intensive study of a single unit for the
purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units. A unit connotes a spatially
bounded phenomenon [...] observed at a single point in time or over some delimited
period of time.”63 In this study, the spatially bounded phenomenon is Ghana’s developing
petroleum sector. The petroleum sector is investigated for the purpose of understanding
multi-actor engagements in natural resource governance in Ghana as the larger class of
units and for deducing potential conclusions and policy-implications for natural resource
governance in general. As more and more African countries discover oil and gas resources
(besides Ghana, Namibia, Mozambique, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and Ethiopia), a case
study of one of these emerging petro-states can extract important results for other cases.
63 For an insightful discussion about problems in case selection in comparative study designs see Geddes
(1990). For a typology in case study designs see Levy (2008).
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Case study designs do not have an easy standing in social sciences. They are said to
be subjective and to not allow for generalizations. Even worse, single case studies “[...]
have such a total absence of control as to be of almost no scientific value” (Campbell and
Stanley 1966: 6, 7). Flyvbjerg (2006) summarizes five common criticisms of case study
designs: (1) Context-independent knowledge produced by comparative or large N -studies
is more valuable than context-dependent, concrete knowledge produced by case studies.
(2) In light of lacking possibilities of generalizations, case studies cannot contribute to
social sciences. (3) Case study designs are only useful for hypotheses generating and not
for testing. (4) Their designs have a bias towards verification and (5) general theories are
hardly to develop on the basis of case studies. In response to these points of criticism,
the Ghanaian petroleum sector is examined as a case for the following reasons:
First, several research gaps exist with regard to the Ghanaian petroleum sector that
make it necessary to generate ‘context-dependent, concrete knowledge’. These gaps are
partly due to the comparable youth of the sector as petroleum production only started in
2010. Besides its youth, researchers so far have not scrutinized the link between citizens’
representation by petroleum actors and the collaboration among them. Rather, the cur-
rent focus evolves around the questions how Ghana can successfully evade the ‘resource
curse’ and in which ways the petroleum activities affect the socio-economic and ecological
well-being of coastal communities. Thus, due to the youth of the petroleum sector and
the existing research gaps, only context-dependent, concrete investigations within a case
study design provide the necessary insights to understand petroleum governance in-depth.
Second, by scrutinizing these research gaps, the case study approach contributes to
ongoing discussions about the alleged benefits of multi-actor engagements. Ghana’s
petroleum sector is a particular interesting case as the diverse number of actors from dif-
ferent sectors are, through the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, Act 815 (PRMA),
legally entitled to participate in petroleum governance (see Section 5.3). Yet, as some
actors – such as traditional authorities or civil society actors – seem to remain rather
enmeshed in contentious national politics, we do not yet know whether they actually join
the ‘big players’ in petroleum governance. Furthermore, the question if institutionally
powerful actors are actually powerful within multi-actor collaborations remains unan-
swered. Thus, despite the fact that case studies do not allow for generalizations, they can
contribute to research on chances and challenges of multi-actor approaches.
Third, and taking the conceptual approach into account, there is no reason why the
logic of inference is not applicable to the Ghanaian petroleum sector as a critical case
study (Flyvbjerg 2006: 229; Vennesson 2008: 228). This set-up will, fourth, help to elude
the danger of verification. Finally, it might be true that a lot of case studies do not
contribute to the development of general theories – but they also do not aim to do so. A
case study, as much as any other research design, is contingent upon what the researcher
looks for (Gerring 2004: 351). As this thesis aims to study the causal mechanisms –
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rather than causal effects – behind petroleum governance in Ghana, a case study is most
suitable (Gerring 2004: 352). In the following, the various data used in this thesis are
discussed.
4.2 Observations and Semi-Structured Interviews
Besides publicly available literature, the most important secondary data in this study
are reports in hard-cover form obtained in the field. For example, a vital document is a
limited edition report about the early phase of the Ghana Gas Pipeline, published by the
Centre for Public Interest Law (2014). So far, the report is the only available study on
the gas project’s socio-economic implications for surrounding communities. The report
was essential to verify the route of the pipeline in order to identify the number of affected
communities and to access citizens who are directly affected by the developing petroleum
industry in order to structinize their representation and trust patterns.
However, the vast majority of data gained in the field are primary data. Extracting pri-
mary data requires the compliance with several ethical obligations. The Belmont Report,
published in 1979, outlines three major principles: The obligation to ‘respect persons’
implies that researchers treat the study subjects as autonomous agents. The ‘beneficence
treatment’ requires researchers to respect the subjects’ decisions, advert any possible dam-
age to and maximize possible benefits for them. And the obligation for ‘justice’ focuses
on the question of who is the study’s beneficiary and who bears its costs. The general
rule to meet this third obligation is to treat equals equally.64 I will discuss how I dealt
with these ethical standards alongside each data collection method in the following.
To gain first insights in collective steering in petroleum governance and to approach
potential interviewees, I employed obtrusive observations (i. e., with the subjects’ knowl-
edge) during 14 large multi-actor meetings (see Table 4.1, page 46). The following ques-
tions guided the observations: (1) Who is (not) communicating with whom and in which
ways are actors communicating (observable positive or negative connotations)? (2) Who
is crosscutting sectors, e.g., which NGO representative is talking to which traditional au-
thority? (3) Which actors are dominating and which actors are dominated? (4) What
is the content of communication (accusations, appreciation, promises, obligations, etc.)?
And (5) do actors adhere to mutual agreements of previous meetings or do they rather
move in circles?
As observations are always a selective, purposeful and positioned way of studying a
phenomenon (Sultana 2007), I use observations to enlarge background knowledge about
64 The “Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Research, Report of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical
and Behavioral Research” is the most basic report on research ethics. The more specific formulations
to comply with are: to each person an equal share, according to individual need, individual effort,
societal contribution, and merit (US National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research 1979).
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the actors engaged in the petroleum sector. Being comparably unfamiliar with the cultural
circumstances and considering the need to understand social relations further motivated
me to apply this method. Participating in these meeting also gave the change to make
contacts and to build rapport.
In order to comply with ethical standards, I always introduced myself or was introduced
at non-public meetings. I provided background information about myself and the purpose
of my presence as well as my contact details.
Despite careful preparation and regular attendances, observations brought along some
challenges: Firstly, obtrusive observations induce fallacies through reactivity.65 Secondly,
personal biases can threaten data quality. In order to limit these fallacies, I tried to record
behavior ‘behaviorally’ and to stay neutral throughout the field research. Moreover, the
limited number of five key questions helped to keep focus and to make results more
comparable. Table 4.1 summarizes the 14 meetings attended.
Table 4.1: Synoptic Table of Observations
Organizer Meeting Purpose Date & Location
Two NGOs Strategic Meeting June 23, 2014; Sekondi
Three NGOs Strategic Meeting June 24, 2015; Sekondi
FES Survey Validation Workshop July 24, 2014; Accra
Tullow Oil Gas Flaring Education and Awareness
Engagement for local NGOs
July 29, 2014; Busua
Tullow Oil Gas Flaring Education and Awareness
Engagement for Traditional
Authorities
Aug. 4-7, 2014; Busua
Ministry of Finance Stakeholder Forum on the Review of
the PRMA
Aug. 14, 2014; Takoradi
PIAC Launch of the 2013 Annual Report Oct. 30, 2014 Accra
One Energy Limited ‘Ghana 1000’ Public Consultative
Workshop
Nov. 20, 2014; Aboadze
GIZ Civil Society Consultative Workshop
on the GHEITI Bill
Dec. 5-7, 2014; Elmina
Petroleum Commission Introduction of the New Petroleum
Bill to Traditional Authorities
Dec. 22-23, 2014; Busua
WRCF Stakeholders’ Kick Off Workshop Feb. 17, 2015; Takoradi
Continued on next page
65 Bernard (2006: 504, emphasis in original) notes: “There is a commonly held notion in anthropology
that participant observation is a means of reducing the severity of reactivity and other biases in direct
observation. Unfortunately, we do not know if this is true, and if so how much error is reduced by
this kind of training”.
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Table 4.1 – Continued from previous page
Organizer Meeting Purpose Date & Location
Tullow Oil Updates on the Jubilee Field and the
TEN Project for Traditional
Authorities
March 3, 2015; Busua
Tullow Oil Updates on the Jubilee Field and the
TEN Project for District Authorities
March 4, 2015; Busua
Tullow Oil Updates on the Jubilee Field and the
TEN Project for NGOs
March 5, 2015; Busua
Source: Own graph.
Besides observations, several semi-structured interviews were conducted particularly
in the beginning of the field research. Semi-structured interviews “... combine[s] the
flexibility of the unstructured, open-ended interview with the directionality and agenda
of the survey instrument” (Schensul, Schensul, and LeCompte 1999: 149). The interviews
targeted the identification of actors active in the petroleum sector, past interactions among
them and, hence, different kinds and amounts of potential collaborative steering. I selected
respondents on purpose and from a number of different sectors. Among 15 semi-structured
interviews, eight were audio-recorded (see Table 4.2).
Table 4.2: Synoptic Table of Transcribed Interviews
Interviewee representing (the) Date & Location
Western Regional House of Chiefs July 10, 2014; Sekondi
Western Region Network of NGOs (WERENGO) July 21, 2014; Takoradi
Platform of Coastal Communities (PCC) July 24, 2014; Takoradi
Platform of Coastal Communities (PCC) Aug. 01, 2014; Sekondi
Tullow Oil Aug. 05, 2014; Busua
Land Valuation Division (LVD) Sept. 17, 2014; Sekondi
Centre for Public Interest Law (CEPIL) Nov. 14, 2014; Accra
Community Land & Development Foundation (COLANDEF) Nov. 19, 2014; Takoradi
Kumasi Institute of Technology and Environment (KITE) Dec. 13, 2014; Accra
Tullow Oil Dec. 18, 2014; Takoradi
Land Valuation Division (LVD) March 15, 2015; Sekondi
Development Planning Unit, STMA March 16, 2015; Sekondi
Ghana Rubber Estimates Limited March 23, 2015; Takoradi
Ghana National Canoe Fishermen Council (GNCFC) March 23, 2015; Takoradi
Ghana Rubber Estimates Limited March 26, 2015; Takoradi
Source: Own graph.
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In order to comply with ethical obligations, I provided an informed consent sheet to
each interviewee (see Appendix 3, page 199). Based on this sheet, I introduced myself
and explained the background and aim of my research. I further elucidated respondents
about their right to ask questions, to refuse answers or to withdraw at any time during
the interview. I ensured confidentiality and anonymity at all stages in the research pro-
cess and included my contact details in Ghana and Germany. I transcribed the recorded
semi-structured interviews and send the transcript to the respective respondents for proof-
reading and revisions.
Interviewer effects and informant biases influence the data’s quality. For example, being
a foreigner and a woman might have primed respondents’ answering behavior. Moreover,
informant biases (i. e., discrepancies between self-reported and actual behavior) occur
unintentionally or intentionally (Sudman and Bradburn 1974; Bernard et al. 1984: 504;
Knoke and Yang 2008: 35). As I was mainly interested in past exchanges and collabo-
rative efforts, respondents might, for example, have overestimated their interactions with
others (social desirability) or remained silent about certain interactions.66 To minimize
interviewer effects and informant biases, I phrased all questions plainly, shortly, respect-
fully and precisely. To ensure directionality, to expose respondents with the same stimuli
as much as possible, and to show respondents that I was “[...] prepared and competent
but [...] not trying to exercise excessive control” (Bernard 2006: 212), I used an interview
guide, i. e., a list of topics and questions I definitely wanted to cover during the respective
interview.67
Both observations and qualitative interviews carry benefits and limitations: Researchers’
lenses always filter observations and observational methods are, therefore, prone to per-
sonal biases. Equally, researchers influence the setting by their presence, behavior and
personal characteristics. Personal characteristics change the amount and kind of infor-
mation researchers have access to, their perception of the phenomena studied and their
relationship with informants (Bray 2008: 304). Moreover observed people tend to adopt
their behavior and tend to act differently as if they do unobserved (problem of reactivity).
Interviewing entails the drawback that “[t]he questions dictate the answer” (Gilchrist
and Williams 1999: 84). Inversely, cultural assumptions and traditions guide researchers
in the kind of questions they ask and the kind of people they interview. Informant biases
and inaccuracies are troublesome and marginalize the validity68 and accuracy of data
gained through interviewing. Ultimately, researchers have to define a satiation point in
the data collection process under the condition of limited resources and they constantly
66 The ‘spiral of silence effect’ stipulates that humans are social beings fearing social isolation. This
isolation prompts respondents to remain silent about certain topics rather than stating their opinions
(Noelle-Neumann 1984).
67 Contrary to structured interviews, semi-structured interviews do not include a catalogue of pre-defined
answer categories.
68 A ‘valid’ measurement truly reflects the phenomenon it is supposed to measure. In most cases, validity
is assumed rather than tested (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 57).
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have to face the fact that by entering the field, they become an independent variable in
the framework they are studying (Bray 2008: 304).
4.3 Survey Design
While observations and qualitative interviews are used for gaining and providing an initial
overview about which actors (aim) to steer petroleum resources and deriving revenues, a
survey instrument is used to scrutinize which of these actors ‘speak with the voice of the
people’. Actors across the public, civil and traditional sector recurrently use this frame
to seek influence for steering the oil and gas sector. But empirical insights into feelings of
representation do, so far, not exist.
Consequently, this section outlines the survey instrument administered in petroleum
affected communities in the Western Region in Ghana. It starts with a detailed discussion
of the sampling procedure to portray the numerous complications in the field. Afterwards,
the content of the questionnaire, its application and the advantages of the conducted
survey are summarized. The section closes with limitations and ethical considerations.
The rationale behind conducting structural interviews was to get insights in the an-
ticipation of representation and trust by those individuals who are directly affected by
the petroleum industry. A representative sample allows to draw generalizations regarding
affected citizens’ attitudes towards those actors who claim to represent communities.
4.3.1 Study Population and Sampling
In shedding light on the political attitudes of citizens, my research deviates from exist-
ing studies focusing on the resource curse and the wellbeing of coastal communities who
are assumed to suffer the most from the developing petroleum industry in Ghana. By
now, the term ‘affected communities’ is a frequently used and highly politicized narra-
tive. In all cases, coastal communities and, therein, fishers and fish mongers are framed
as most affected. This is a result of the increasing depletion of fish catches and, hence,
the deterioration of livelihoods in communities along the coast where fishing is the most
important economic resource. Yet, scientific results strongly question a negative relation-
ship between petroleum extraction and fish catch decreases (Environmental Protection
Agency 2014).69 Petroleum actors, practitioners and researchers nevertheless take upon
this narrative of ‘being affected’ without questioning the meaning of it: So far, no discus-
sion about how to define affectedness by offshore oil explorations has emerged. The aim
of having a precise definition of ‘being affected’ culminated in a quite different definition
69 Instead, overfishing, catching baby fishes and the use of illegal fishing methods provoke fish declines.
Such illegal fishing methods include the use of dynamite or so-called ‘light fishing’ to attract fishes
throughout the year (see Interview Transcript XII).
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of ‘affected communities’ in this research: The theoretical population70 in this survey
contains all individuals within the Western Region directly affected by the oil and gas
activities. Direct affectedness is defined as having lost land(s) and / or crops due to a
petroleum related infrastructure.
The 111km long ‘Ghana Gas Pipeline’, part of the ‘Western Corridor Gas Infrastruc-
ture Development Project Phase 1’, fits this criteria perfectly.71 The project, so far,
includes an offshore pipeline connecting the vessel at the Jubilee Field with the mainland
in Atuabo, a gas processing plant in Atuabo, and the 111km long Ghana Gas pipeline
connecting the gas plant with the Volta River Authority (VRA) power plant in Aboadze
close to Takoradi.72 The pipeline, depicted in Map 4.1, enters the mainland at Atuabo
(Ellembelle District), crosses the Western Region and ends in Aboadze (Sekondi-Takoradi
Municipality Area). I perceive this definition of ‘being affected’ as clearer and, hence, bet-
ter suitable for a PhD research. Furthermore, the route of the pipeline (going from the
coast to the hinterland back to the coast) gives a broad picture of people’s attitudes in
coastal and inland communities.
Short Background on the Ghana Gas Pipeline
Natural gas is an important global energy resource, much cleaner than coal or oil, and is
a versatile resource that can be employed in several different ways, including energy pro-
duction and fertilization (Coombs 2013: 210). The government’s rush for gas exploitation
is a direct consequence of the increasing demand for power by citizens, companies and
industries in Ghana. As the country’s economy grew considerably until recently since the
new millennium, citizens (with their partly increased incomes) and businesses consume
an increasing amount of electricity.73 The problem, however, is that the power infrastruc-
ture cannot keep up with this trend. Since 2008, Ghana experiences regular power cuts
that pose serious barriers to further economic growth and social development.74 Dumsor,
meaning “off and on” in Akan, has become part of Ghanaians’ everyday lives.75
70 The ‘theoretical’ population includes all units of interest. In some cases, this theoretical population is
equivalent to the ‘study’ population to which the researcher has access to.
71 The gas project is only one part of the planned “Western Corridor Development Zone”, which is
planned to include a petroleum terminal, the railway modernization, the Takoradi Port rehabilitation
as well as the Sekondi Free Zone.
72 Currently under construction is further a 75 km long lateral pipeline stretching between a gas distri-
bution station in Esiama (between Atuabo and Aboadze) and a regulating and metering station in
Prestea in the northern part of the Western Region (SINOPEC 2014: 5).
73 According to the Ministry of Energy, power demand is expected to grow at an annual rate of 7.5%
between 2012-2021, and, slightly decreased, at a rate of 6.3% from 2022 onwards.
74 According to estimates by GRIDCo, the public company in charge of electricity transmission in Ghana,
the power outrages costs up to 6% of GDP (Power Systems Energy Consulting (PSEC) 2010: 71).
75 Dumsor arises from a number of obstacles: First, the existing facilities do not sufficiently meet Ghana’s
power demand – even if they would work smoothly. Second, the Akosombo Dam, the biggest energy
supplier, suffers from significant water shortages which reduces the amount of generated hydro power.
Third, the natural gas supplies from Nigeria through the ‘West African Gas Pipeline’, which power the
thermal plants in Takoradi and Tema, are increasingly unreliable and continuously force authorities
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Figure 4.1: The Western Corridor Gas Infrastructure Development Project
Source: Justice Camillus Mensah and author’s own graph.
The company responsible for the project is the Ghana National Gas Company (GNGC),
most commonly referred to as “Ghana Gas”, in collaboration with Sinopec, a Chinese
state-owned company.76 The Government carved Ghana Gas out of the Ghana National
Petroleum Company (GNPC) in July 2011 in order to build, own and operate the gas
infrastructure.77 According to Ghana Gas, the project entails “enormous benefits to
Ghana”: new employment opportunities, socio-economic development, new infrastruc-
ture, and self-sufficient energy production (Ghana National Gas Company 2011: 7). The
“Environmental and Social Impact Assessment” for the pipeline re-emphasizes the gener-
ation of employment and training opportunities as the following abstract from the report
articulates:
to put the thermal plants on hold (Ministry of Energy 2012; Fritsch and Poudineh 2015). Fourth,
both the public VRA and the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) are coined by inefficiency, a lack
of transparency, and the failure to appropriately maintain existing infrastructure, let alone to build
new one (Fritsch and Poudineh 2015: 5-6).
76 The company has been accused of human rights violations in conflict-ridden Sudan.
77 Hereby, Ghana Gas is a midstream operator regulated by the Petroleum Commission (PC) in its
upstream activities, the Energy Commission in its midstream activities, and the National Petroleum
Authority and the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission in its downstream activities (Ghana Gas
2013). In brief, the upstream industry discovers and produces crude oil and natural gas, the midstream
industry stores, processes and markets the commodities and the downstream activities mean the
refining of crude oil or the distribution of natural gas.
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“The local economy is expected to benefit from regular monthly earnings of work-
ers and artisans during the 6 months construction period. Their purchasing power
will be greatly enhanced and members of the communities involved will be in a good
position to plan their personal and family lives better. This will in effect contribute
significantly to the national economy [...] Renting of rooms to the workers will also
develop as an avenue for generating income. This will improve the aesthetics of the
communities and encourage entrepreneurs to provide more social infrastructure such
as internet cafes, chop bars or even restaurants as well as other supporting services
in health and education. Availability of social amenities will therefore increase and
school children can have easy access to good education. Standards of living will very
likely improve” (Ghana National Gas Company 2012: 95, own emphasis).
Several remarks are questionable in this quotation: Firstly, considering the number of
about 150 people the project employed during the construction phase, it is controversial
to state that improvements to the salary of 150 people along a 111km long pipeline can
‘greatly enhance’ the purchasing power across the region. Secondly, it can be disputed
whether a salary over six months will put workers into a position ‘to plan their personal
family lives better’. Thirdly, the statement that income can be generated by renting
out rooms to the Chinese workers is questionable, taking into consideration that Chinese
workers tend to live in houses built by themselves and outside the communities.
In contrast to these alleged benefits, the project has been conflict-ridden since before
constructions started: In the very beginning, the pipeline was planned to run off-shore
close to the coast. Yet, this plan was soon abandoned.78 Likewise, Ghana Gas revised
the route of the pipeline: In the initial plans, the offshore pipeline was planned to come
onshore in Bonyere in the Jomorro District instead of Atuabo in the Ellembelle District.
The community of Bonyere is located approximately 15km west of Atuabo towards the
border with Cote d’Ivoire (see Map 4.1, page 51). Although the change of location was
explained and justified by several reports of independent valuators, there is speculation
that the location switched because of personal networks: the site only changed as both
the Minister of Energy (who is also the Member of Parliament (MP) for the Ellembelle
District) and the CEO of Ghana Gas come from the Ellembelle District, and favored the
re-location to secure the above mentioned project benefits to their home district.79
The ongoing changes of location contributed to a third problem, the overall delay by
18 months.80 According to estimates by Amin and Boakye (2014), the delay costed the
78 The Ghana National Gas Company (2012: xiii) states the following reasons: Lower capital cost, lower
operating and life cycle cost, easier handling of increasing gas flows from future oil fields, the potential
creation of direct and indirect employment opportunities for Ghanaians, as well as decreased threats
for public health and safety.
79 The rumors are aggravated by the ‘co-incidence’ that the brother of the MP is currently building a
hotel lodge next to Atuabo.
80 Legal proceedings against Ghana Gas initiated by the Omahen of the Nzema East Traditional Area,
where the gas plant is located, further caused this delay. See therefore Section 8.1.1.
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country around US$550 million per year since 2011.
Sampling
Following the definition of ‘direct affectedness’, the study population comprises an esti-
mated number of 72 communities along the gas pipeline. Time and financial constrains
made it necessary to select a sample population. A sample is a smaller but hopefully rep-
resentative collection of units from the study population. Sampling requires three consec-
utive steps: Building a sampling frame, selecting a sampling approach (non-probabilistic
or random) and determining the sampling size.
(1) The sampling frame is a list of units from which the sample is taken. Yet, in the
case of the gas pipeline, the local conditions impeded the building of a sampling frame
with individuals as units of analysis. Failing a list of individuals (for good reasons from an
ethical perspective), I used communities as the sampling frame. Yet, also a list of affected
communities was not available. Several informants explained to me that no such list exists.
Ghana Gas generally withholds information besides some few and irregular published press
statements. Official requests for a meeting or for further information were repeatedly
unsuccessful.81 As an alternative solution, I identified as many communities as possible
by studying secondary data,82 interviewing representatives of the Lands Commission and
the Land Valuation Department in Sekondi, and by using satellite and GIS data.
Despite this extensive research over several weeks, the ultimate number of affected
communities and, respectively, farmers and landowners is hard to finalize: For example,
on July 10, 2012, the Daily Guide reported that 166 farmers had been compensated for
crops destroyed in the course of the pipeline’s construction. According to a press statement
by Ghana Gas, released on November 26, 2012, 1498 farmers within 57 communities were
soon expected to receive compensation for their crops. On September 24, 2013, GhanaWeb
proclaimed a number of 2361 compensated farmers and 80 more to be compensated.
Contrary to this, the Centre for Public Interest Law (2014: 30, 53-55) report recounts 1566
farmers in 57-66 affected communities. The report supports its validity by presenting the
first actual list of affected communities. In the end, I was able to identify 72 communities
and approximated the number of 1800 affected individuals for the sampling frame.
(2) The second step in the sampling procedure is to select a sampling approach: In
random sampling,83 every unit within the population has an equal probability of being
81 One informant working for Ghana Gas traced this back to an incident occurred in 2014 which is still
pending: An organization interviewed a Ghana Gas Liaison Officer for ‘information purposes’ only.
After the interview, the organization publicly used the retrieved information against the company.
82 Newspaper articles, the Centre for Public Interest Law (CEPIL) report and documents from an
informant.
83 In non-probabilistic sampling some elements of the population do not have the chance of being selected.
Non-probabilistic samples are, per definitionem, not representative for the population, do not allow
for the estimation of sampling errors and prevent generalizations about the population. The most
frequently used non-probabilistic sampling techniques are quota sampling and convenient sampling.
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selected. This allows for the estimation of sampling errors and more valid generalizations
about the study population. Within random sampling, cluster sampling is a useful strat-
egy if no convenient list exists to built a sampling frame.84 Cluster sampling assumes that
individuals act in more or less enclosed ‘natural groups’. These groups can either refer
to villages or cities (geographical context) or to similar activities (like schools, churches,
etc.). If it is impossible to conduct a list of units for the sampling frame, a list of such nat-
ural groups can help out. From this cluster frame, an ex ante defined number of clusters
is randomly chosen as the study’s sample. Based on the community sampling frame with
72 affected communities, I used random cluster sampling to select sample communities.
First, I subdivided the study population in eight clusters along the district borders (see
Map 4.2). Second, I applied random sampling of communities and selected the first 30
communities on the list. Map 4.2 depicts the pipeline’s route, the district borders and
the sampled communities.
The comparably high number of 30 communities aimed at increasing the likelihood of
sampling at least one community within each district cluster. Further, such a scattered
selection of communities along the pipeline gives diverse insights in representation. As
it was usually impossible to determine the number of affected individuals within each
community in advance,85 it left a further 39 communities86 for additional random selection
in case the sample would be too small after visiting the initial 30 communities. Within
the 30 sampled communities, the respondents were randomly selected as much as possible.
84 Others are simple random, systematic, stratified, multistage and multiphase sampling. Stratified
sampling is useful to ensure the inclusion of key subpopulations in the sample (Bernard 2006: 153).
The study population is sub-divided by independent variables in several ‘strata’ which are, in the
following, treated as independent sub-populations. Every strata is included in the sample with a
particular number of strata units. I did not pursue the initial idea of applying stratified sampling
based on different communal categories (urban vs. rural, coastal vs. inland). Two major problems
impeded stratified sampling: First, it was hard to categorize urban vs. rural communities before
sampling. Second, a lot of farmers and landowners live, e.g., in an more urban community along the
coast, but have their (farming) land in a rural setting in the inland (or the other way around). This
fact made stratified sampling impossible.
85 We sometimes were able to find out an approximate number with the help of community members
and informants.
86 From the remaining 42 communities, we pretested the questionnaire in three communities, resulting
in 39 communities for subsequent random selection.
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Figure 4.2: Route of the Ghana Gas Pipeline and Sampled Communities
Source: Justice Camillus Mensah and author’s own graph.
(3) The third step is to determine the sample size. This minimum number of necessary
respondents for the sample to be representative depends on several factors such as the
size and the heterogeneity of the population, the size of subgroups, the estimates and
the precision. The minimum number of respondents can be determined based on the
(estimated) population size, a multiplier of the confidence level, the standard deviation
and a marginal error. With a confidence level of 95%, a margin error of 5% and the
population size of 1800, a minimum sample size of 317 respondents was found to be
statistically adequate (236 respondents for a confidence level of 90% respectively). Table
4.3 (page 55) provides an overview of the sample’s composition with N = 333.
Table 4.3: Overview of Sample’s Composition (N = 333)
Sex Male 58.26%, n = 194
Female 61.74%, n = 139
Age x = 51 years
min = 18, max =
101
Marital Status Married 74.17%, n = 247
Widowed 12.31%, n = 41
Divorced/Separated 7.51%, n = 25
Continued on next page
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Table 4.3 – Continued from previous page
Single 5.71%, n = 19
Polygamous Marriage 0.30%, n = 1
Household Size x = 7 people
min = 1, max = 21
Household Location Rural 69.37%, n = 231
Semi-Urban 12.01%, n = 40
Urban 18.62%, n = 62
Education No formal schooling 30.63%, n = 102
Primary School 55.85%, n = 186
High School 6.01, n = 20
Polytechnic 1.20%, n = 4
Bachelor 2.70%, n = 9
Diploma 1.50%, n = 5
Other 2.10%, n = 7
Major Occupation Farmer 74.77%, n = 249
Teacher 4.50%, n = 15
Fisher/Fishmonger 4.20%, n = 14
Artisan 3.00%, n = 10
Trader 2.10%, n = 7
Driver 1.20%, n = 4
Student 1.50%, n = 5
Unemployed 0.60, n = 2
Retired 2.40%, n = 8
Other 4.80%, n = 16
Source: Own graph. Answers derived from question numbers 1 - 5 including
the preamble.
4.3.2 Questionnaire Design
Survey questionnaires generally include either fixed-choice or open questions. Fixed-choice
questions enclose pre-coded answers whereas in open questions the respondents’ verbal an-
swers are noted and coded afterwards. The answering categories in fixed-choice questions
have to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive.87 My questionnaire instrument included
both fixed-choice items and open questions.88 I used open questions if exhaustive an-
swer categories were impossible to provide but also to break the monotony of fixed-choice
items. In fixed-choice items, I chose to use 5-point likert scales rather than 3-point likert
scales as I aimed to extract quasi-metric data and to give respondents the chance to make
87 ‘Mutually exclusive’ are answers only if respondents cannot confirm two categories at the same time.
‘Exhaustive’ questions cover all possible answers.
88 Converse and Presser (1986: 43) note the usefulness of using open questions as follow-ups to fixed-
choice questions as this procedure can guide the interpretation of fixed-choice questions results.
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“finer-grained choices” (Bernard 2006: 274).89
To ensure exhaustiveness and to increase the questions’ quality, I applied the guidelines
discussed in the previous section: To be unambiguous, clear and simple in the questions’
wording and to avoid loaded, biased or double-barreled questions. I thoroughly ordered
the questions from general to specific as interviewees tend to be as sensitive about the
order of questions as they are about the wording. To meet ethical demands, each question
included the residual categories ‘Other, please state’, ‘None’, ‘Don’t know’ and ‘Refuse to
answer’.90
The questionnaire consisted of ten thematic blocks (see Appendix 5, page 201). Each
time before starting a new section, the interviewer team (consisting of three research
assistants and myself) briefly informed the respondent about the upcoming topic. The
title page covers the name of the interviewee, contact details, the sex, the community
and traditional area, and the settlement location (urban, semi-urban, rural). Block (1),
Socio-Demography and Economic Activity, covers the age, the marital status, the edu-
cational degree, the household size, the number of years living within the community
and reasons for migrating to the community (if applicable). This section aims to give
a general overview over the participants’ backgrounds. Block (2), General Questions on
Political Issues in Ghana, targets the political involvement of respondents (political in-
terest, voting behavior and general trust in political actors and society). Moreover, the
respondents report three major challenges in their community and rank actors in their
helpfulness in addressing these challenges. This will show to what extent affected respon-
dents perceive the developing petroleum sector as a challenge at all and to give insights
into representation as commissioning. Block (3), the Land Acquisition and Compensation
Process (LACP), follows. This section divides the sample along landowners and farmers
and gives in-depth insights in respondents’ experiences within the LACP.91
Block (4), Knowledge about the Oil and Gas Sector, and Block (5), Interests and Infor-
mation in the Oil and Gas Sector, illuminate respondents’ knowledge about and interest
in the petroleum industry as well as the information policy of state authorities. It will
help to understand how much affected individuals actually know about the developments
taking place in their immediate living environment. In block (6), Participation in Oil
and Gas Related Matters, the interviewees report about their own engagements in the
petroleum sector. This section is decisive as results will highlight which actors respon-
dents rely on if they have a problem related to oil and gas and, consequently, which of
89 Furthermore, 5-point likert scales are standard in existing survey instruments such as the Afrobarom-
eter Survey.
90 These residual categories are disputed due to their non-interpretability and as more interviewees
choose them if they are offered (Converse and Presser 1986: 35). However, in my opinion, it is more
important to refrain from forcing respondents to answer all questions. Additionally, as the various
answers show, the problem of non-interpretability is absent in this research.
91 Even though the compiled answers provide novel insights in current developments in Ghana’s petroleum
industry, they are excluded from this thesis for the sake of clarity and shortness.
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these actors can claim to represent affected communities. To find out more about the
individually perceived inclusiveness in and satisfaction with the petroleum developments,
the questionnaire proceeds with block (7) (Personal Inclusiveness and Satisfaction). This
block aims to find out how satisfied affected citizens are with the way petroleum actors
govern the petroleum resources and deriving revenues.
The last three sections directly target the respondents’ satisfaction with, and trust in,
petroleum actors by first looking at the Performance of National Policy-Implementers
in block (8). In block (9), Trust, Power and Legitimacy in/of Policy-Implementers, re-
spondents evaluate their trust in and the perceived influence of petroleum actors. This
block is important as responses can be analyzed to show whether respondents differ in
their general trust towards political actors and the particular trust they forward to them
in petroleum governance. Moreover, two questions explicitly scrutinize the brokerage
abilities of non-state actors (traditional authorities, NGOs and media). Only respon-
dents who understood the concept behind NGOs and CSOs, answered the final block (10)
(Civil Society Assessment).92 Here, the interviewees summarize past participation(s) in
NGO projects and the usefulness thereof. The very last question includes a list of NGOs
and CSOs who are active in the oil and gas sector. This section will test whether these
organizations are really known by the people they aim to represent. The questionnaire
closes with an open window for additional remarks to give respondents the chance to add
comments which they felt should be included in my PhD project.
4.3.3 Arising Problems and Applied Solutions
The structure of the questionnaire, the questions themselves as well as the interview
situation influence the quality of extracted data and the amount of missing data. To put
the research into a larger picture, I will shortly discuss some problems I faced in the field
and how I tried to solve them. They range from methodological challenges over practical
problems to ethical considerations.
Methodological Problems and Applied Solutions
A very general problem of survey instruments is their artificial demand: Respondents are
essentially ‘forced’ to put a numerical ‘price tag’ on non-numerical behavior or attitudes.
This demands high cognitive abilities of respondents and potentially blurs reality. Further,
even if the questionnaire includes a ‘Refuse to answer’ category, social desirability research
shows that respondents may shy away from choosing this exit option as they face the
person that is interested in the answer. Particularly in light of controversial questions,
this face-to-face situation can cause false statements. Moreover, face-to-face interviews
92 This filter induces high drop out rates. This is unfortunate for the analysis, yet it already tells us a
lot about the image and self-image of civil society actors on the grass root level.
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are “intrusive and reactive [and it] takes a lot of skills to administer a questionnaire
without subtly telling the respondent how you hope he or she will answer your questions”
(Bernard 2006: 257). The problem of reactivity increases with the engagement of research
assistants as respondents tend to adapt to the person asking the questions. Hence, with
the different interviewers in my PhD project, the respondents faced different stimuli – but
imposing the same stimuli to all interviewees is the initial idea of structured interviews.
To counterbalance these disadvantages, the research team always encouraged respon-
dents to not shy away from making use of the residual answering categories. As the
answers show, respondents made particularly use of the “Don’t know” category, for ex-
ample with regard to the performance of NGOs: Within the sample, 35.74% (n = 119)
respondents indicate to not know (enough about) NGOs for evaluating their performance.
The data, thus, suggests that respondents did not shy away due to social desirability. To
decrease interviewer effects, the research team discussed the questionnaire in-length and
the Ghanaian assistants agreed upon a common translation of the English questionnaire
into Fante and Twi. All of them speak at least one of the local languages dominating
the Western Region and were, thus, able to interview respondents in their mother tongue
if required. Moreover, all research assistants have profound knowledge in administering
questionnaires. We further intensively discussed each field trip and, thus, had constant
feedback mechanisms to minimize respondents’ reactivity and interviewer biases.
Practical Problems and Applied Solutions
A rather practical downside of surveys are the high financial costs and the trade-off
between these costs, the available time and the sample size: To increase the size of the
sample, researchers either have to delegate responsibilities to research assistants who need
to get paid or they have to invest more time for interviewing more respondents on their
own. Working with three research assistants helped to best balance sample size, duration
of the survey and financial possibilities.
Time can turn into a problem in face-to-face interviews on its own: Interviewing over
300 respondents with the same questionnaire is challenging and tiring. Related to this,
external challenges such as bad infrastructure and climatic conditions (e.g., heavy rain-
falls, floods, etc.) are time-consuming. Moreover, researchers need to take care of not
“[...] being overtaken by events [...]” (Bernard 2006: 258), e.g. in the case of political
disruptions. These challenges are particularly troublesome as they are completely inde-
pendent from the researcher’s agency. In order to minimize these disadvantages, we tried
to minimize the duration of the questionnaire’s application to four months and collected
the data during dry season (as some of the communities are hard or impossible to reach
during the rainy season). Yet, bad infrastructure greatly aggravated our travels and, thus,
was very time consuming.
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Ethical Problems and Applied Solutions
The ethical considerations of the Belmont Report discussed in Section 4.2 are as much
as valid and decisive for survey studies as they are for exploratory methods: Respect for
respondents and their fair and equal treatment is crucial. Equally essential are informed
consent with extensive information in a comprehensive manner, willingness to volunteer,
a risk-benefit-assessment, the right to refuse or withdraw, confidentiality, and anonymity.
Besides these general guidelines, I want to discuss some particular examples emerged in
my survey research: First and foremost, the affected individuals were not asked whether
they want to be present in the population, sampling frame or sample. Strictly speaking,
already this first step violates the ethical guidelines of voluntariness and informed consent.
Some community leaders and members were skeptical about how they had been identified.
The biggest challenge we faced – besides transportation – was to assure communities that
we were not working for or with Ghana Gas. Thereby, we always emphasized that the
study will not influence government’s decisions or the compensation processes. Besides
that, both community leaders and community members were very welcoming and open
to us.
Second, as I worked with research assistants, the number of people who are able to iden-
tify respondents and the danger of violated confidentiality increased. As a consequence,
they all ensured confidentiality before starting to work on the survey. Third, we tried
to interview everyone who was interested in sharing their experiences and opinions with
us.93
Lastly, the question of whether or not paying the respondents and gatekeepers came
up. The decision for or against financial compensation is disputed: While some argue it is
a rightful exchange, others argue that it compromises the ‘scientific community’ as future
researchers might not have the available resources to follow suit to a researcher who paid
informants. In my case, the decision for or against payment was obsolete as the size of
my sample inherently impeded a financial compensation of respondents.
4.3.4 Application in the Field
Before entering a community as an outsider in Ghana, it is appropriate and in most
cases necessary to first introduce yourself and the purpose of your visit to the community
leaders. Depending on the communal setting, these leaders include the local chief(s),
the District Assembly representative or other opinion leaders. Therefore, introducing
ourselves and the purpose of the research was always the first step. In most cases, we had
some background understanding of the respective community leaders and were able to
93 This means we did not restrict the number of respondents before entering the community so that




prepare appropriately.94 Almost all community leaders were very welcoming and helpful
in identifying affected community members. In most cases, we interviewed the community
members at their homes or at communal places.
Before the interviewing process started, we explained the purpose of the study, the right
to refuse and all other ethical necessities, based on the “Participant Information Sheet”
(see Appendix 4, page 200) of which each respondent received a copy.
To improve the questionnaire’s overall quality, the research team pretested it in Novem-
ber 2014 before the main survey took place between December 2014 and March 2015. By
pretesting, I aimed to evaluate the questionnaire as a whole and to assess the quality of
each single question (Converse and Presser 1986: 54-65). Together with the assistants,
I pretested the questionnaire with 17 different respondents (men and women, old and
young, literate and illiterate) in three affected communities in different geographical set-
tings (urban and rural, coastal and inland) in three waves. The pretesting phase helped to
shape the questionnaire, to discover important items and to eliminate unnecessary ones.
Although I conducted open-ended interviews particularly in the beginning of my field
research, I applied this method also during the survey in affected communities. If all
respondents chose to answer the questionnaire in Fante or Twi, I could not help in the
interviewing process due to my insufficient knowledge of either of these languages. This
gave me the time to talk to community leaders or other communities members. Herein, I
spoke with several chiefs, opinion leaders, citizens and Ghana Gas Liaison Officers.95 The
conversations mainly evolved around the implications of the gas infrastructure and more
general concerns.
In summary, the investigation of the second main research question – which of the
actors who aim or claim to steer petroleum resources and resulting revenues (collectively)
are representatives of petroleum-affected communities – is based on the answers of 333
individuals who lost crops and/or land due to the construction of the Ghana Gas pipeline.
The third research question – to what extent do these actors collaborate with each other
– is premised on the analysis of social network data. The following section discusses the
collection of these data.
94 After explaining my status as a PhD Student, we were never obliged to provide the traditional gifts
of schnapps or money. In one case we had the a priori knowledge that the chief will insist on the
schnapps, so we decided to follow suit. In a second case we were asked to contribute to the renovation
of the chief palace after we interviewed community members. As the chief allowed us to conduct the
interviews without his presence in his palace, we were happy to contribute a minor amount of money.
95 Ghana Gas engages these officers to act as a point of contact and broker between communities and
the company. In most cases, these Liaison Officers are community members and used to farm before
starting to work for Ghana Gas. According to conversations with three different Liaison Officers,
they each are responsible for about four communities and earn around 800 Ghana Cedis (∼ US$
210 per month). They all got the jobs by chance such as David who observed the Land Valuation
Division (LVD) demarcating the land. As his community was not informed before the valuation took
place, he went to Ghana Gas for more information and got the job in return. Also Daniel got the job
by his own initiative after getting to know that Ghana Gas is looking to engage community members.
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4.4 Social Network Analysis (SNA)
As discussed in Section 2.1.2 (page 13), scientists and practitioners in international devel-
opment cooperation assume that natural resource governance is successful only if a diverse
set of actors are able to participate and interact in the steering of natural resources and
deriving revenues. Among other things, proponents of this approach argue that through
actors’ collaboration, knowledge and innovations spread easier and faster and that col-
laboration benefits the formation of mutual trust. Social Network Analysis (SNA) is the
most suitable research technique to scrutinize relations and interactions between social
entities. It helps to understand interactions in-depth by providing “[...] a convenient,
efficient, and [...] productive way of penetrating to the heart of various social orders” and
by sensitizing “[...] the investigator to the inherent tension in social relations between
persons who have differential access to resources which affect power chances” (Boissevain
1979: 393).
Surprisingly, development researchers only begin to scrutinize natural resource gover-
nance by the means of SNA (Bodin and Crona 2009; Bodin et al. 2011; Ramirez-Sanchez
and Pinkerton 2009; Ramirez-Sanchez 2011; Lienert, Schnetzer, and Ingold 2013). And
within this little space of cross-cutting disciplines and methodologies, the available infor-
mation on how to individually generate social network data is still scarce: Insights into
the development of a suitable questionnaire and its application in the field remain very
limited. If SNA data is generated in the field, questionnaires often consist of only two
dichotomous questions examining the existence or absence of relationships among actors
(Ramirez-Sanchez 2011; Lienert, Schnetzer, and Ingold 2013). Yet, such a research ap-
proach is insufficient to answer the third research question. Accordingly, the next section
first defines networks in terms of boundary, population and sampling. It then discusses
the structure of the questionnaire used to generate network data among petroleum actors
in Ghana and provides an overview of the derived data.96 The chapter proceeds with
debating arising challenges and applied means to address these challenges. It closes with
summarizing how the different data sets are used to answer the thesis’ central research
questions.
4.4.1 Boundaries, Population and Sampling
The first step in a SNA is to identify the network actors (boundary setting) and, if the
network is too big, to sample. Laumann, Marsden, and Prensky (1989) are the pioneers in
recognizing the significance of boundary setting. Until then, “[...] boundaries of a network
are presented as so self-evident in a social situation studied as to require no comment”
96 For studying ego-centric networks see, for example, Prell (2012: 65-66). For theoretical reasoning
and differentiations in ego-centric networks (such as intimate, effective and extended networks) see
Boissevain (1968).
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(Laumann, Marsden, and Prensky 1989: 20). The boundary of a network refers to the
demarcation line “[...] around a set of actors that the researcher deems to be the complete
set of actors for the network study” (Prell 2012: 66). The difficulty of identifying this set
of actors varies, according to the study interest.97
Laumann, Marsden, and Prensky (1989) suggest a two-steps procedure: First, network
researchers have to choose between proceeding either nominalistic or realistic. The nom-
inalist approach sets the boundary based on theoretical or practical considerations (Lau-
mann, Marsden, and Prensky 1989: 21; Prell 2012: 66-67) whereas the realist approach
assumes that “[...] a social entity exists as a collectively shared subjective awareness of
all, or at least most, of the actors who are members” (Laumann, Marsden, and Prensky
1989: 21).98 Second, network researchers need to choose from three “definitional foci”
(Laumann, Marsden, and Prensky 1989). These three foci are attributes, relations and
events, or a mixture of all of them. The most frequently used focus are actors’ attributes.
If actors possess a particular attribute, they are inside the boundary, if not they are ex-
cluded.99 The second focus defines those actors as network alters who share a specific
type of social relation (e.g. advisory relation).100 The third focus are events : Here, the
network consists of actors who participate in the same event(s) (‘event-based approach’,
Wasserman and Faust 1994; Marsden 2005; Knoke and Yang 2008). As all approaches
come with advantages and disadvantages, no approach overrides the other. Rather, all
are ideal types and scientists have to adapt them case-to-case while taking theoretical and
practical considerations into account.101
In the present research, the nominalistic approach was combined with the three foci
in a three-step approach.102 The first step studied the Petroleum Revenue Management
97 If studying the relations among students in a classroom, the classroom is the boundary and, hence, the
boundary definition is straightforward. In other cases, and this is rather the rule than the exception,
it is difficult or even impossible to correctly determine the boundary (Wasserman and Faust 1994:
31).
98 Realistic network researchers therefore include those actors who are perceived as network members by
the alters themselves. An early selection of key informants, who are able to identify members of the
network, is consequently crucial (Prell 2012: 66).
99 The most popular approach using the attributional focus is the ‘positional approach’ which includes
actors in a certain position (e.g. all CEOs from different organizations) in the network.
100 The most popular approach using this foci is the ‘reputational approach’: The researcher starts with
an initial list of actors (roster) who are identifiable network members. These actors are then asked to
nominate alters with which they share, e.g., an advisory relation.
101 Moreover, we should keep in mind that the two-steps procedure can cause different networks and, by
that, different results. This becomes evident if we, for example, rely on the reputational approach:
Firstly, the boundary is biased by the initial actors on the roster. Other respondents might nominate
different actors as network alters. Secondly, taking into account only those alters who are immediately
nominated, can cause a more densely connected network than the other two approaches. Yet, the
reputational approach is important for “hard-to-reach populations [...] such as drug dealers and user,
illegal immigrants, sex partners of HIV-positive people, or underground militia”(Knoke and Yang
2008: 18). The best strategy depends on the context. Mixing foci by starting with one focus and
reviewing the results with the other two foci seems to be a favorable solution.
102 Mixing the three foci by applying them gradually is possible but tend to overestimate the network’s size
(and, hence, more theoretical degrees of freedom, Laumann, Marsden, and Prensky (1989: 28-30)).
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Act, Act 815 (PRMA) and deemed those actors inside the petroleum actors’ network who
are legally assigned to influence the petroleum revenues’ management. These are specific
actors like the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum but also here-called ‘sectors’ like civil
society, traditional authorities or media representatives. The second step reviewed this
nominalistic approach with the attributional focus, here defined as taking (or aiming for)
an active part in petroleum governance, e.g. by providing policies such as the Ministry
of Finance or by implementing petroleum related projects such as NGOs. The third step
cross-checked the results by attending numerous meetings (event focus) and by observing
interaction patterns during these meetings (relational focus).
By these means, I compiled a list of potential network actors (“roster”) with 41 organi-
zations and institutions from ten different sectors (see Appendix 8, page 217). For lack of
time it was impossible to interview all 41 actors. But contrary to traditional surveys that
consider actors to be independent units which can be added until a representative sample
of the study population is reached, network data are non-independent observations and
impede a random selection by nature. Consequently, I had to apply convenient sampling
and interviewed all actors who were accessible and who were interested in participating
in the study. As a result, the interactions and relations analyzed in this thesis compile an
‘artificial’ network, a snapshot of a much bigger network.
4.4.2 Questionnaire Design
Network researchers essentially use four key methods to extract network data: Internet-
based data extraction,103 archival studies,104 observations, and interviews.105 I used obser-
vations as initial stage of discovering unknown relations and a questionnaire as the main
instrument.106 The questionnaire consists of three parts (see Appendix 7, page 216): Six
103 They currently enjoys considerable attention. Due to the rise of social media platforms (e.g. Facebook,
Twitter) and professional platforms (e.g. LinkedIn), the data volume is massive, easy accessible, and
allows for sophisticated quantitative network and data mining models. Moreover, drawbacks of other
methods such as biases or recall mistakes in observations and interviewing are avoided (Prell 2012:
74).
104 Archival studies are most frequently used in cases in which the interactions of network alters can not
be studied directly (Henning et al. 2012: 82-83; Marsden 2005: 24. The most famous social network
publication realized with archival methods is the study of Florentine networks in medieval Italy society
by Padgett and Ansell (1993). By extensively combing historical archives, they identified different
types of relationships (e.g. kinship, marriage ties and business ties), were able to explain the Medici’s
rise to power, and moved the focus of network studies away from structure to localized agency.
105 Other methods are experimental designs, (reverse) small-world techniques or Cognitive Social Structure
(CSS) designs. Small-world techniques search for chains of connections at different removes. The
reverse small-world methods searches for an extended number of connections in immediate social
circles by the means of an initial imaginary sample of network alters (Killworth and Bernard 1978;
Knoke and Yang 2008: 27). CSS designs gain data indirectly by that respondents report on their
perceptions of other people’s relations rather than their own (Krackhardt 1987; Wasserman and Faust
1994: 51-54; Marsden 2005: 9, 20-21; Knoke and Yang 2008: 32-34).
106 The observations were helpful to navigate through the variety of organizations and institutions partic-
ularly in the beginning of the field research. A number of characteristics yet became apparent: First,
observing interactions between different pairs of organizations was challenging as not all interactions
64
4.4 Social Network Analysis (SNA)
preliminary questions give background information about respondents, the organization
they work for and its respective goals in the petroleum sector. These answers are pivotal
in order to scrutinize actors’ agendas in petroleum governance and to test how communi-
ties’ interests and actors’ agendas intersect in petroleum governance. The questionnaire’s
second part consists of 13 open questions that extract directed and valued network data.
Directed data indicate the direction of a tie from the sender i to the addresse j. As
undirected data ‘only’ denote the presence or absence of a relation, directed data hold
more content, allow for a better understanding of relations and, thus, are preferable to
undirected data. The same applies to the dichotomy between binary and valued data:
Binary data only measure present or absent ties (i. e., dummy variables) whereas valued
data indicate the strength, intensity, duration or frequency of a relation (Wasserman and
Faust 1994: 44). Yet, as Granovetter (1973) famously shows with his concept of ‘the
strength of weak ties’, strong ties are not automatically ‘better’ or more useful than weak
ties and it depends on the researcher to interpret the meaning of valued network data.
Twelve of these relational questions generate both active (outgoing) and passive (incom-
ing) ties in regard to six forms of economic and social exchanges (general communication,
meetings, advising, advocacy, resource exchange and gatekeeping). Tackling both direc-
tions allows to cross-check answer and this aim constitutes a decisive novelty of this PhD
research. As results in Chapter 7 show, only about 30% of interactions are confirmed by
both the sender and the addressee of a tie.
The 13. relational question aimed to extract negative ties, a major research gap in
SNA research. Unfortunately, the answering behavior of most respondents leads to the
conclusion that the question’s wording was not well chosen. Though I tried to phrase it in
a ‘positive’ way (“With which of your contacts / partners are you currently not intending
to collaborate in the year 2015?”), only two respondents specified former partners with
whom they would not collaborate again in the future. All other interviewees stated
that they would continue collaborating if the chance arises. It remains unclear whether
this is really the case or whether respondents shied away from giving a correct answer.
Considering the resource scarcity in the petroleum sector and the general openness of
all actors to interact, it is not unlikely that actors indeed intent to collaborate with all
contacts / partners again.
The questionnaire’s third part consists of six attributional, closed-end questions in
which respondents evaluate their alters on a scale from 1-5 with regard to the following
attributes: usefulness to consult, to coordinate, to represent, to link unconnected alters,
the amount of trust,107 and the assigned influence in petroleum governance. These attri-
are visible and, hence, observable. Second, as discussed in the previous section, actors tend to behave
differently if observed. Ultimately, I had to be very clear on what constitutes an interaction: Is it
merely the presence of two individuals in the same room, their greeting or is it rather a conversation
for a certain period?.
107 In order to ensure the same understanding of ‘trust’ by all respondents, I chose to use a very narrow
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butional questions (also called ‘name interpreter’ questions) allow to check to what extent
relational and attributive data coincide.
4.4.3 Arising Problems and Applied Solutions
Gaining network data through interviews brings along the same problems as do survey
studies (see Section 4.3, page 49) and some specific challenges: inaccurate data (reliability
and validity), missing data and ethical problems. Very profoundly, it was necessary
to define ‘collaboration’ by distinguishing six ways of collaborating and by illustrating
each way with a specific example. Simply asking whether or not actors ‘collaborate’
would have been an invalid instrument as actors can understand ‘collaboration’ very
differently. Besides validity, discrepancies between actual and reported behavior pose a big
problem for the reliability of SNA data. In ‘traditional’ social science methods, a reliable
measurement yields the same results over and over again. However, this understanding is
problematic in SNA as relations are fluid and unstable over time (Knoke and Yang 2008:
38).108 This problem made it necessary to define a specific timeframe, i. e., the year 2014.
Readers might rightly argue that capturing one year is insufficient and that actors within
the petroleum sector interacted before 2014. Other readers might argue that one year is
too long to approximate, yet to recall, different means of collaboration across a number
of exchange partners. Both views are justified but three reasons required this specific
timeframe: Firstly, this timeframe was clearly demarcated and easy to define. Secondly,
all pretest respondents109 felt more comfortable with this timeframe and favored it over
the two other tested timeframes (“the last three months” and “the last six months”).
Thirdly, as I had the chance to meet each interviewee at least once before the actual
SNA interview took place, I could inform respondents about the questions’ style so that
they could think about their (long term) patterns of interactions or even go through their
diaries. Consequently, the one year timeframe turned out to be the best option in the
field and the best practice in order to balance respondents’ memories and relatively stable
patterns of interactions.110
understanding of trust. I defined it (and explained it to each interviewee) as ‘receiving trustworthy
information‘, that is the trust that information are provided “[...] in good faith according to the best
of competence [...] where opportunism is limited or absent” (Ramirez-Sanchez and Pinkerton 2009).
108 Prell (2012: 77) argues that SNA measurements are reliable if they generate reciprocal ties. Yet, this
understanding is problematic in some kinds of relations, for examle in regard to advice as in my study:
If i nominates j as a family member, the measurement is assumed to be reliable if j replicates this
relation.
109 The pretest respondents were familiar with the structural context of my study and actors in the
network but outside the boundary themselves.
110 Freeman and Romney (1987) make a resounding theoretical argument to defend network data against
the criticism that network data are overall invalid and unreliable as respondents tend to forget alters
and are biased towards regular interactions (see, for example, Bernard 1977). They state that even
though recalls are biased, they are biased towards the norm rather than the exception and, hence,
are valid and reliable: “To some extent [...] the verbal recall data should at least in part, be tapping
into the subject’s recollections of the same kinds of regular patterns of interaction that we have
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Nevertheless, the SNA data are prone to inconsistencies, for example if respondents
reported themselves as better connected than they actually were, if they were unable to
memorize occurred interactions or if they falsely recalled exchanges. These inconsisten-
cies either stem from unintentional cognitive structures, informant biases, lacking trust
towards the interviewer, ‘wrong’ interviewees or are the result of intentional false state-
ments (Knoke and Yang 2008: 36-38, see also Bernard and Killworth 1977; Bernard,
Killworth, and Sailer 1979; Bernard et al. 1984).111 To tackle this problem, the collection
of both outgoing and incoming ties is decisive as it allows to control for false memories,
strategic responding and the ‘individual reliability’ of each respondents.112 To address
the potential problem of lacking trust, I met each of the interviewees several times and
scheduled semi-structured interviews before the actual SNA interview.
‘Wrong’ interviewees were a challenge that could only be minimized and not completely
solved. It refers to the presence of various large organizations in the petroleum sector (e.g.,
the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum). While I interviewed
respondents as representatives of their respective organization, relations are still very
much linked to individuals. Particularly in the case of larger organizations, this can lead
to contradictions in answers and may trouble the reciprocity of ties. To address this
challenge, I followed Casciaro’s (1998) and Marsden’s (2005: 23) suggestions to consider
respondents’ personalities, their position in the organization and their position in the
larger network structure. I interviewed those people who had a leading role regarding
petroleum governance in their organizations and who I felt were able and willing to answer
the network questionnaire. However, as some of the interviewed organizations are very
small, I will not display the status of respondents in any of the interviewed organizations.
For the sake of protecting respondents, network researchers often have to take the loss of
data and the loss of some clarity in their publications (Kadushin 2005: 145).
Incompleteness in my data set is mainly caused by missing actors who were not in-
terviewed due to time and financial constraints. SNA is particularly sensitive to missing
data as only one absent tie can alter the observed network structure completely, for ex-
ample if this concerns a broker that connects two separated networks.113 Though missing
characterized as social structure. Subjects will be systematically biased, but they will be biased in
the direction of providing accurate descriptions of the underlying structure that is our true focus of
interest”(Freeman and Romney 1987: 331).
111 LaPiere (1934) famously shows that most people tend to differ in what they practice and in what they
preach: Between 1930-1932, LaPiere visited over 250 hotels and restaurants together with a Chinese
couple. They were ‘only’ refused in one of these places. Afterwards LaPiere send out letters to all
hotels and restaurants asking whether they would accept “members of the Chinese race” in their
location – 92% reported to not accept Chinese.
112 With the increase SNA data collection, current network researchers caution against so-called “strategic
responding” by interviewees. If respondents are aware that their answers might influence their future
within an organization (or the future of fellow or unpleasant colleagues), they tend to manipulate the
‘true’ structure. If respondents even coordinate themselves, this can end up in a “dialectical arms
race” (Borgatti and Molina 2003: 345).
113 Here it is important to differentiate ‘absent ties’ from ‘null ties’. Absent ties are those ties for which
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data are “[...] exceptionally troublesome [...]” (Borgatti and Molina 2003: 339), there is
“[...] no failsafe solution [...]” (Knoke and Kuklinski 1982: 35) to this problem, neither in
literature nor in this research.114 From the compiled list of network actors with 41 organi-
zations, I was ‘only’ able to interview 29. Therefore, it is again pivotal to emphasize that
the networks analyzed in the empirical chapters are only a snapshot of existing relations
and not the network in petroleum governance in Ghana.
In regard to the ethical challenges I faced, the most interesting question might be: Who
owns the reported ties? On the one hand, we can argue that ties always belong to the
source and the addressee. Consequently, it is unethical to use relational data if only one
of the involved actors is participating in the study. On the other hand, we can maintain
that the respective respondent is the sole owner of what (s)he perceives as and reports
about a relation and, consequently, network data can simply be treated as data gained by
more ‘conventional’ methods of data collection. Either way, both arguments have a saying
and researchers have to carefully decide on a case-by-case basis what the most appropriate
procedure is. In this research, I focus on complete network data, i. e., answers from both
sender and target.
Besides this fundamental question, the research confronted three further ethical points:115
The first concerns the anonymity of network alters. As it is the very aim of network anal-
ysis to extract names, respondents actively report about their interactions and the unsus-
pecting addressee of ties become identifiable (Borgatti and Molina 2003: 338; Kadushin
2005). This inherent lack of anonymity posed burdens both to my interviewees (who had
to trust that I will handle the data appropriately) and to myself who has to do justice to
this trust throughout the research project. Second, as rosters violate anonymity if they
entail the names of individuals,116 I only included the names of organizations and not
the names of individuals. To further respect the first Belmont Report guideline (to avoid
harms to innocents), I thoroughly veiled my network data for identifying information,
replaced names with ID numbers and remove all other identifying attributes.117
researchers have no information about their nature (regardless of whether or not they are present)
whereas ‘null ties’ indicate a missing link between two actors (Zˇnidarsˇicˇ, Doreian, and Ferligoj 2012:
134).
114 The following authors discuss the problem: Knoke and Kuklinski 1982; Stork and Richards 1992;
Schafer and Graham 2002; Robins, Pattison, and Woolcock 2004; Borgatti and Molina 2003 Huisman
and Steglich 2008; Huisman 2009; Zˇnidarsˇicˇ, Ferligoj, and Doreian 2012; Zˇnidarsˇicˇ, Doreian, and
Ferligoj 2012.
115 Ethical obstacles do not only arise with primary data but also with publicly available secondary data
as SNA makes ‘invisible visible’ Kadushin (2005: 149).
116 Seeing the own name on the list can further discourage potential respondents to participate in the
survey (Prell 2012: 80).
117 Borgatti and Molina (2003) argue that ‘innocents’ can be avoided in the first place by complete
disclosure of participating actors and voluntarism. If everyone knows which actors are participating
in the survey, no one is ‘innocent’ in that sense. The expanding selection method used to enlarge the
roster violates this rules as alters were added step-by-step. If an alter was nominated three times,
I gained access to this actor with the help of the sender of the tie as suggested by (Kadushin 2005:
149).
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The third ethical problem relates to the relative youth of network analysis. By now,
(most) people are used to ‘traditional’ methods of social science. People habitually report
what their opinions and perceptions and are, if informed rightly, well aware of possible
consequences. Yet, this is often not the case in network studies. Due to its youth in social
sciences, “[...] we are in what could be called the golden age of social network research
because most respondents seem to fill out the questionnaires quite naively” (Borgatti
and Molina 2003: 345). Also the network actors in this study were not familiar with
network analysis and its potentially powerful results (Borgatti and Molina 2003: 341). As
a consequence, I extensively explained the aims and methods behind SNA, how I plan to
use the data and what research outputs might emerge. I further emphasized the voluntary
basis of participating, lacking financial benefits, confidentiality and anonymity according
to the “Participant Information Sheet” (see Appendix 6, page 215). The answer categories
‘Don’t know’, ‘Refuse to answer’ and ‘Not applicable’ were included in the interviews.
4.4.4 Application in the Field
To obtain the network data, I interviewed 29 organizations and institutions from Jan-
uary 2015 to March 2015. The preliminary meeting observations and the semi-structured
interviews gave necessary background information and helped to identify knowledgeable
respondents within larger organizations. During the interview, respondents reported their
relations to each actor on the roster with initially 41 organizations and institutions. The
first question118 compiled the ‘personal’ roster for the respective respondent and formed
the basis for the subsequent questions. The roster was helpful as it allowed interviewees
to recognize rather than to recall alters. If necessary, I gave contextual assistance (‘aided
recalls’) to stimulate respondents’ memories. As rosters are prone to the inclusion of
unnecessary or the exclusion of necessary actors (Prell 2012: 72-73), I adopted the ex-
panding selection method provided by Doreian and Woodard (1992). They use a roster
but give their interviewees the opportunity of free recalls if their alters are not included
in the roster. The initial list is revised and enlarged after the same actor has received at
least three nominations by different respondents.
In the petroleum sector, this procedure was necessary as the set of actors who (aim
to) steer petroleum resources is scattered and convoluted. The method combined the
advantages of rosters with the flexibility of recalls. In the course of 29 network interviews,
the initial roster with 41 organizations increased to the final roster with 58 actors (see
Appendix 8, page 217). For example, the respondents completely ‘generated’ the interna-
tional civil society sector and the sector with ‘other institutions’ (such as the University
in Kumasi, the Auditor General Department, etc). As I never came across any of these
118 “In the year 2014, with which of the following actors have you interacted with, by face-to-face talks,
telephone, emails or any other communication means, concerning matters related to Oil and Gas in
Ghana?”.
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across during meetings or interviews, and for the lack of time, I did not interview any
actors out of these two sectors but ‘added’ five actors from other sectors. After the per-
sonal roster was compiled, the numeric answers in regard to the 13 relational and the six
attributional network questions were captured in a matrix (see Appendix 9, page 219).
To sum up, the aim of generating a pool of primary network data by interviewing net-
work alters is ambitious. Not only do researchers have to define the network boundaries
and get in contact with all network members but they also have to prioritize different
means of collaboration, find suitable instruments for their measurement and have to iden-
tify qualified and interested respondents. They additionally have to thoughtfully handle
aspects of inconsistencies, incompleteness and ethical precautions.
4.5 Summary
It became obvious that this thesis works with triangulation, a procedure that mixes
methods of data collection and analysis under the assumption that different methodical
strategies are complementary rather than mutually exclusive (Bryman 2006: 109-110;
Porta and Keating 2008: 34).119 Triangulation is assumed to underpin scale validity in
quantitative studies (Merrill-Matzner 2006: 133; Petro´czi, Nepusz, and Bazso´ 2007: 39)
and to increase data efficiency and reliability (Boyne 2011: 47). Moreover, it is particularly
useful in research designs which include a network approach. For example, Prell (2012:
68) regularly informs her SNA questionnaire designs by means of qualitative methods
before data collection. Petro´czi, Nepusz, and Bazso´ (2007: 42) review their quantitative
data against observational results after data collection and Walther (2015) combines SNA
results with qualitative data that provide information on the historical and social nature
of actors’ ties.120 From a similar perspective, I argue that in order to fully grasp problems
in natural resource governance as a prime example of a convoluted, complex problem,
it is necessary to understand the dynamics ‘on the ground’ (by qualitative analysis) to
subsequently relate it to ‘the bigger picture’ (by quantitative analysis).
Besides these theoretical and analytical components, practical considerations favor a
triangulated research approach. Qualitative methods (desktop studies, attendances of
meetings, exploratory interviewing and semi-structured interviews) helped to embed the
research questions into the local context throughout the field research. Additionally, the
exploratory methods provided the contacts to petroleum actors and were necessary to
build trust with interviewees. Ultimately, the qualitative methods opened the doors for
the survey in affected communities and the SNA questionnaire.121
119 Due to this mixture, some researchers prefer to use the term ‘multi-method approach’ rather than
‘triangulation’ (MacLean 2010: 35; Muethel 2012: 121).
120 For mixed-methods in SNA see Edwards (2010).
121 In this sense, qualitative methods are somewhat exploited for the subsequent quantitative procedure.
This remark is linked to the differentiation by Klein and Newell (1996: 10-11) between instrumental
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To this end, I conduct a mixed-method assessment to answer the thesis’ six subques-
tions: (1) To what extent do interdependencies and inequalities, resulting from past social
conduct and unequal distribution of capital, shape the overall context in which natural
resource governance takes place? (2) How do structures, provided by institutions and poli-
cies, enable or restrict actors’ interactions in governing natural resources? (3) Which goals
do actors pursue in natural resource governance and which of these actors can, hereby,
legitimately claim to represent the interests of others? (4) To what extent do actors en-
gage in economic exchanges, social exchanges and network practices to collectively steer
natural resources? (5) How do these exchanges and practices influence relational patterns
such as trust and power? And (6) to what extent do all these factors shape unilateral,
collaborative or contentious steering of natural resources and deriving revenues? Table
4.4 (page 71) splits these key questions according to the conceptual approach (Figure 3.1,
page 24) and summarizes the data sources used.
Table 4.4: Natural Resource Governance and its Methodical Rapprochement
Theoretical Component Data Sources
Box 1 Inequalities and Interdepen-
dencies
Secondary data; explorative interviews;
semi-structured interviews
Box 2a/b Institutional Embedding
Policy Environment
Legal documents; semi-structured in-
terviews; survey data
Box 3 Network Embedding Semi-structured interviews; survey
data; SNA data
Box 4 Actors Secondary data; survey data; SNA data
Box 5 Social Conduct Semi-structured interviews; SNA data
Box 6 Relations SNA data
Box 7 Governance SNA data
Source: Own graph.
and critical interdisciplinary as discussed by Mollinga (2008: 5). For further insights into qualitatively
SNA see Heath, Fuller, and Johnston (2009).
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in Ghana
Chapter 2, “Framing Natural Resource Governance”, defines natural resource governance
as interactions between interdependent and power-asymmetric actors who (aim to col-
lectively) steer natural resources and deriving revenues, as well as the institutions and
policies that provide the structural embedding in which these interactions take place. In
this regard, the thesis empirically scrutinizes the kind and extent of actors’ collabora-
tive steering rather than normatively discussing its necessity as put forward by literature
about how to ‘better’ governing natural resources. Subsequently, Chapter 3, “Conceptual
Approach: Steering Through Exchange”, argues that past social contact and the resulting
unequal distribution of capital among actors lead to inequalities and interdependencies
which necessitate actors’ interactions in natural resource governance. It further maintains
that while structures enable and impede actors’ interactions, actors still have the agency
to exchange resources or to refrain from such exchanges to a large degree. To investigate
these arguments in Ghana’s petroleum sector, Chapter 4, “Research Design: Case Study,
Methods and Triangulation”, presents the necessary data.
According to the conceptual approach summarized in Figure 3.1 (page 24), it is first
necessary to assess how Ghana has governed her natural resources in the past and how this
prehistory shapes the rapprochement of the developing petroleum industry today. As the
mining sector frequently performs a point of reference in petroleum actors’ interactions,
the first step of the empirical analysis (Section 5.1) investigates how experiences in the
mining sector invoke the set-up of institutions and policies in petroleum governance.
The subsequent Section 5.2 discusses the structural embedding of actors’ interactions
by focussing on institutions whereas Section 5.3 outlines the policies that structure the
petroleum industry. The chapter closes with some concluding remarks.
5.1 Some Effects of Mining on Petroleum Governance
Ghana is endowed with a wide range of natural resources, among others gold, timber, co-
coa, iron, bauxite, diamonds and petroleum. Figure 5.1 depicts the total natural resource
rents (% of GDP) since 1970 and, separately, the rents from minerals, forestry, and oil.122
122 So far, natural gas is used for domestic power generation only, together with dry gas imports from
Nigeria via the ‘West African Gas Pipeline’ installed in 2009.
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Figure 5.1: Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP, 1970-2013)
Source: World Bank data, own graph.
Ghana’s experiences in resource extraction reach back to pre-colonial times when mainly
traditional authorities and communal organizations were in charge (Crook 2005: 1; Ma-
hama 2009: 8). The British colonial rulers altered this system – for economic and ideolog-
ical reasons or simply out of ignorance – by using the existing structures of the traditional
system as a means of economic exploitation, for gaining control over the local populations
and for exercising power (not authority) in society (Eguavoen and Laube 2010; Lutz and
Linder 2004; Spear 2003).
After independence in 1957, Ghana nationalized her natural resources for several rea-
sons: To fit the socialist ideas of the first President Kwume Nkrumah, to underline the
government’s emancipation from the British crown and to disempower the chiefs as for-
mer “henchmen” of the colonialists who represented the very “antithesis” to the political
set-up Nkrumah imagined for the young nation (Eguavoen and Laube 2010: 12; Herbst
2000: 174).123
Today, the mining sector differs from the other natural resource sectors in two important
ways: quantitatively as mining contributes about 47% to total exports, advancing Ghana
to the second largest gold producer in Africa;124 and qualitatively as the common negative
point of reference for petroleum actors who aim for a ‘better’ governing of petroleum
123 For a intensive study about chieftaincy under Nkrumah see Rathbone (2000).
124 In 2015, Ghana produced 94.7 tonnes of gold. Africa’s biggest producer is South Africa with 167.5
tonnes (2015). Worldwide, China produces the most gold (460.3 tonnes in 2015). All numbers
retrieved from the World Gold Council.
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resources and revenues. Together with researchers, these actors emphasize four major
problems in the mining sector: (1) the inability to counterbalance negative environmental
and social side effects; (2) the legislative failure to capture the realities of the sectors’
dynamics and to enforce existing laws; (3) the lost opportunity to integrate the sector
and its value chain into the national economy; and (4) a failed integration of necessary
stakeholders (Banchirigah 2008; Hirons 2013; Teschner 2012; William 2009).
The first problem, negative environmental and social impacts, is mainly induced by the
dominance of galamsey mining. ‘Galamsey’ are artisan or small-scale gold miners who
operate unregistered – and, thus, illegally –, but with the knowledge or even concession
of gold mines. In consequence, the registered and unregistered sectors work parallel to
each other, interweave with each other and highly depend on each other (Banchirigah
2008; Hilson and Yakovleva 2007; Teschner 2012). The use of chemicals, such as cyanide
or mercury, and the use of explosives to speed up mine production, have detrimental
effects on the health of miners, pose serious threats to the environment and pollute water
bodies and ground water. For example, in the Western Region, the illegal gold mining
activities have resulted in a serious deterioration of the Pra River’s water quality and the
quantity of available water. This not only deprives adjoining communities of their fresh
water access but also massively destructs the flora and fauna along the river. But even
though the environmental and social problems are immediately visible, public authorities
repeatedly fail to address them appropriately.
This goes hand in hand with the second problem: Legislative failures and the lack of law
enforcement have culminated in a sector employing about one million Ghanaians (includ-
ing galamsey miners) without government control and law enforcement. The responsible
state agencies are poorly resourced (e.g. for inspecting mines), coined by internal weak-
nesses, are not able to synchronize their agendas, and are incapable of implementing
effective accountability mechanisms (Dashwood and Puplampu 2010). Additionally, the
high costs of legally registering a mine (fees are tremendous and the paperwork excessive)
and the de facto toleration of unregistered mines by the state, make galamsey the most
rational choice for artisanal miners.
The lost opportunity to integrate the mining sector and its value chain into the national
economy is a third warning for governing the petroleum resources: As Ghana barely
processes gold and mostly exports the raw material, it loses the value chain, attached jobs
as well as tax opportunities. While this is also induced by (foreign) private companies
and the global trade system, the government is continuously blamed as the main culprit
of this problem.
Finally, researchers and practitioners criticize the exclusion of important actors and uni-
lateral decision-making by state authorities. Among other things, traditional authorities
– who still control about 75-80% of land in Ghana – were mostly excluded from negoti-
ation processes between companies and state authorities in the past. This continuously
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led to tensions or open conflicts between traditional authorities, mining communities and
companies.125 Additionally, the communities themselves were often excluded, enforcing
their marginalization and objectification in political bargaining processes.
The present thesis argues that these four failures coin actors’ interactions in petroleum
governance in several ways: On the one hand, they led to interdependencies between the
various actors. Fundamentally, only the failures within the mining sector gave rise to
the new quantity and quality of NGOs which are today highly active in the petroleum
sector “in order to fight mistakes made in mining in the past” (personal conversation).
Together with traditional authorities, these NGOs continuously remind public agencies
about the failed chance to make the mining revenues more inclusive and beneficial for
the country to such an extent that government representatives can hardly ignore them in
petroleum governance. In addition, it led to a deep mistrust within civil society towards
public institutions and within local communities towards private companies (Hilson and
Yakovleva 2007; Mensah and Okyere 2014; William 2009; Interview Transcript IV).
Consequently, I suggest that the four problems in mining invoked the following four
steps in petroleum governance: (1) an emphasis on high and up-to-date environmental
safety standards, (2) a diverse set of institutions and policies that are aimed at structuring
the petroleum sector, (3) the goal of, and pressure for, vesting the petroleum industry
in the national economy ‘for the benefit of all Ghanaians’, and, (4), the inclusion of a
diverse set of actors who aim to steer petroleum revenues from the onset, starting with the
“National Forum on Oil and Gas” in February 2008.126 This inclusion explicitly targets
the protection of communities – given the historical experiences of land and compensation
disputes in mining – and their active participation through local content policies.127
5.2 The Institutional Embedding of Petroleum Governance
Section 3.2 (page 26) argues that the structures embedding actors’ relations enable, con-
strain or even force actors to collaborate in natural resource governance. It further sug-
gests that two decisive structural components in natural resource governance are institu-
tions and policies as they afford actors with sets of resources that empower or constrain
social interactions and that are reproduced by these interactions. Therefore, it is neces-
sary to investigate how institutions and policies shape actors’ interactions in petroleum
governance in Ghana.
125 The failed integration of traditional authorities in the mining sector is, however, also a product of
Western donor politics: As Hirons (2013: 29) notes, donor agencies often ignored the role that chiefs
play in land tenure and Ghanaian politics because this role differs from their view on how politics
should work in Ghana and, therefore, clearly excluded traditional authorities from mining governance.
126 For further information on the content of the Forum see Appiah-Adu and Appiah-Adu (2013: 83-85).
127 In consequence, even though the thesis does not pursue any normative prescription of petroleum
governance, these normative problems have to be discussed as petroleum actors regularly tackle them.
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5.2.1 State Institutions
In regard to the petroleum sector, important ‘rules of the game’ are provided by the
constitution and orally passed institutions. Since gaining independence as the first country
in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1957 under Kwame Nkrumah128 and after surviving nine different
political regimes, Ghana is hailed as a ‘role-model’ democracy since the 1992 Constitution
established the current IV. Republic. The institutional set-up and the reputation as ‘role-
model’ democracy play a decisive role for natural resource governance as they define the
legal margins of public institutions, provide civil society with scopes of actions, legally
confirm the role of traditional authorities in natural resource governance, turn Ghana into
a reliable partner for the private sector, and – last but not least – make it a promising
development cooperation country.
The political system combines a directly elected President with a Westminster-style
parliament. Two dominant parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the
National Patriotic Party (NPP), regularly alternate in power and enforced three demo-
cratic turnovers since 1992.129 They are voted for in universal, free and fair elections
every four years. Participation in the general elections is viewed as an important civic
responsibility. This becomes evident in the survey along the Ghana Gas Pipeline in which
94.89% of respondents indicate to have voted in the presidential elections. The national
trend in the last presidential and parliamentary elections with voter turnouts of around
80% supports this high percentage.130
In regard to natural resource governance, the institutional framework declares the pres-
ident to be a central actor by stipulating that
“[e]very mineral in its natural state in, under or upon any land in Ghana, rivers,
streams, water courses throughout Ghana, the exclusive economic zone and any area
covered by the territorial sea or continental shelf is the property of the Republic of
Ghana and shall be vested in the President on behalf of, and in trust for the people
of Ghana”(Article 257, 6).
The Parliament is in charge of adopting all petroleum related policies. It annually
128 Nkrumah’s party, the Convention People’s Party (CPP), had emerged as a dyarchy to colonial ad-
ministration since 1949 and mobilized the masses with pan-Africanist, post-colonialist and socialist
convictions. Although Nkrumah led Ghana into independence as a democracy, he quickly established
an extremely centralized state with a one-party system, a myriad of state corporations and, by that,
gave rise to corruption and state inefficiency. He was overthrown in 1966.
129 J. J. Rawlings overthrew the democratically elected Government of Hilla Limann in 1981 and became
the Chairman of the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC). He was democratically elected in
1992 as the first President of the new Republic and ruled with the NDC (arising from the PNDC) from
1992-1996 and from 1996-2000. That is why Lyons (1997: 71) contemplates a “transition without
change”. In the 2000 elections, the National Patriotic Party NPP under John Kufuor superseded
Rawlings. Kufuor ruled until 2008 when John Atta-Mills (NDC) replaced him. Atta-Mills died in
office in July 2012, his vice John Mahama took over. Mahama emerged as the winner in the 2012
elections and lost the 2016 elections on December 7, 2016 against Nana Akufo-Addo (NPP).
130 The same holds true for the last district elections in 2010 with a voter turnout in the sample of 91.29%.
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decides about how the petroleum revenues are spent as part of the national budgetary
process. Currently, the Parliamentary Committee on Mines and Energy is in charge of
overseeing the government, but there are repeated calls from civil society to establish a
permanent committee exclusively responsible for petroleum governance. Yet, the presi-
dential powers weaken the Parliament’s strength in petroleum governance severely. For
example, the Constitution denies Members of Parliament to propose a bill that carries
any financial burden to the government, which is the case for most bills (Article 108).
Moreover, the Constitution requires the President to appoint the majority of Ministers
among Members of Parliament (Art. 78, 1), which endangers their independence and
poses a double-edged burden to them.
These factors compromise the Parliament’s independence, its effectiveness and its le-
gitimacy in enforcing horizontal accountability (Whitfield 2011: 57; Gyimah-Boadi 2013:
9-10). The executive dominance also undermines the judiciary’s independence: For exam-
ple, the extensive presidential powers include the right to appoint an unlimited number
of justices within the Supreme Court (Article 128, 1), making it prone to executive ma-
nipulations.
The current system of local government in Ghana originates from a decentralization
program that began in the late 1980s under Rawlings.131 Under the slogan “Bring the
government to the people” (Lentz 2007: 223), the Provisional National Defense Coun-
cil (PNDC) established a local governance system as an institutional expression of partic-
ipatory democracy (yet, under military rule). The specific aim was to boost development
on the local level, an aim that is still pursued by local authorities today (Ahwoi 2010a).
The first elections on the local level took place during the turn of the year 1988/1989
and paved the way for democratic elections on the national level as “Ghana’s significant
[...] progress had reached the stage where it needed popular legitimacy and political
institutions to support it” (Lyons 1997: 6).
On the regional level, ten Regional Coordinating Councils (RCCs) – one for each region
– are the highest decision-making bodies and constitutionally responsible units.132 Yet,
they do not play any considerable role in petroleum governance as they do not have any
policy-making, legislative or financial power. They act on behalf of the national gov-
ernment and only play an administrative and coordinative role between Accra and the
regions. Because of this deconcentration (see page 14), the RCCs are the weakest unit
in the local governance system (Ahwoi 2010b: 13). Their closest function in petroleum
governance may be found in regard to the Western Region’s Regional Planning Coordi-
131 In the Second Republic (1969-1972), Kofi A. Busia initiated the first attempts of local government
structures in the shape of so-called ‘District Councils’ (Azarya and Chazan 1987).
132 They comprise the Regional Ministers (the chairperson), District Chief Executives (DCEs), the Pre-
siding Members of each District Assembly (DA) in the Region, two Paramount Chiefs nominated by
the respective Regional House of Chiefs, and the regional heads of decentralized departments who
have no voting rights. For a detailed overview on the local governance system in Ghana see Ahwoi
(2010a).
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nating Unit which is in charge of monitoring and evaluating the district planning units
and which occasionally mediates conflicts between landowners and investors in the sector
(personal conversation). Besides that, they were never present at any petroleum meeting
or indicated as an important partner in the network study.
On the district level, the 216 Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs)
take up the role of devolved units with policy-making, legislative and taxation power. Ad-
ditionally, they provide guidance to and supervise other administrative authorities in their
district. An important goal of the Assemblies is to rally for the development of their areas.
70% of the Assemblies are publicly elected on a non-partisan basis133 whereas the remain-
ing 30% get nominated by the President in consultation of traditional authorities and
interest groups (Ahwoi 2010a: 65).134 This selection process aims to induce the Assem-
blies with expertise and experience while including traditional authorities in the process
and, therefore, recognizing their importance on the local level (Ahwoi 2010b: 5). Districts
are headed by District Chief Executives (DCEs) who are appointed by the President and
endorsed by a two-third majority of the respective Assembly.
However, the increasing polarization of politics and the ‘winner-takes-it-all’ character
of the electoral system undermines the non-partisan character of district elections and
increasingly divides the country. The two dominating parties are more and more turning
into ‘vote-gathering machines’ instead of offering real alternatives to citizens. In conse-
quence, party politics increasingly split the country:
“My family, I have brothers and sisters, they have children, their children are my
children, my children are their children. So the family system is very strong but
now, because of politics, it is divided. If my sister is NPP and my sister is NDC,
we will see eye to eye. But this should not happen. Some of us are worried about
these things that are happening [...] [Partisan politics] is dividing us seriously.”
(Interview Transcript III, page 6-7).
This is a particular problem for governing the petroleum resources as parties instru-
mentalize the spare information citizens have about petroleum for their own benefits:
“[T]he party which has lost [the elections] often tries to misinform the people.
So because of the [low] level of education and information, [the people] will take
whatever the opposition says as true and this creates tension” (Interview Transcript
I, page 16).
Yet, the role of District Assemblies in petroleum governance is not only undermined by
this politicization but also their marginalization by the executive: Although the consti-
tution legally affords the District Authorities major rights and tasks in petroleum gover-
133 The district elections are further state-sponsored (giving poorer people the chance to run for office) and
literacy is not a precondition anymore. Furthermore, the requirement of being an ‘ordinary citizen’
of the district excludes urban elites with their potential advantages (Ahwoi 2010b: 4).
134 The Fourth Republic adopted this appointment procedure from the PNDC regime.
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nance, their scope of action is, de facto, very limited. The President’s right to entitle an
area to constitute a district has become a political instrument for ensuring votes before
elections.135 The financial situation of District Assemblies is delicate across the country
and, de facto, makes it impossible for them to fulfill their mandate of actively influencing
the allocation of petroleum revenues.
Finally, the levels of accountability and responsiveness of the district authorities and
their service delivery capacities remain extremely weak because of lacking human capital
(Gyimah-Boadi 2013: 7). The President’s right to appoint the Regional Ministers, the
District Chief Executives (DCEs) heading the district authorities, and 30% of the District
Assemblies, further promotes the executive’s dominance and gives rise to clientelistic
practices. The ‘gratitude effect’, as it is often referred to in Ghana, deteriorates public
confidence in political institutions:
“We need people to stand up for us and fight for the Western Region. That
is what we want. For now I can say we do not have that. If I am appointed by
a political head, definitely I want to achieve whatever he wants me to achieve [...]
What I am saying is: If the President appoints me as a Regional Minister, a District
Chief Executive, I want to dance with the President. Because I will always have the
fear [that he empowers me and so I do] not fight for the people. That is the case”
(Interview Transcript III, page 13).
Another interviewee observes the ‘gratitude effect’ particularly in regard to the youth:
“Most of the youth is now paying their attention to party politics. Because they
see it as a lucrative venture. Because if you are with somebody and he was fortunate
to get voted as a MP [Member of Parliament], the next day he becomes an important
man, drives expensive cars, [has a] big house [...] And even if you do not go that
far, if you follow a political party, you are assured of a job. [So] many young people
are now turning into politics for the wrong reasons. This is another problem that
the country is facing” (Interview Transcript I, page 16).
Indeed, the trust in political institutions is low among the survey’s respondents as Table
5.1 illustrates. It shows that within the sample, skepticism towards the President and the
DCEs is high.
135 This contradicts the Local Government Act 1993, Act 462 which entails frankly clear requirements for
defining a new district (such as a ‘single compact settlement’ for a Municipality or ‘economic viability’
for a District).
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Table 5.1: General Political Trust (numbers in percent)
Not at all Little Neither Fairly Very Total
President 35.26 12.16 7.60 11.25 33.74 100
MP 34.95 8.81 7.90 15.50 32.38 100
DCE 36.94 11.25 6.05 17.83 28.03 100
DA (Wo-)Man 26.20 11.75 9.64 17.47 34.94 100
Source: Own data, numbers in percent. Answers derived from question number 11.
N = 333. ‘Don’t know’ and ‘refuse to answer’ coded as missing.
5.2.2 Traditional Authorities
The constitutional recognition of the traditional system is another important institu-
tional feature that structures the network of petroleum actors. The 1992 Constitution
acknowledges chieftaincy as an integral part of Ghanaian politics and guarantees both
its existence and its independence from state interference (Art. 270 and following). The
traditional sector has its own structural organization parallel to the decentralized political
system (regulated by Art. 271 and 272 of the Constitution and the Chieftaincy Act, 2008
(Act 759)): Officially, the Ministry of Chieftaincy and Traditional Affairs leads the tra-
ditional authorities and aims for an efficient and effective traditional system in line with
the government’s policies. More important than the Ministry is, yet, the National House
of Chiefs in Kumasi (in the Central Region), composed of 50 Paramount Chiefs (five from
each Region in Ghana), the ten Regional Houses of Chiefs comprising all Paramountcies
in each region, and 275 Traditional Councils on the district level.
The constitution further recognizes customary lands as vested in the stools136 on behalf
of and the trust for the stool’s subjects (citizens) in accordance with customary law
and usage (Art. 267, 1). Between 75-80% of all land in Ghana is customary land and
traditional authorities earn good money as 25% of received land royalties benefit the
current chief for expenditure (Amanor 2006: 5; Boafo-Arthur 2003: 133). In consequence,
all onshore petroleum activities by the government or external actors constitute important
venues for traditional authorities to bestow recognition and financial income (Kleist 2011:
645).
In 1996, Rawlings proposed to actively include chiefs in party politics by offering them
the possibility of running for offices without the abdication of their stools. The proposed
constitutional amendment exemplifies how chiefs view themselves and how the public
136 In most of Ghana, the customary offices are occupied by the chieftaincy institution – the stool in
southern Ghana and and the skin in the North. The stool, a carved wooden seat, is the most important
symbol of power and has social, political, and religious significance. As there cannot be a chief without
a stool, chiefs are ‘enstooled’ when they come into office and ‘destooled’ when they (have to) leave it
(Edusei 2004).
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thinks about the role of traditional authorities in today’s Ghana. Both argued against the
amendment, fearing that day–to–day politics could damage chieftaincy as an institution
with long-standing traditions (Lentz 1998: 52). The exclusion of traditional authorities
from partisan politics, according to a interviewee, has one particular reason:
“[T]here is a wisdom in doing that: Because if a chief is found to be actively
involved in politics, he will lose the respect that he has. Because our politicians
are perceived as somebody who talks anyhow. That is how the Ghanaian mentality
is. Politicians talk anyhow [...] So if you are a politician, that is how they see you.
Meanwhile the traditional authorities are respected. So that is why our Constitution
hinders them to get involved in politics” (Interview Transcript I, page 2).
Traditional authorities position themselves as trustees and defenders of communities’
interests, not only in petroleum governance. They repeatedly emphasize their standing
through acquired wealth in the past, cultural leadership, the representation of commu-
nities’ interests and identity, and the constitutional duty to socially and economically
develop their respective traditional areas (Amanor 2006; Boafo-Arthur 2003; Crook 2005;
Kleist 2011; Knierzinger 2011; Lutz and Linder 2004; Rathbone 2000; Ray 2003; Valsec-
chi 2007). Thereby, their key power-balancing strategy is to recurrently refer to their
‘non-partisan’ character in contrast to other petroleum actors:
“A lot of people respect our chiefs and our chieftaincies. Government politics is
something new that has come. So we realize that even our government officials, the
kind of respect that the chiefs can command, they cannot command. Someone can
talk on radio and insult the chief. But that will have consequences. So we either
accept that [chieftaincy] has been here or we are dividing ourselves. Our traditional
system is the core” (Interview Transcript III, page 6).
A second interviewee maintains the same view:
“Democracy is good but we see it as an alien phenomenon here because it is at
variance with the traditional authorities’ system. In the olden days, when the chief
spoke, nobody was speaking against. If the chief spoke, whether you liked it or not,
you had to accept it. But democracy sees that as dictatorship. Because democracy
includes the freedom of speech. So even if a chief speaks and I have a different
opinion, I have the right so share my opinion [...]” (Interview Transcript I, page 6).
As traditional authorities’ legitimacy and power decisively depend on their individual
agency, strategic behavior and their ability to transform social into economic and political
power (Lentz 1998: 52-53), they do, by far, not form a coherent group. Rather, their power
and legitimacy differ from region to region, from traditional area to traditional area and
from chief to chief. They contest each other as much as they contest other political
actors. For example, severe struggles exist among members of the Western Regional
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House of Chiefs as different Paramount Chiefs mistrust and envy each other in regard to
the developing petroleum sector (personal conversations). As the network analysis will
show, this contention troubles traditional authorities’ ability to form an effective alliance
in order to balance power in their favor.
In sum, even though the power and legitimacy of traditional authorities varies indi-
vidually, they are assumed to constitute important venues of representation. They are
formally acknowledged by the constitution and recognized as important sensitizers and
transmitters by key players in the developing oil and gas sector. Section 6.2 will investigate
whether this is also the case for local communities affected by the developing petroleum
industry.
5.2.3 Freedom of Press and Association
Finally, important institutions that structure petroleum governance are the freedom and
independence of the media (particularly Art. 162 - 165), and the freedom of assembly
and of association “[...] which include freedom to form or join trade unions or other
associations, national or international, for the protection of their interest”, i. e., civil
society organizations (Art. 21, 1e). Both media and civil society are said to play a pivotal
role in petroleum governance by controlling the government and by bringing information
to the citizens.
Radio, an easily accessible means of gathering information, remains by far the most
popular device across Ghana whereas newspapers are barely used: In the Afrobarometer
2014/15 survey, two-thirds of all respondents indicate that they get news via radio daily
whereas almost three-quarters never read newspapers to inform themselves. These results
correspond with the survey in petroleum affected communities: As Table 5.2 indicates,
radio is, with over 23%, the most important source for regular information about oil
and gas related matters. Friends and family follow with 18%, television with 12.5% and
newspapers with only 2%.
Table 5.2: Sources of Information on Oil & Gas Activities (numbers in percent)
Never Once Occasionally Few times Regularly
Radio 19.39 5.15 36.97 15.45 23.03
TV 47.81 8.75 24.06 6.88 12.50
Newspaper 84.11 3.97 9.27 0.66 1.99
Family & Friends 29.73 13.21 29.42 9.61 18.02
Source: Own data. Answers derived from question number 27. N ranges between 302
(newspaper) and 333 (friends & family). ‘Don’t know’ and ‘not applicable’ co-
ded as missing.
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The importance of radio is further illustrated by asking respondents how they first heard
about the petroleum discovery. As Table 5.3 shows, nearly two-thirds of all interviewees
heard about Ghana’s oil discovery on the radio for the very first time. If not on radio,
the news spread mostly through social contacts, TV and the gong-gong.137





Family & Friends 33 9.91
Gong-gong / community meeting 11 3.30
Politician 4 1.20
Community Chief 2 0.6
Initial intervention of oil & gas companies 8 2.40
Other 7 2.10
Can’t remember 26 7.81
Total 333 100
Source: Own data. Answers derived from question number 21. No respondent
refused to answer this question.
Besides the media, civil society organizations aim to play a significant role in petroleum
governance. Although the term ‘civil society’ differs locally, it here refers to intermediary
actors who aim to represent diverse societal interests and who encounter the state’s hege-
monic ambitions (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 19). In this way, civil society is defined as a
contra-distinction to both the family and the state (Yarrow 2011: 100).138
As Vormawor and Atuguba (2014: 61) argue, civil society in Ghana is complex:
“It is impossible to paint a calcified outline of civil society in Ghana. Such an
attempt would be to disregard historical sensitivities. This is especially because
the formation and/or development of civil society in Ghana is anything but uni-
form, sometimes emerging as solutions devised by rational actors in their attempts
to decipher strategic coordination and collective action problems [...], other times
concocted as expedient devices to surmount social or ethnic cleavages”.
137 The gong-gong is beaten if the chief or any other citizen wants to spread information in a community.
138 Therefore, the thesis understands civil society as a broad family of non-governmental and non-profit
organizations that express the interest of their members or others. While the focus here lies upon
NGOs as one element of civil society, civil society is much broader and includes labor organizations,
faith-based associations or foundations as well. In the Ghanaian context, some authors also categorize
traditional authorities under this term. For an historical acknowledgement of civil society in Ghana
see Vormawor and Atuguba (2014).
84
5.2 The Institutional Embedding of Petroleum Governance
Literature critically examines the re-conquering of agenda-setting and policy influence
by civil society in Ghana, paralleled by the flourish of NGOs worldwide in response to
donor policies. Yarrow (2011) provides the most recent account of Ghanaian NGOs. He
emphasizes the moral reasoning of development practitioners who ‘sacrifice’ themselves
with their commitment to development. With this argument, he challenges two views:
those who argue that civil society most often perpetuates longstanding patronage relations
with government officials, undermining the autonomy of both (Bayart 1993; Chabal and
Daloz 1999); and post-colonialist thinking which proclaims that developmental visions
never serve altruistic but rather selfish interests. Though such criticism is necessary to
oppose the vision of NGOs as panacea for development, Yarrow (2011) rightly argues that
in order to understand the work of NGOs in Ghana, it is necessary to not mistake the
institution for the process.
According to Kopin´ski, Polus, and Tycholiz (2013: 592), the new role of civil society in
Ghana traces back to its strategic move facing challenges in the mining sector as discussed
in Section 5.1:
“Usually, [civil society groups] vehemently attack governments for their lack of
transparency in mineral revenue management policies, whereas in Ghana, both
members of the political class (including the opposition) and representatives of civil
society claim that their cooperation is on the right track and that both sides are
benefiting from it [...] In general, it might be argued that Ghanaian civil society
has moved away from street protesting [...] towards constructive engagement with
the government”.
An interviewees supports this view:
“Lately, there have been a lot of improvements between civil society and government
agencies [...] In the past, it was difficult with government agencies. Government
agencies were very hesitant in terms of their relations with civil society. But over
the years in the work of civil society, government has got to realize that civil society
can be wired in the way they present themselves but they are looking at the general
interest of the Nation and in things the government is interested in. So there was
a kind of new form of collaboration. And that increased the space for interaction
between civil society and government agencies” (Interview Transcript IV, page 9).
Yet, the fact that various NGOs were also not immune to the great expectations after
the oil discovery troubles the integrity of some civil society organizations: “For many
Ghanaian civil society groups, Ghana stood at a threshold of making a giant leap into
its dream of becoming a middle income nation in the shortest possible period” (Gyampo
2010: 4). Additionally, the petroleum discovery caused the establishment of numerous
new civil society organizations and an increase of “charlatans” (Vormawor and Atuguba
2014: 93). Some interviewees anticipate this flourishing with caution:
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“A lot of [NGOs] just realized that oil and gas is now the new kid on the block.
And that there is a high level of funding in the area. So in order to stay in existence
[as an NGO], you need to move towards this direction. So there are a lot of NGOs
in this area now” (Interview Transcript IV, page 10).
The sheer number of NGOs repeatedly leads to problems, for example in their interac-
tions with state representatives:
“[...] some of the things they [government authorities] tell you [as an NGO] is
that “We are tired of engaging with you. The last group was here yesterday, you
are here today, another group will be here tomorrow” (Interview Transcript VIII,
page 6).
The upcoming SNA findings will support this lack of tuning and coalition formation.
The biggest problem for NGOs, yet, might be citizens’ unawareness of their work. While
all NGOs aim and repeatedly claim to “represent the voice of the people”, Table 5.4
suggests that NGOs fail in this goal. The table depicts those NGOs that have implemented
a project related to oil and gas in the Western Region. First of all, out of the 333
respondents, only 214 (64.24%) feel able to answer questions about NGOs – the remaining
119 respondents either do not understand the concept of NGOs or see themselves not
knowledgable enough to answer questions about them. And even among those who do
understand the concept of NGOs, their work is not very much recognized.
Table 5.4: Awareness of NGOs & CSOs in the Western Region (numbers in percent)






















Source: Own data. Answers derived from question number 45. N = 214.
The most popular organizations are the Nzema Youth Association (NYA), the Ghana
Wildlife Society (GWS) and the Ghana National Canoe Fishermen Council (GNCFC) –
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organizations which are very much absent in network interactions. Contrary to this, those
NGOs which advocate for local communities the loudest – Friends of the Nation (FoN),
the African Centre for Energy Policy (ACEP) and the Western Region Network of NGOs
(WERENGO) – are barely known to those they aim to speak for. Only around 15%
of respondents recognize their work. These numbers cast first doubts on civil society’s
abilities to represent citizens’ interests.139
To sum up, the overall institutional setting in Ghana enables several actors to par-
ticipate in the steering of petroleum resources: the central state, most importantly the
executive, district authorities and traditional authorities. However, the example of the
Regional Coordinating Councils (RCCs) exemplifies that such an institutional enabling
does not automatically translate into an active engagement in petroleum governance.
Moreover, although institutional structures provide the right of free press and associa-
tion, it is only through their respective agenda-setting abilities that the media and civil
society participate in steering petroleum resources and revenues.
5.3 The Policy Environment in Petroleum Governance
Besides the institutional embedding, the government passed several policies explicitly aim-
ing to structure responsibilities and interactions in petroleum governance: the (1) Ghana
National Petroleum Corporation Law, 1983 (PNDCL 64), the (2) Petroleum (Exploration
and Production) Bill, 1984 (PNDCL 84), the (3) Petroleum Commission Act, 2011 (Act
821), the (4) Petroleum (Local Content and Local Participation) Regulations, 2013 (L.I.
2204), and the (5) Petroleum Revenue Management Act, Act 815 (PRMA). This section
analyzes which actors are enabled or restricted in their aim to unilaterally, collaboratively
or contentiously steering petroleum resources and deriving revenues by these policies.
5.3.1 Governing Petroleum Resources
The ‘Ghana National Petroleum Corporation Law, 1983 (PNDCL 64)’ and the ‘Petroleum
(Exploration and Production) Bill, 1984 (PNDCL 84)’ are a heritage from the military
regime under Rawlings in the 1980s. Despite their age, they still coin Ghana’s petroleum
sector by setting out general directions: the PNDCL 64 established the Ghana National
Petroleum Company (GNPC) as Ghana’s national oil company with the mandate to
explore, develop, produce, and dispose petroleum resources. Subsequently, PNDCL 84
provides the regulatory framework for the management of upstream oil and gas explo-
ration, development and production, and details the contractual relations between the
state, GNPC and potential investors in the upstream petroleum industry. But even
139 Though the age bias in the sample (which is induced by the fact that mostly elderly people are subsis-
tence farmers in Ghana) might also cause respondents’ unawareness, the sample is still representative
of communities affected by the developing petroleum industry.
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though these laws make GNPC the state representative in petroleum operations, dis-
putes emerged over clear areas of responsibilities between GNPC on the one hand and the
Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MoE) as the oversight body of all petroleum activities
on the other (Banful 2013).
To solve these obscurities, the government established the Petroleum Commission (PC)
in 2011 to “[...] regulate and manage the utilisation of petroleum resources and to co-
ordinate the policies in relation to them” (Petroleum Commission Act, Act 821). The
PC, consequently, became the sole upstream regulator of petroleum resources.
Besides the Petroleum Commission Act, the government drafted a new ‘Petroleum
(Exploration and Production) Bill’ in 2013 to supersede PNDCL 84. After a parliamen-
tary rejection in 2013 and resubmission in 2014, it was finally approved by Parliament
in August 2016. While some stakeholders hail it as an instrument “[...] to ensure that
upstream petroleum operations are conducted in accordance with the principles of good
governance, transparency and sustainable development” (African Centre for Energy Pol-
icy 2014), others fear that Ghana’s petroleum expertise is still insufficient to handle the
planned change of the fiscal regime (Adombila 2016).140 The law further gives the MoE
considerably more power and, hence, replicates the excessive role of the executive branch
(Woodroffe 2015). Accordingly, two interviewees note: “The new Petroleum Bill is even
worse than the former one [...]” (Interview Transcript IV, page 6) and “The law is silent
[on a lot of things]. The Minister can do whatever he wants” (Interview Transcript III,
page 9).
The ‘Petroleum (Local Content and Local Participation) Regulations, 2013 (L.I. 2204)’
came into effect in February 2014.141 The regulations require all foreign investors to
give first preference to Ghanaian companies, to integrate indigenous companies (besides
GNPC) for at least 5%,142 and to use local labor as much as possible. The objectives of the
policy are to maximize patronage of Ghanaian goods and services, to increase employment
of Ghanaian professionals, to facilitate technology and skills transfer, and to boost local
participation in equity holding and management offices (see Meeting Transcript I, page
5).
The pressure for local content in petroleum governance traces back to the problems
discussed in Section 5.1: the missed opportunities in the mining and other sectors (e.g.,
in telecommunication), a moral argument (as petroleum is typically formed over centuries
but produced in only one or two generations), a paradigm shift in resource governance
from a revenue-focus to an in-country focused strategy promoting local capacity’s develop-
140 The law replaces the current concessionary system which transfers ownership to the licensee holders in
exchange for percentage of total revenue accrued, with production sharing agreements which restrain
ownership in the state and, thus, often create higher revenues for the state (Adombila 2016).
141 According to the Ministry of Energy (2010), local content and local participation refers to the level of
using Ghanaian expertise, goods and services, labor, and businesses in the petroleum activities.
142 To qualify as an indigenous company, the company must have at least 51% of its equity owned by a
Ghanaian with 80% management and senior positions occupied by Ghanaians (personal conversation).
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ment, and the value addition indirectly induced by local content measurements (Meeting
Transcript I, page 6).
The legal enforcement of the local content regulations is, however, pending. Local
content, so far, only exists on paper and lacks reasonable implementation and serious en-
forcement. Local procurement is limited as local products and services are not purchased
by international companies, either because the products are not standardized or because
they do not conform to the industries’ regulations. Furthermore, Ghanaian businesses
have an unrealistic understanding of what it means to become competitive suppliers in
the petroleum sector (personal conversation). Finally, the very ambitious timetables of
the L.I.2204 pose serious challenges to the Petroleum Commission (PC) which is in charge
of receiving and approving the companies’ business plans and of ensuring the implemen-
tation of the regulations’ provisions (Interview Transcript VII, page 1).
The last key policy, the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, Act 815 (PRMA), causes
the most disputes among petroleum actors. Accordingly, the following discussion is more
detailed. These details are necessary to understand the subsequent discussion of network
interactions.
5.3.2 Governing Petroleum Revenues
Shortly after the oil discovery, the government under Atta Mills accepted the key idea
of continual consultations with civil society actors, traditional authorities, and media
representatives. The “National Conference on Oil and Gas” in Accra in February 2008
formulated the goal of multi-actor consultations to manage deriving revenues and to
tare potential impacts on society. Passed by Parliament in April 2011, the Petroleum
Revenue Management Act, Act 815 (PRMA) institutionalizes the interplay among state
and non-state actors in form of the Public Interest Accountability Committee (PIAC), and
provides the legal framework for the collection, allocation and management of petroleum
revenues.143
Figure 5.2 depicts how the petroleum revenues are distributed between spending and
saving as regulated by the PRMA. The allocation depends on a ‘benchmark revenue’
which is based on a seven year moving average of oil prices (Amoako-Tuffour and Ghan-
ney 2013: 35). From the benchmark revenue, 50-70% are allocated to the Annual Bud-
get Funding Amount (ABFA) and the remaining 30-50% are split between the ‘Ghana
Petroleum Funds’.144 The ‘Stabilisation Fund’ is assigned to alleviate shortfalls in unan-
143 The government has four different components of oil revenue: (1) Royalties from oil and gas of 5% of
gross oil revenues including receipts from the sale or export of petroleum, (2) 13.78% of the Jubilee’s
field commercial net profits received from the GNPC, (3) an ‘additional oil entitlement’ of 10-25% of
petroleum revenue, net of royalties and the GNPC interest, accrued if the project rate of return is
between 18-33%, and (4) the government levies company income tax on all net profits of 35%. For
further insights into the petroleum fiscal regime see Amoako-Tuffour and Owusu-Ayim (2010).
144 The Ministry of Finance (MoF) estimates the benchmark revenue, makes distributional propositions
concerning the ABFA and the Petroleum Funds to the Parliament, oversees the Fund’s investment
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ticipated or actual petroleum incomes by giving government the opportunity to make
withdrawals (Section 9 and 10, PRMA). The ‘Heritage Fund’ aims to provide future gen-
erations with a profit of the petroleum wealth after reserves will be depleted. Whereas
the Stabilisation Fund was built up quickly to cushion the impact of adverse prices or
production changes, the Heritage Fund is built up slowly and will support the welfare of
future generations. In 2026, 15 years after the date of commencement of the PRMA, the
Parliament can review the restriction on transfers from the Heritage Fund and change its
cap with a simple majority.145















* Up to 70% of the annual benchmark revenue from petroleum operations.
Source: Own graph based on the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, Act 815.
The PRMA stipulates twelve areas in which the Annual Budget Funding Amount
(ABFA)’s money has to be spent.146 From these twelve areas, the Minister of Finance
can prioritize no more than four areas for each legislative period. In 2011, the Parliament
approved to use the ABFA for the following four priority areas: expenditure and amorti-
policies, and is responsible for the overall management of the Petroleum Funds (Amoako-Tuffour and
Ghanney 2013).
145 For a comparison between different petroleum laws in Africa with a focus on transparent regulations
see Veit and Excell (2015).
146 These areas are: (1) Agriculture and industry, (2) physical infrastructure and service delivery in
education, science and technology, (3) portable water delivery and sanitation, (4) infrastructure de-
velopment in telecommunication, road, rail and port, (5) physical infrastructure and service delivery
in health, (6) housing delivery, (7) environmental protection, sustainable utilization and the protec-
tion of natural resources, (8) rural development, (9) developing alternative energy sources, (10) the
strengthening of institutions of government concerned with governance and the maintenance of law
and order, (11) public safety and security, and (12) provision of social welfare and the protection of
the physically handicapped and disadvantaged citizens.
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zation of loans for oil and gas infrastructure, agricultural modernization, roads and other
infrastructure, and capacity building (including oil and gas). They were maintained for
the period 2014-2016 (Public Interest and Accountability Committee 2014). Table 5.5
depicts the distribution of oil revenues among these areas for the year 2014 and the years
2011-2014.
Table 5.5: Distribution of ABFA to Priority Areas, 2011-2014
Priority Area 2014 in GHS 2011-2014 in GHS in %
Expenditure / Amortisation of Loans 163.084,572 421.005,419 22.49
Agricultural Modernization 170.624,180 269.848,985 14.42
Road and Other Infrastructure 215.691,357 1.047.810,541 55.99
Capacity Building (incl. O & G) — 132.893,097 7.1
Total 549.400,109 1.871.558,042 100
Source: Public Interest and Accountability Committee (2014: 39).
Despite its general high acknowledgement, the PRMA has several weaknesses: For
example, it neither criminalizes nor sanctions the government for withholding public in-
formation. While the governments in other African petro-states such as Uganda or Liberia
need to justify why certain information should stay confidential, in Ghana the public is
prompted to argue why information should be released (Veit and Excell 2015: 71-77).
Moreover, several fiscal issues exist which are objects of criticism (for details see Meeting
Transcript II). Finally, the capitalization of the Ghana Stabilization Fund to the “arbi-
trary” cap of US$ 250 million in 2014 caused outrage in Ghana. Triggering the cap to
250 million enabled the Ministry of Finance to allocate around US$ 195 million to the
Contingency Fund and the Debt Service Account.
The reasons why the PRMA attracts the highest attention are not explicitly laid out
but the observations, interviews and meetings suggest the following interpretations: First,
revenues expenditures – as regulated by the PRMA – are easier to understand for non-
experts than the highly technical downstream and upstream industry regulated by the
other policies. Second, the revenues’ spending is visible and immediately affects the lives
of ordinary Ghanaians, who petroleum actors claim to represent. Third, the revenue
spending opens the space for regional debates in which local actors want to secure the
highest benefits for their region (see Section 8.1.2). Fourth, the PRMA institutionalizes
the Public Interest Accountability Committee (PIAC), the multi-actor platform that is
entitled to merge interests and to control and advise the government (see Section 6.1 for
further information). Fifth, the law provides civil society actors and traditional authorities
with the opportunity to advocate against the government: They criticize the number and
kind of the twelve priority areas, the number and kind of the four areas the government
in power selects, the way the government spends the revenue within these four areas, and
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the transparency and success in this process. For example, one interviewee reports:
“I think if it would be concentrated on one or two areas for the period we would
have gotten more benefits [...] in the four areas we do not see any impact! We
do not see the impact [...] And if they are tackling a project, they should look
at a project that will benefit the people [...] It does not help. So, I believe, they
[should] concentrate on tackling few projects and [on] complet[ing these projects]
[...]” (Interview Transcript III, page 11-12).
Following the discussions for the period of 10 months, it seems questionable whether
criticism would stop if the number and/or kind of priority areas differed. This doubt is
increased by the fact that the MoF seems to take past criticism on the petroleum revenues’
spending into account: While in 2012, the ABFA allocation to the priority area ‘Road
and Other Infrastructure’ was still distributed across eight different sectors, the Ministry
reduced this number to five sectors in 2013 and three sectors in 2014. It, hence, remains
unclear whether detractors are really convinced of their criticism or whether they criticize
primarily in order to take the stage and to raise a point. Critical voices are loud voices –
and bring the attention which most stakeholders are aiming for in order to steer petroleum
resources and revenues in their preferred way.
5.4 Summary
The past chapter introduces natural resource governance in Ghana with a focus on the
institutions and policies which embed network interactions in petroleum governance. In
the beginning, the chapter argues that past experiences in the mining sector – most im-
portantly, the government’s inability to alleviate negative impacts of mining, the failures
of necessary law making and enforcement, the lost opportunity to integrate mining into
the national economy, and the exclusion of necessary stakeholders – established or accel-
erated interdependencies and inequalities among state institutions on the national and
district level, traditional authorities, civil society and communities in petroleum gover-
nance. These interdependencies and the different resources actors possess are agued to
promote or impede exchanges in petroleum governance.
In regard to the institutional embedding of petroleum governance, the chapter reveals
the following key results: First, a strong deviation between formal rules and their im-
plementation, unclear responsibilities or dual roles of public institutions on the central
level, and an executive dominance which thwarts decentralized decision-making and im-
plementation of state institutions on the regional and local level. Second, traditional
authorities’ constitutionally anchored power and the legitimacy they are assumed to en-
joy among rural communities influence actors’ network embedding. Their exclusion from
mining governance by state authorities in the past gives them a good justification for
being included in the petroleum sector.
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The emergence of civil society actors since the 1990s – pushed by the end of the military
regime in 1994 – and their institutional recognition together with the freedom of press
thirdly strengthen actors’ interdependencies. The experiences in mining governance made
civil society aware of the importance of governing petroleum in a better way and the need
to interfere in its steering. A great number of NGOs active in today’s petroleum sector
were founded in regard to mining which replicates now for the petroleum sector. Their
weight in Ghanaian politics and their means to advocate force government authorities to
recognize them. In this vein, civil society actors and traditional authorities aim to build
on their social and human capital as representing the ordinary people. However, it is
doubtful to what extent civil society groups satisfy their own claim to ‘represent the voice
and interest of the ordinary people’ as they are rarely known within affected communities.
Besides institutions, five explicit policies structure actors’ networking embedding. The
legal enforcement of these policies is, however, pending to a large degree. The local content
regulations only exist on paper and lack serious enforcement by state authorities. And
even though the PRMA stands out as a unique policy in natural resource governance,
it remains to be seen in the following chapters whether the PIAC is able to fulfill its
mandate of advising and controlling the government in the petroleum sector. Overall,
the diverse set of actors aiming to influence petroleum governance reveals the need to go
beyond a purely institutional analysis in order to understand petroleum governance in
Ghana. Therefore, the next chapter examines the network embedding of actors.
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6 The Network Embedding of Actors in Petroleum
Governance
The conceptual approach in Chapter 3 argues that past social contact and unequal distri-
bution of actors’ resources produce interdependencies which necessitate actors to interact
(if not collaborate) in regard to natural resources. It further reasons that these inter-
actions are enabled and constrained by structures on the one hand and actors’ overall
network embedding on the other. In answer to these two arguments, the previous chap-
ter assesses how past experiences in the mining sector shape the rapprochement of the
petroleum sector today. It further discusses institutions and policies that enable actors to
interact in petroleum governance and it shows how structures and their interpretation in
day-to-day-politics impede single actors, such as local government authorities. To pursue
the arguments of the conceptual approach (see Figure 3.1, page 24) further, this chapter
investigates the network embedding of actors in petroleum governance. This network
embedding comprises the following actors, as an interviewee explains:
“[...] we wanted to create an arrangement that allows for dialogue between the
oil and gas companies and communities. We realized, however, that it cannot just
be the two [his NGO and the oil companies]. Because the two do not make up
the complete system. We also need to look at the other actors which are engaging
[in the petroleum sector]. So in developing a set-up [...] we ended up with five
sub-clusters: (1) We have the traditional authorities because the chiefs are the
custodians of the land and you cannot do something without them. Even though
the new governance system as we have it – I call it ‘new’ not because it just came
out but because it was not a way of ruling before –, it is important that we still
recognize their contribution [...] (2) Then there is the civil society cluster. Because
we realized that – yes, we are an NGO but we cannot reach everybody on our
own. There [...] is a good number of NGOs who are actively involved. (3) So then,
whatever development you are intending to carry out, it will happen within a District
Assembly or the Municipal Sector. So we also had to include the District Assemblies
and the Municipal Sector. Because you see, the development of each district is
centered on their development plan. It is important to get them on board [...]. (4)
And then there is a representative from the Regional Coordinating Councils (RCCs).
Because they set up the ground agenda that the districts set themselves out to do.
And because this is not just a localized issue in one district, but across six districts,
it was important that the people at the top are also involved [...] And then (5) the
companies who are the business men, the main actors (Transcript VIII, page 1).”
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The network data validates this summary. The overall network, compiled through 29
network interviews, comprises 809 relations (‘arcs’) among 99 actors (‘nodes’). Figure 6.1
visualizes actors’ network embedding in petroleum governance.147
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Source: Own data. Symbols represent different sectors, digits the number of actors within
the different sectors. Graph compiled with STATA nwcommands.
Although the figure lacks explanatory power, it visualizes the complexity and purported
interactivity in Ghana’s petroleum sector: First, a high number of actors aim to influence
petroleum governance. Interviewing only 29 actors produces a dense and complex network
embedding in which relations provide the chance to exchange resources and, hence, to
collaborate in petroleum governance. Second, the arcs among actors disseminate across
sector boundaries. Eight broad and interconnected sectors emerge from the first analysis:
State institutions on the (1) national level and on the (2) district level, (3) oil and
gas companies, (4) traditional authorities, (5) NGOs (from the international, national
147 The data is retrieved from the first question of the network questionnaire, i. e., “In the year 2014,
with which of the following actors have you interacted with, by face-to-face talks, telephone, emails or
any other communication means concerning matters related to Oil and Gas in Ghana? [COMPILE
LIST]”. See Appendix 7 (page 216) for further information.
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and local level), (6) media organizations, (7) donor agencies and (8) a residual category
covering, for example, educational institutions.
Third, the figure visualizes the limitations of the following analyses. Borgatti, Carley,
and Krackhardt (2006) found that centrality measures only remain robust if data col-
lection misses a maximum of 10% of present ties in a network. If we assume that the
overall network depicted in Figure 6.1 is a realistic rapprochement to existing linkages in
petroleum governance (with 99 nodes), the sample of 29 nodes does not comply with this
criteria. Therefore, it is pivotal to emphasize – again – that the compiled network struc-
tures depict a snapshot of one network at a certain point in time and not the network in
Ghana’s petroleum governance. The data only capture one aspect of a complex landscape
in petroleum governance.
The following chapter provides in-depth insights into this complex landscape by inves-
tigating the actors within the network embedding, their rationales to engage in petroleum
governance and their relations with each other. Section 6.1 gives an overview of those
actors participating in the SNA.148 Additionally, the overview discusses three newly es-
tablished organizations in more detail as their formation and the challenges they face help
to better understand the overall network structures.
Section 6.2 tackles the second major research question: Which actors represent the
interest of affected communities? Answering this question is pivotal as representation is
a central mechanism to claim the legitimacy to being active in petroleum governance. In
fact, “representing the voice of the people” or, at least, averting damage from them, is the
most central justification of all actors to have a say in petroleum governance. But despite
this centrality, it remains so far unclear which actors affected communities view as their
representatives. In order to shed light on this research gap and to meet the complexity
of representation as a concept, the empirical analysis follows the different theoretical
approaches discussed in Section 3.3.1, i. e., representation as commissioning, mediation,
advocacy and as a trust relationship.
Still following the conceptual approach visualized in Figure 3.1 (page 24), Section 6.3
scrutinizes the explicit goals of actors in petroleum governance. It further focusses on
overlapping agendas and the question to what extent similar actors pursue similar goals
as proposed by exchange theory through the concept of homophily. The last section,
Section 6.4, provides insights into the general network’s structure with a focus on favorable
and problematic characteristics for natural resource governance as discussed in Chapter
3 (see Table 3.1, page 38). In sum, the present chapter highlights the diversity of actors
engaged in Ghana’s petroleum governance, their detachment from the communities’ level
in regard to the developing petroleum industry, the diversity of actors’ agendas, and
148 The interviewed organizations are treated as individual representatives of the various institutions
discussed in Chapter 5.2: For example, the interviewed Paramount Chief is viewed as a representative
of traditional institutions with own agency.
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their opportunities to collectively steer petroleum resources and revenues due to their
interconnectivity across sector boundaries.
6.1 Actors in Petroleum Governance
Table 6.1 provides an overview of the interviewed organizations. It summarizes the orga-
nization’s code in the SNA analyses, the year of starting to engage in the petroleum sector,
the organization’s focus in oil and gas as indicated by the interviewees, and background
information gathered through secondary data and interviews.
As the table indicates, a number of actors emerged in parallel to the evolution of
the petroleum sector for the specific purpose to become active in petroleum governance.
These new organizations are small networks on their own as they are composed of differ-
ent individual actors or individuals representing institutions. Understanding the rationale
behind their formation is important as some of their challenges are stereotypical for other
actors active in petroleum governance. Furthermore, their foundations illustrate Emer-
son’s (1962) and Cook’s (1984) hypothesis that coalition formation is the most rational
means to counterbalance power dominance (see Section 3.3.3, page 33).
Among several attempts to collate organizations, the following section scrutinizes three:
Localized coalition formation in the Western Region among traditional authorities (the
“Platform of Coastal Communities (PCC)”), intra-sectoral coalition formation among
NGOs across Ghana (the “Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (CSPOG)”), and inter-
sectoral coalition formation between different sectors (the “Public Interest Accountability
Committee (PIAC)”).
Localized Coalition Formation: The Platform of Coastal Communities
In 2010, eleven traditional councils from five coastal districts in the Western Region
formed the Platform of Coastal Communities (PCC). PCC aims to act as a “mouth-
piece” of coastal communities and to maximize communities’ benefits from the developing
petroleum sector. Therefore, PCC explicitly positions itself not as a representative of the
people’s voice but as the very voice of the people themselves. Implicitly, it emerged as a
consequence of traditional authorities ‘othering’ from NGOs in Accra.149 Two founding
members of PCC imply this argument in their elaboration of the organization’s founda-
tion:
“[...] the reason behind the formation was that we thought that we could do it
ourselves. Why do you need somebody to come and do it? With the oil finds a
lot of NGOs have been formed. And unfortunately, even some of them have their
offices in Accra. So we said: If they sit in Accra and can do it, then we will do it
ourselves” (Interview Transcript II, page 2).













Table 6.1: Overview of Sampled Network Actors
No. Code Year Focus in O&G indicated during Interview Background Information
Public Sector – National
1 EPA-ACC 2011 Regulate environmental aspects, issue
environmental permits to companies
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) emerged
from the Environmental Protection Council (founded in
1974) and was established through the Environmental
Protection Agency Act, 1994 (Act 490). As an agency of
the Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology and
Innovation (MESTI), its mission is to co-manage, protect,
and enhance the country’s environment. In 2011, the
Petroleum Section was inaugurated with support by the
Norwegian ‘Oil for Development’ Program.
2 MoE 1957 Biggest possible number of Ghanaians should
participate and play an active role
The Ministry of Energy was established in 1957 and was
renamed to ‘Ministry of Energy and Petroleum’ in 2009.
The Ministry is the oversight body of all petroleum
related activities in Ghana and directs the activities of the
Petroleum Commission (see below).
3 MoF 2007 Sound fiscal policies, effective allocation of resources The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoF)
was established in 1957. Its Energy, Oil & Gas Unit is
responsible for the management of the petroleum funds. It
is further demanded to provide and process all necessary
information and funding to the Public Interest
Accountability Committee (see below).



























Table 6.1 – Continued from previous page
No. Code Year Indicated Focus in O&G Background Information
4 PC 2011 Regulate petroleum sector, manage revenues’
utilization, coordinate all petroleum policies
The Petroleum Commission is the sole upstream regulator
of petroleum resources. It was established through the
Petroleum Commission Act, 2011 (Act 821) to solve
unclear regulatory responsibilities between the Ghana
National Petroleum Company and the MoE (which still
constitutes PC’s mother body).
5 PIAC 2011 Monitor revenues’ spending, provide platform for
discussion, assess resources’ spending independently
in accordance with PRMA
The Public Interest and Accountability Committee was
established under the Petroleum Revenue Management
Act (PRMA), 2011 (Act 815) as an independent body
overseeing the management of petroleum revenues. It
consists of eleven members representing the various
interest groups in Ghana, among others the National
House of Chiefs, religious groups and civil society.
Insufficient access to necessary information and lack of
funding effectively undermines PIAC’s scope of work.
Public Sector – District
6 DA since 2010 How do we at the ground benefit from oil and gas? The District Assemblies are designed to be the highest
political authority on the local level. 70% of the
assemblies’ members are voted for, 30% are appointed by
the President in consultation with traditional authorities
and interest groups. The interviewed District Assembly
Man, elected in 2010, views the lacking communication
and collaboration with other DA representatives as the
major burden for effective petroleum governance.
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No. Code Year Indicated Focus in O&G Background Information
7 EPA-WR 2007 Extraction in a sustainable, resource-harnessing way The Western Region branch of the EPA was founded
together with its mother body in 1994. The EPA-WR is
responsible for all developmental activities within the WR
including the management of the vast natural resources.
With the advent of oil and gas, the WR branch is the
support base for all petroleum related activities of the
EPA.
8 FC-WR 2007 Address conflicts between fishing industry and oil
industry
Established by the Fisheries Act, 1980 (Act 625) under
the authority of the Ministry of Agriculture, the Fisheries
Commission is mandated to regulate and manage the
utilization of fishery resources and to coordinate related
policies. It became particularly important through the
alleged inverse relationship between offshore petroleum
activities and the fish population / fish catches in the WR.
Private Sector
9 Tullow Oil 2007 Production of oil Tullow Oil has a share of 34.7% in the Jubilee Field.
Together with Kosmos Energy (23.49%), Anadarko
(23.49%), GNPC (13.75%) and Sabre Oil (2.81%), it adds
up the ‘Jubilee Partners’. Tullow’s ‘Social Performance’
strategy focusses on three pillars: Education & training,
water, health & sanitation, and livelihood protection. The
Social Performance strategy builds upon stakeholder
engagements, community demands, and the District
Development Plans.
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10 GNPC 1983 Lead exploration, development, production, and
disposal of petroleum
Established in 1983, the Ghana National Petroleum
Company is mandated to provide adequate and reliable
supply of petroleum products and to reduce the
dependency on crude oil imports through the development
of own petroleum resources. While GNPC has its own
social investment / corporate social responsibilities
projects, they state that other petroleum actors
overwhelmingly approach Tullow as the main operator for
social investment projects.
Donor Sector
11 GIZ 2009 Support institutional transparency and
accountability
The Deutsche Gesellschaft fu¨r Internationale
Zusammenarbeit implements projects on behalf of the
German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and
Development (BMZ). It currently focuses on
decentralisation, agriculture, and sustainable economic
development. In the oil and gas sector, the GIZ supports
Ghana in the EITI processes and regularly finances
workshops and trainings, for example for journalists on oil
and gas reporting.
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12 STAR-GH 2010 - 2015 Social inclusion and citizens’ participation STAR-Ghana, a multi-donor pooled mechanism
coordinately funded by DFID (UK), DANIDA (Denmark),
USAID (USA) and the EU, is a follow-up to similar
programs (first initiated in 2005).150 It aims to increase
the influence of Ghanaian civil society in the governance
of public goods with the ultimate goal of improving the
accountability and responsiveness of public institutions,
traditional authorities and the private sector. It has
funded most NGOs projects in the petroleum sector.
13 OfD 2008 Capacity building in national agencies responsible
for resource management (PC, MoE), environment
management (EPA and MESTI), and – since 2015 –
revenue management (MoF, Ghana Revenue
Authority)
Since 2005, the Norwegian ‘Oil for Development’ program
focusses on capacity development through institutional
collaboration: Norwegian public institutions enter into
long-term agreements with public institutions in a partner
country. In December 2010, Ghana and Norway signed
two Program Agreements under the OfD program to
strengthen Ghana’s resource and environment
management in the oil sector. In 2015, the collaboration
was extended to further include revenues’ management
until 2020.
Continued on next page
150The first phase ended in 2015. The second phase aims to establish STAR-Ghana as a Ghanaian owned and led entity with the “[...] core mandate [...] to
function as a convener, catalyst and coordinator” (STAR-Ghana 2014: 3-4) in order to promote collective action of civil society. However, the consortium of
partners only includes one Ghanaian NGO among five UK-based organizations. The network interview left out interactions with other donor agencies as these
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Traditional Sector
14 WR-HoC 2007 Mitigate negative impacts on the people and
maximize benefits for the people
Established by the Chieftaincy Act, 1961 (Act 81), the
Western Region House of Chiefs is one among ten Houses
(one for each region) and headed by the National House of
Chiefs. The House consists of 23 Paramount Chiefs. Its
core mandate is to settle disputes from traditional
councils on the sub-regional level, interpret and codify
customary laws, and represent the respective region on
the national level.
15 P-Chief 2007 Enhance the development of my area and ensure
that future generations benefit from current
petroleum wealth
Paramount chiefs head the traditional councils and lead
the various sub-chiefs in their areas. Though the role of
traditional authorities has changed, they remain a
significant force. The interviewed Paramount Chief was
enstooled some years ago and participates in the PCC (see
below). He views the petroleum discovery generally
positive but criticizes its fast implementation and the
partnerships with several Chinese companies.
16 PCC 2010 Act as the mouthpiece of the people’s voice along
the coast, bridge the gap between local
communities and the national discourse
Initiated by Friends of the Nation (see below) and two
chiefs from the WR in 2010, the Platform of Coastal
Communities consists of community members of eleven
traditional councils along the coast. It situates itself not as
representative of communities’ voices but as the very voice
of the people themselves. Some of the chiefs participating
in PCC view themselves as ‘jokers’ in turning the
petroleum resources into a blessing for the WR.
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Civil Society Sector – National
17 ACEP 2010 Petroleum Governance The African Centre for Energy Policy, established in 2010,
is an energy policy think tank that focusses on harnessing
the potential of Africa’s vast energy resources for
accelerated development across the continent. Like
Friends of the Nation (see below), it is active in petroleum
governance particularly through advocacy and by directly
confronting the government.
18 ACET 2010 Petroleum Governance The African Center for Economic Transformation,
founded in 2008, is a economic policy institute seeking to
support Africa’s long-term growth through research. It
differs from most other NGOs due to its
policy-/research-focus rather than advocacy orientation.
In 2014, ACET compiled a survey on the impacts of
Tullow’s social investment strategy with government
agencies, NGOs and communities on behalf of Tullow Oil.
19 KITE 2009 Manage expectations by providing reliable
information, monitor institutional transparency &
accountability
The Kumasi Institute for Technology and Environment is
a non-profit organization established in 1996. It focusses
on promoting the effective supply and use of renewable
and non-renewable energy resources for enhanced
sustainability and productivity to accelerate the
achievement of the MDGs and steady economic growth.
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20 CDD 2008 Transparency and accountability in legal regimes,
empower citizens
The Ghana Center for Democratic Development,
established in 1998, views itself not at the forefront in the
petroleum sector but actively pursues transparency and
accountability in natural resource governance. It is most
famous for coordinating and implementing the
Afrobarometer Survey for Ghana.
21 CEPIL 2009 Legal help to communities and their education The Center for Public Interest Law is a rights-based NGO
established in 1998 through two other NGOs. It focusses
on access to justice, research about public laws, and
repeatedly represents communities in court cases. They
are the first NGO explicitly targeting the communities
along the Ghana Gas pipeline.
22 CSPOG 2009 Improve petroleum governance, ensure benefits for
economic development and poverty reduction
The Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas, founded in
2009, comprises around 120 organized groups, individuals
and professional bodies working towards ensuring
transparency and accountability in the oil and gas
industry. It aims to strengthen the ability of civil society
to have their voices heard on oil and gas matters. The
secretariat is hosted by another NGO.
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Civil Society Sector – Local
23 COLANDEF 2009 CSR Projects of oil companies and
multi-stakeholder interactions (‘CSR Dialogue
Platform’)
The Community Land and Development Foundation was
formed in 2004 and views itself as a development oriented
organization committed to contributing to poverty
reduction and a improved land governance system. In the
petroleum sector, COLANDEF tries to facilitate the
establishment of a multi-stakeholder dialogue platform to
coordinate discussions (including private companies, in
parallel to the CSPOG).
24 FoN 2008 Community empowerment, monitoring social and
environmental impacts, facilitating
multi-stakeholder dialogues
Friends of the Nation, established in 1993, is a
socio-environmental advocacy organization. It has
co-initiated several other petroleum actors like
WERENGO (see below) and PCC and acts as a broker for
other organizations. It is most famous as an advocacy
organization and often critized for “making a lot of noise
without the necessary knowledge”.
25 UCSOND 2007 Communities’ participation and benefits The United Civil Society Organizations of Nzema East
District, formed in 2005, is an umbrella organization of 27
organized associations and interests groups in the Nzema
East District (see Map 4.1, page 51). It focuses on
transparency and accountability in natural resource
governance and public service delivery.
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26 WERENGO 2013 Participation of community members and giving
them a saying
The Western Region Development Network of NGOs was
formed to act as a coordinating network of NGOs in the
WR in 2002. It closed down in 2008 and was revived in
2009. Though its purpose is to act as a gate-keeper
between member organizations and, e.g., donors, it
nowadays seeks to act as an autonomous NGO. This
traces back both to secure funding (as members fail to pay
fees) and to the rationale of the new board.
Media Sector
27 NP 2007 Focus on all parts of the petroleum industry In 2011, 129 state-owned and private newspapers were
registered in Ghana (National Media Commission 2014).
The oldest and most widely-read newspaper, the Daily
Graphic, was established in 1950 and is the only
newspaper that is fully distributed across the country.
Yet, its newspaper coverage remains low and, as a baseline
assessment of newspaper reporting argues, “[t]he sheer
number of oil and gas advertisements in the Daily Graphic
[...] suggests that the paper benefits from the emerging
industry through advertisements but neglects to play the
critical watchdog role” (PenPlusBytes 2013: 11).
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28 Radio 2007 Bring truth to the people, provide information for
the ordinary people
In 2015, a total of 412 radio stations were authorized by
the National Communication Authority Ghana (2016) of
which 313 stations are operational. Radio stations
frequently provide citizens with oil and gas related news,
for example through regular roundtable discussions or
‘Question & Answer’ sessions. JoyFM, the interviewed
radio station, is particularly active in the petroleum
sector. It was part of a STAR-Ghana grant agreement
with media partners to increase accountability and
responsiveness of key stakeholders during the 2012 election
campaigns and to ensure conflict prevention through
responsible media reportage (Ghana News Agency 2012).
29 PPB 2007 Train journalists, establish links between media and
civil society (because media often does not even
know NGOs)
PenPlusBytes, funded in 2001, seeks to empower the
media through the use of Information and
Communications Technology (ICT) to advance the work
of journalism. It consists of a network of media
organizations and journalists interested in using ICTs to
advance the cause of journalism. Through their project
“Empowering the media to play an active watchdog role
over oil and gas revenues and resources” (funded by
STAR-Ghana), PPB aimed to increase the quantity and
quality of reporting on oil and gas, to build knowledge
capacities of journalists on oil and gas questions, and to
facilitate exchanges between media and civil society.
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And the second member explains:
“[...] we realized that the various groups that talk for us [...] have their offices
in Accra, like the companies themselves. Most of them who used to come and talk
about oil and gas were from Accra. So they come, go to USAID or GIZ or British
Something, put up a proposal, and then they want to [...] meet the local people,
educate them and such things [...] But they are in Accra. And because they have
to send a report, at one time, they will come and organize something and say “Sign
that you are present” and then they go again [...] Meanwhile they have not made
the necessary impact! Because you cannot use only one group, one day or four, five
hours within that day, to say “We have all the information we need.” You can’t! So
these are some of the things and operations we were thinking about. Why do not we
have these responsibilities? Because we are with the people and we are the leaders
of the communities, so why should we delegate these responsibilities to somebody
to come and do it? That is how PCC came about. So it was a revolutionary
thing. They go and collect big moneys in Accra. And then come and do some small
seminars here. Why do not we do it and use our name? So that is how PCC came
up, we decided to take these things on our own” (Interview Transcript II, page
10-11).
Whereas the first interviewee only indirectly implies some competition with NGOs based
in Accra, the second respondent clearly establishes PCC as an alternative to organizations
based in the capital. The practice of ‘othering’ (‘we’ against ‘them’) is used as the founding
strategy of PCC (see more details in Section 8.1.2, page 168). And even though the
second interviewee explains PCC’s establishment with the rationale that they are “with
the people”, his wording indicates that traditional leaders in the Western Region also
want to have their slice of the ‘petroleum cake’ and make “big moneys” as others do in
Accra. In consequence, the coalition formation is a means to balance the power of actors
perceived as more influential.
Six years after its foundation, several weaknesses exist that hamper the work, visibility
and credibility of PCC. First, PCC was formed against the backdrop of the oil discovery.
As discussed, such NGOs are not well received by other civil society actors. Second,
PCC’s institutional set-up is very ambiguous151 and cannot keep up with the reality of
civil society work in Ghana, particularly in regard to self-sufficient funding.152 Third, as a
leading member explains, PCC lacks sufficient coordination and collaboration among its
members. Fourth, their past activities – such as protesting against galamsey mining, water
shortages and waste-dumping along the coast (Johnson 2012: 22) – merely occupy a niche
151 Including a General Assembly, a Steering Committee, a Secretariat and six ‘Zonal Offices’ to function
as ‘Rapid Response Centers’ which monitor activities in the extractive industries within the coastal
districts (Platform of Coastal Communities 2011).
152 Both the funding from the traditional councils as well as member fees from individuals from coastal
districts (2 Cedi per month) are not payed (personal conversations).
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but are placed in the field of other, more experienced and better resourced organizations.
This behavior traces back to the lack of strategic, long-term objectives. Established as
a platform with a clear focus, PCC increasingly tries to overcome its organizational and
financial difficulties by seeking external funding and, thereinafter, turns into an ‘ordinary’
NGO rather than a ‘platform for coastal communities’ (Platform of Coastal Communities
2011).
As a consequence of these problems, PCC is not able to achieve its goal of acting as a
“mouthpiece” of coastal communities. Within the sample, only 20.09% (n = 43) of those
214 respondents who understand the term NGO, took notice of PCC’s work. Section 6.2
scrutinizes this detachment from local communities in more detail.
Intra-Sectoral Collaboration: The Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas
In preparation of the “National Conference on Oil and Gas” (see Section 5.3.2, page 89),
civil society actors met in order to collate goals in regard to the developing petroleum
sector (Kopin´ski, Polus, and Tycholiz 2013: 591-592). Since then, civil society aimed to
form a joint coalition to balance government’s power with the awareness that “together
we are more powerful” (Interview Transcript V, page 6). The “Civil Society Platform on
Oil and Gas (CSPOG)”, the outcome of these efforts, is a merger of about 120 organised
groups, individuals and professional bodies. It focuses on strengthening the ability of
civil society to have its voice heard in petroleum legislation, revenues’ management and
environmental protection policies. It also aims for improvements in transparent petroleum
governance and for ensuring that petroleum extraction benefits ‘the people’.153
However, a lack of strategy is also troubling the CSPOG, particularly as it focusses
solely on pressurizing the Ghanaian government and fails to define its relationship with
oil companies (Kopin´ski, Polus, and Tycholiz 2013: 593).154 Furthermore, the funding
troubles the platform:
“The problem is that these initiatives are started as projects and they are very
good. But once the project closes [...] then you cannot sustain it. So that is also
the problem with the Platform, sometimes we do not even have money to react to
things [...] So how to sustain these initiatives beyond the projects that gave birth
to them?” (Interview Transcript V, page 6).
153 The first stakeholder network, the ‘Oil and Gas Stakeholder Network’, was initiated by the Kumasi
Institute for Technology and Environment (KITE) between 2007 and 2008 and, until its formalization,
used to be a loose network of energy experts and civil society organisations committed to pursue
‘sound’ governance in Ghana’s energy sector. The network was merged with the CSPOG (Interview
Transcript V, page 2)
154 An interviewee replicates this interpretation for the relation between NGOs and the private sector:
“[...] between civil society and the private sector, there seems to be some kind of grievance [...] so
interaction is not that fluent [...] There is still this level of grievance if it comes to the spaces of
interaction” (Interview Transcript IV, page 9).
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During an unrecorded interview, a second respondent identifies three more profound
problems hunting all joint collaborative efforts among NGOs: On the one hand, he argues
that initiatives like the CSPOG do not deliver proper work and are unable to keep track
with both their ambitions and promises. On the other hand, he criticizes that members
do not commit to the Platform and that instead of investing some resources, they only
want to profit from their membership. Third, he concludes that all these joint initiatives
are too much centered around one single individual who heads an own NGOs.155
The CSPOG has, hence, so far been unable to use the euphoria of the oil discovery to
becoming a reliable partner in petroleum governance. Moreover, attributional weaknesses
such as lack of funding and inappropriate reasonings of becoming a member trouble the
effort of sustaining multi-actor collaboration. Whether this translates into weaknesses in
economic and social exchanges as well, is investigated in the next chapter.
Inter-sectoral Coalition Formation: The Public Interest Accountability Committee
Contrary to PCC and the CSPOG as voluntary initiatives, the Public Interest Account-
ability Committee (PIAC) is the legal expression of the government’s effort to include a
wide range of actors in petroleum governance. Despite this difference, it grounds in the
same assumption: that collaboration benefits natural resource governance.
PIAC was established under the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, Act 815 (PRMA)
and inaugurated in September 2011 as a “[...] citizens’ based committee responsible for
independent oversight of the management of petroleum revenues” (Civil Society Platform
on Oil and Gas 2011: 13). It is mandated to (1) monitor and evaluate government’s com-
pliance with the PRMA and other relevant institutions in the management of petroleum
revenues, to (2) provide a platform for public debate on spending prospects of petroleum
revenues in line with the twelve priority areas (see Section 5.3.2, page 89), and to (3)
conduct independent assessments on the management and use of petroleum revenues to
assist Parliament and the executive in the oversight and performance of their functions
(Public Interest and Accountability Committee 2013: iv; Parliament of the Republic of
Ghana 2011: Section 51 - 57).
PIAC consists of eleven members, each representing one institution, amongst them the
National House of Chiefs, the Association of Queen Mothers, the Ghanaian branch of the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI),156 think tanks, religious groups, and
155 This interpretation is indeed valid across all merger organizations from the civil society sector: The
CSPOG is headed by the chairman of ISODEC, another Accra-based organizations, and WERENGO
was co-founded by the chairman of FoN in the Western Region.
156 The Ghana Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (GHEITI) is the Ghanaian branch of the
international EITI between governments, extractive companies and civil society aiming to promote
transparency and accountability in revenue mobilization. It was launched in 2002 at the World Summit
on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg and took up the idea of the ‘Publish What You Pay’
campaign which persuades companies to publish what they pay to governments and governments to
publish what they receive and how they spend these revenues (Heller 2013; van Oranje and Parham
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NGOs. The various interest groups nominate one representative each and the Minister of
Energy and Petroleum appoints them.
PIAC’s weaknesses are diverse and predominantly institutionally induced. Instead of
making it an independent monitoring institution with sanctioning power, its responsibili-
ties are only advisory to the Parliament and the executive. Moreover, Parliament’s failure
to assign a committee that reviews and reacts to PIAC’s annual and semi-annual reports
weakens PIAC’s role in petroleum governance. As members are appointed by the MoF
– the Ministry the PIAC is mandated to control –, members face accusations of lacking
independence, integrity and credibility. Because institutional capacity building is done by
development partners (e.g., the GIZ or the Norwegian Oil for Development program), the
government can further easily escape its financial and contextual responsibilities. Ulti-
mately, PIAC’s systematic lack of financial and technical resources, which members of the
PIAC “keep saying that it sounds like a broken record” (Dr. Joe Amoako-Tuffour at the
launch of 2013 Annual PIAC Report, see Meeting Transcript III),157 is the most sincere
weakness: Not only does the government regularly fail to release the legally binding funds
but the PRMA, the law that founded PIAC, does not stipulate its finances and, thus,
gives the government the space to evade.158 A former member of PIAC notes:
“[W]hen I was on the PIAC, I realized that PIAC’s work was a little bit limited in
the sense that we did not have the ability to do some more independent verifications,
a monitoring of the projects [...] We did not have the capacity – both human
resources and financial resources – to go down down down to see it for ourselves
[...] [so that we would be] convinced that the resources are spend wisely” (Interview
Transcript V, page 3).
As these weaknesses are all induced by institutional failures, there is a strong suspicion
that while the Government under Atta Mills was eager to include non-state actors through
the PIAC, the legal framework at the same time was institutionalized in a way that ensures
that the committee does not become too influential. In that regard, the PIAC is given
the platform to be heard but not to have its inputs considered by those it is mandated to
control. This is a strategy more often used by government representatives in petroleum
governance in Ghana – and, together with the network practice of ‘othering’ –, discussed
in Section 8.1 (page 165) in more detail.
2009). As a tripartite collaboration between public institutions, the private sector and Civil Society
Organizations (CSOs), it is a voluntary rather than official body in Ghana, financed by the Ministry
of Finance (MoF). With its focus on revenue mobilization it complements PIAC’s focus on revenue
allocation and disbursement to some extent (Disch, Rasmussen, and Asamoah 2015: 32).
157 Dr. Joe Amoako-Tuffour is President and Founder of African Center for Economic Transformation
(ACET) and an advisor to the Ministry of Finance.
158 As a consequence, the PIAC operated without funding for the greater part of 2013 and, since 2014,
can only finance a secretariat with the help of the GIZ. It was only in January 2015 when PIAC
moved into an own office space while it had its Secretariat at the offices of an international NGO (the
Revenue Watch Institute) before moving.
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In sum, this section portrays 29 actors who are active in petroleum governance in
Ghana. The interviewees work for the government on the national and regional level,
for the two major oil companies, donor agencies, civil society groups, the media or are
part of the traditional system. While some of these organizations only emerged in the
course of the oil discovery (such as PCC, the CSPOG and PIAC), others have been active
before 2007. What connects them is their aspiration to ‘represent the voice of the affected
people’ or – in the case of private companies and donor agencies – to make the oil ‘benefit
the people’ as much as possible (or, at least, to minimize potential negative effects). But
who can legitimately claim to represent the people’s interests in regard to the developing
petroleum industry? The next section aims to answer this pivotal question.
6.2 Representation: Who Speaks with the Voice of the People?
The necessity to scrutinize which actors represent affected communities cannot be over-
emphasized as representation is highly contentious in research and much sought after
among actors in petroleum governance. For example, in his assessment of the developing
petroleum sector in Ghana, Gyampo (2010: 7) views civil society as “[...] the true repre-
sentatives of a cross section of the ordinary citizenry [...]”. The same role is also assigned
to traditional authorities who are said to mediate effectively between communities on
the one hand and state authorities on the other. However, reviewing the forestry sec-
tor, Amanor (2006: 10) emphatically rejects the assumption that traditional authorities
represent citizens’ interests. He rather concludes that the undermining of communities’
interests is, to a large extent, caused by the “myth” that traditional authorities represent
communities as they are
“[...] intermarried with the political elites and often have their own business
empires [...] Many chiefs have closer social ties and share similar mindsets with
business and political contacts than with their own subjects. Yet, they are promoted
as an independent civil society group standing up for the rights of the rural poor”
(Amanor 2006: 4).
Literature is, hence, inconsistent about communities’ representatives in natural resource
governance in Ghana. In practice, actors who are active in petroleum governance consis-
tently claim to represent communities’ interests. “Speaking with the voice of the people” is
the most central instrument to seek influence in petroleum governance, both for elected ac-
tors (such as District Assembly members), traditional authorities and civil society groups.
As Section 3.3.1 (page 29) argues, legitimacy through representation is an important
resource, particularly for those actors who lack economic or human capital. The section
also discusses the complexity of ‘representation’ as a concept and its association with
delegation, mediation, advocacy, and trust. The following discussion gives insights into
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these different aspects. In a preceding step, it is, however, first necessary to understand
what communities’ interests actually are, i. e., which problems communities perceive as
most urgent in their immediate living environments and to what extent the new petroleum
industry is one of them.
To identify these problems, the survey asks respondents to openly state the three biggest
challenges their community is currently facing. The question deliberately dispenses with
closed-end questions to provide respondents with maximum flexibility in identifying prob-
lems. Though the underlying aim was to find out to what extent respondents view the
developing petroleum sector as an immediate challenge, the questionnaire abstains from a
direct question159 in order to not stimulate respondents’ answering behavior in the direc-
tion of perceiving petroleum as a challenge. Table 6.2 summarizes the biggest challenges
that respondents indicate in descending order. Out of the 999 possible answers – three
challenges per 333 respondents –, 787 were stated, i. e., a return quote of 78.78%.
Table 6.2: Communities’ Challenges along the Ghana Gas Pipeline
Frequency Percent
Poor sanitation 155 19.70
Insufficient water supply 131 16.65
Poor quality of schools / education 99 12.58
Poor road network / quality 94 11.94
Unemployment 85 10.80
Insufficient electricity supply 66 8.39
Lack of clinic / health center 43 5.45
Lack of community center 30 3.81
Lack of market place 29 3.69
Loss of land / fishing grounds 14 1.78
Poverty 9 1.24
Lack of development 9 1.24
Lack of community park 6 0.76
No playing ground for children 3 0.38
Flooding 2 0.25
Customary matters 2 0.25
Others 10 1.27
Total 787 100
Source: Own data. Answers derived from question number 13. ‘Don’t know’
and ‘refuse to answer’ coded as missing.
The depicted answers support the choice of an open-ended question. In fact, none of
159 For example in the format “How much does the developing oil and gas sector pose a challenge to your
community?”.
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the respondents directly refer to the developing petroleum sector as a challenge. Indi-
rectly, 16 interviewees (2.03%) pertain to it in the form of loss of land / fishing grounds
and flooding as a consequence of the pipeline’s construction. Apart from that, partici-
pants identify rather ‘classical’ fields of development, first and foremost poor sanitation
facilities including the lack of drainage systems (19.70%, n = 155), insufficient supply
with running water (16.65%, n = 131), the low quality of schools and education (12.58%,
n = 99), an insufficient road network or its poor quality (11.94%, n = 94), high unem-
ployment (10.80%, n = 85), and an unreliable electricity supply (8.39%, n = 66). The
remaining challenges scratch amenities in communities such as a joint market place, a
community park, safe playgrounds for the children and, most importantly in numbers, a
clinic or health center. In order for citizens to feel represented in petroleum governance
and beyond, stakeholders would, thus, have to advocate, for example, for the investment
of petroleum revenues into the creation or proper maintenance of sanitation and water
facilities, education, the road network, and job creation schemes.
In view of the previously discussed government activities in the sector (see Table 5.5,
page 91), two interferences have to be emphasized: First, the repeated calls from civil
society to limit the spending of petroleum revenues to only one or two priority areas
should be critically overthought in light of the diverse spectrum of challenges citizens
perceive to trouble their communities. Second, investing in road networks and other in-
frastructural developments is one of the four priority areas of the Annual Budget Funding
Amount (ABFA) and, thus, complies partly with communities’ challenges.160 These two
interferences drive the question to what extent respondents feel represented by petroleum
actors in general and related to oil and gas in particular. As representation is a complex
phenomenon, the following discussion sheds light on the four anticipated aspects of rep-
resentation (commission, mediation, advocacy, and trust) and carves out contradictions
and similarities.
Representation as Commissioning
As discussed in Section 3.3.1 (page 29), representation can first be understood as com-
missioning : Actors can commission others to promote their interests. In order to get
insights into representation as commissioning, the survey includes two questions. The
first is a follow-up question to the challenges respondents anticipate in their communities.
They subsequently indicated a maximum of three actors that are, in their personal opin-
ion, helpful to address these challenges. Table 6.3 summarizes these actors in descending
160 However, a closer look into the allocation of petroleum revenues within this priority area in 2014 shows
that none of these road constructions nor any of the educational infrastructure projects were built
within the sampled communities. Additionally, two of the energy infrastructure projects benefited
the Western Region of which one is a payment for the construction of the Aboadze coastal protection
works to secure the power generation plant (Public Interest and Accountability Committee 2014:
77-82).
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order. Out of 999 possible answers, 750 were given, i. e., a return quote of 75.08%.
Table 6.3: Representation as Commissioning in General
Frequency Percent
Government (incl. President) 165 22.00
District Assembly (Wo-) Man 158 21.07
Members of Parliament 148 19.73
Traditional Authorities 101 13.47
DCE 86 11.47
NGOs 25 3.33
Individuals / Community itself 13 1.73
Community Leaders 11 1.47
Unit Committee 9 1.2
Ghana Gas 9 1.2
Private Sector / Companies (excl. Ghana Gas) 9 1.2
Ghana Highway Authority 4 0.53
Regional Minister 2 0.27
Ghana Water Company 2 0.27
Ghana Education Service 1 0.13




Source: Own data. Answers derived from question number 13.1. ‘Don’t know’
and ‘refuse to answer’ coded as missing.
The Government (including the President as a sub-category) is for most interviewees
(22.00%, n = 165) the central actor when it comes to addressing communities’ chal-
lenges. Together with state representatives on the district level and Members of Par-
liament (MPs), government authorities even make up 62.80%. These numbers strongly
contradict the claim of both civil society and traditional authorities that they are the
predestined representatives of communities’ interests because they are “with the people”.
Almost two-thirds of respondents perceive government representatives as helpful in ad-
dressing challenges – contrary, this holds true for traditional authorities only to 13.47%
and for NGOs to 3.33%.161
The second question narrows the question down to the petroleum sector and asks whom
161 The remaining answers often directly target responsible units, e.g. the Ghana Highway Authority
for road constructions or the Ghana Education Service for improving educational facilities. Another
important addressee is the private sector, including Ghana Gas as the state-owned company.
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respondents would commission if they had a problem in regard to oil and gas in the future.
It is again an open question that provides respondents with full freedom to nominate up
to three actors. Only 523 answer are generated, aggregating to a comparably low response
rate of 52.36%.
Table 6.4: Representation as Commissioning in Oil and Gas
Frequency Percent
Traditional Authorities 153 29.25
District Assembly (Wo-) Man 132 25.24
Ghana Gas (incl. Liaison Officers) 86 16.44
Member of Parliament 41 7.84
District Chief Executive 41 7.84
Police 13 2.49
Community Organizations 12 2.29
GREL (incl. ROAA) 9 1.72
Friends / Family / Other Farmers 9 1.72
NGO 6 1.25
Media 6 1.25




Source: Own data. Answers derived from question number 32. ‘Don’t
know’ and ‘refuse to answer’ coded as missing.
In direct comparison to the first question, the ranking changes considerably. The Gov-
ernment is at the very end whilst traditional authorities come first. District Assembly
members occupy again the second place and 16.44% of respondents would commission
Ghana Gas, more specifically the Ghana Gas Liaison Officers. Those respondents who
perceive the Member of Parliament as potential assistance are all (despite one respondent)
from the Ellembelle District, i. e., from the district the current Minister of Energy and
Petroleum (who is also the MP) originates. NGOs again score low which increasingly
raises the question whether they actually ‘speak with the voice of the people’.
Representation as Mediation
Williams (1998) enlarges the traditional understanding of representation with the compo-
nent of mediation. She argues that actors need to mediate their relations with constituents
in a sound way in order to act as representatives. Additionally, she understands mediation
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as a precondition for building trust.
Literature about Ghana frequently discusses traditional authorities, NGOs and media
as mediators between communities on the one hand and state authorities on the other.
To tackle representation as mediation, the questionnaire includes two questions: to what
extent, on a scale from 1 to 5, non-state actors are perceived to have influence in oil and
gas as mediators and how much respondents approve of such mediation.162
The idea that these actors have some form of influence in petroleum governance is
widely supported by respondents. The cross-tables 6.5 – 6.8 provide an overview on
respondents’ anticipation of actors’ influence in petroleum governance and their approval
or disapproval of this influence. In regard to both paramount and community chiefs
(Table 6.5 and 6.6), whether or not respondents think they are influential in petroleum
governance, they very much approve of such mediation. Overall, 86% of all respondents
in the case of paramount chiefs and even 88% in the case of community chiefs do approve
or highly approve that traditional authorities play a role in governing Ghana’s oil and gas
resources. If respondents are convinced that traditional authorities influence petroleum
governance ‘very much’, almost all respondents – 84% in the case of paramount chiefs and
83% in the case of community chiefs – highly approve of this influence. And even among
those respondents who do not think that traditional authorities have something to say in
petroleum governance, they would approve of it if they did so in the future.163
Table 6.5: Mediation by Paramount Chiefs & Respondents’ Approval (numbers in percent)
Disapproval / Approval
Influence High disapproval Disapproval Neither Approval High approval Total
No influence 12 8 17 32 32 100
Little 0 14 24 29 33 100
Neither 3 0 6 52 39 100
Fairly 0 2 0 43 55 100
Very much 1 1 2 13 84 100
Total 4 4 7 28 58 100
Source: Own data. Numbers in percent. N = 285, γ = .6109. Answers derived from question
number 41 & 41.1.
162 Accordingly, the questionnaire only scrutinizes the mediation abilities of actors who are not voted
for in public and free elections, i. e., traditional authorities, civil society representatives, and media
organizations.
163 As the rank coefficient γ indicates, a moderate relation between perceived influence and its approval
exists: At least in the case of paramount chiefs (γ =.6109), it can be assumed that the more respon-
dents are convinced that paramount chiefs influence petroleum governance, the more they give their
blessing to this mediation.
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Table 6.6: Mediation by Community Chiefs & Respondents’ Approval (numbers in percent)
Disapproval / Approval
Influence High disapproval Disapproval Neither Approval High approval Total
No influence 10 9 10 39 31 100
Little 0 8 17 25 50 100
Neither 3 0 6 32 58 100
Fairly 0 5 2 44 49 100
Very much 2 1 1 14 83 100
Total 3 4 5 28 60 100
Source: Own data. Numbers in percent. N = 310, γ = .5407. Answers derived from question
number 41 & 41.1.
The high approval of non-state actors having influence in petroleum governance repli-
cates for both NGOs and the media. While the dropout rate in regard to NGOs remains
high (119 respondents refuse to answer), more than half of the remaining respondents
ascribe a high or very high influence to civil society representatives in petroleum gover-
nance. Parallel to traditional authorities, perceiving NGOs and media as influential, goes
hand in hand with a high or very high approval.
Table 6.7: Mediation by NGOs & Respondents’ Approval (numbers in percent)
Disapproval / Approval
Influence High disapproval Disapproval Neither Approval High approval Total
No influence 12 18 18 24 29 100
Little 6 0 17 44 33 100
Neither 6 0 9 53 31 100
Fairly 0 2 0 44 53 100
Very much 0 0 1 9 90 100
Total 2 2 5 28 62 100
Source: Own data. Numbers in percent. N = 200, γ = .6981. Answers derived from question
number 41 & 41.1.
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Table 6.8: Mediation by Media & Respondents’ Approval (numbers in percent)
Disapproval / Approval
Influence High disapproval Disapproval Neither Approval High approval Total
No influence 10 6 30 32 22 100
Little 7 0 20 48 26 100
Neither 0 0 21 46 33 100
Fairly 0 1 1 50 47 100
Very much 0 0 1 21 78 100
Total 3 1 12 37 47 100
Source: Own data. Numbers in percent. N = 310, γ = .5931. Answers derived from question
number 41 & 41.1.
Accordingly, whereas respondents are scattered in their opinion to what extent these
actors are able to mediate in petroleum governance, they cluster in their approval of this
mediation. Two interpretations present themselves based on these figures: On the one
hand, it could be argued that respondents disengage from state authorities and favor an
active role of non-state actors in petroleum governance.164 Meanwhile, the results of the
first two questions – representation as commissioning – question this interpretation. On
the other hand, the low variations in both influence and influence’s approval may suggest
that interviewees support the basic idea that other actors – besides the government –
should exist in petroleum governance irrespective of whether or not this involves civil
society or media or traditional authorities or any other potential actors. This could
originate from the narrative that – in comparison to state authorities – non-state actors
are automatically ‘good’ or ‘better’.
Representation as Advocacy
As a third component, representation may be understood as ‘advocacy’, i. e., that actors
advocate for their subordinates and, as a consequence, these subordinates feel well rep-
resented. The questionnaire tackles this form of representation with two questions: The
first question prompts respondents to indicate who pushes communities’ interests into
Ghanaian politics in general (on a scale from 1 to 5). The second question replicates this
question with a focus on oil and gas and asks interviewees to evaluate how well – on a
scale from 1 to 5 – various state and non-state actors promote communities’ interests in
petroleum governance. The two sub-graphs (Graph 6.2) depict their answers.
164 Azarya and Chazan (1987) put forward this argument already 40 years ago.
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Figure 6.2: Stakeholders’ Abilities to Advocate for Communities’ Interests
(a) General Advocacy Abilities (b) Advocacy Abilities in O&G
Source: Own data. Answers derived from question number 14 and 38.
In direct comparison, community chiefs perform best in promoting communities’ in-
terests in general (58.97%, n = 329), followed by paramount chiefs (46.05%, n = 291).
Due to the high drop out rates in regard to NGOs, the results should be compared with
caution, but NGOs are comparably popular among those to whom the term means some-
thing: 53.77% (n = 107) think they pressurize communities’ interests ‘very much’ into
politics. Contrary to this, the media seems to be detached from the local level in the eyes
of respondents.
The same question, replicated for the petroleum sector, draws an entirely different
picture. Respondents do not feel that their interests are well represented by any of the
actors. Whereas community chiefs again advocate best, the vast majority of interviewees
(74.13%, n = 212) is convinced that paramount chiefs are ‘not at all’ promoting local
interests. The same replicates for the District Chief Executives (DCEs) and the Members
of Parliament (MPs).
As in the case of commissioning, respondents therefore considerably differ between
general representation on the one hand and representation in the petroleum sector on
the other. While respondents feel comparably well represented by various stakeholders –
particularly by traditional authorities (and, with some limitations, NGOs) – in general,
they feel that their interests are mis- or underrepresented in the emerging petroleum
sector.
Various factors may cause this difference: First, as the survey shows, respondents do,
so far, not perceive any personal benefits arising from the petroleum sector and, hence,
may feel ill-represented. Second, actors (intentionally) fuelled citizens’ expectations after
the oil discovery. As these expectations were disappointed, citizens may not feel well
represented in oil and gas even though they still appreciate specific actors in general. This
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observation warns against an inversion of the argument that actors who are generally
well accepted as representatives in Ghanaian politics are automatically recognized as
representatives in petroleum governance as well.
Representation as Trust Relationship
Finally, trust is anticipated to play a decisive role in representation based on a simple
logic: Citizens are assumed to feel better represented if they trust their representatives.
This trust, in turn, legitimates actors to play a role in petroleum governance. Yet, so far
it remains unclear whom communities trust. One interviewee explains:
“The issue of trust is a very contentious one. There can be no [single] answer that
covers all [petroleum] actors [...]. Local communities have over the years looked up
to NGOs to represent their interest. However, in recent years, the proliferation of
NGOs in Ghana and especially those seeking to be doing interventions in the oil and
gas sector, resulted in situations where some NGOs have conducted themselves un-
professionally and so receive negative reactions from the communities. In the same
way, even so communities do not trust private sector companies, there are some
cases where very good relationships have been cemented through well thought con-
sultations on particular interventions. Therefore, I would say that there is generally
a lack of trust by community members. However, noting their need for collaboration
in addressing impacts of oil production in their lives, they are able to establish some
level of trusting partnership and collaboration” (Interview Transcript VI, page 1).
To shed light on this contentious question, Graph 6.3 depicts two sub-graphs: respon-
dents’ trust in petroleum actors in general and respondents’ confidence in regard to oil
and gas.
Figure 6.3: Trust in Petroleum Actors
(a) General Trust (b) Trust in O&G
Source: Own data. Answers derived from question number 11 and 40.
123
6 The Network Embedding of Actors in Petroleum Governance
Replicating actors’ commissioning and advocacy abilities, respondents assess their trust
in actors separately: General trust in actors is much higher than confidence in their work in
petroleum governance. General trust in non-state actors – paramount chiefs, community
chiefs, NGOs and the media – is comparably high: Around half of all interviewees place
‘very much’ trust in each of these actors (from 45.21% for paramount chiefs to 52.48%
for community chiefs and NGOs). Yet, in the oil and gas sector, citizens’ trust in these
actors shrinks by around 20% for traditional authorities and NGOs, and almost by 30%
for the media. The mistrust against political actors – the President, MPs, DCEs and
DA members – is also much higher in oil and gas matters than in general. Consequently,
respondents are much more distrusting of actors’ abilities to represent their interests in
petroleum governance than their general political capabilities. This inference is supported
by a look at the means: For example, the general mean trust in paramount chiefs (x¯ =
3.5548) falls to a mean trust in oil and gas of x¯ = 1.5258. Low pairwise correlations
between, e.g., general trust in paramount chiefs and trust in paramount chiefs in the oil
and gas sector, support the argument that respondents differ two forms of trust.
This finding revives the argument that inferences from general trust patterns to trust
in the developing petroleum sector are made without an empirical foundation.
Comparing Actors’ Representation Skills
Table 6.9 summarizes the scores of each stakeholder group in regard to the different
theoretical components of representation.
Table 6.9: Summary of Actors’ Representation Abilities















MP 2 3 – 2.52 0.81 2.02 1.40
DCE 4 4 – 2.53 0.67 1.88 1.29
DA (Wo-)Man 1 2 – 2.60 1.08 2.23 1.53
Param. Chief 3 1 3.43 2.80 0.65 2.55 1.53
Comm. Chief 3 1 3.43 3.12 1.20 2.80 1.95
NGOs 5 5 3.49 3.08 1.26 2.98 2.24
Media 6 6 3.30 2.58 1.22 2.96 1.95
Source: Own data based on previous tables on representation.
The first two columns depict the ranks stakeholders occupy in commissioning, based on
the numerical results of the open questions whom respondents would commission in regard
to the perceived challenges on the one hand and in regard to oil and gas on the other
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(see Table 6.3, page 117).165 For general problems, District Assembly representatives
score the highest rank, followed by Members of Parliament and traditional authorities.
Only a small number of respondents would commission NGOs and media representatives
and, consequently, they occupy the last ranks. The same replicates for commissioning in
regard to oil and gas where traditional authorities rank the highest, followed by District
representatives and Members of Parliament.
The approval that non-state actors – traditional authorities, NGOs and media – po-
tentially or actually influence petroleum governance, is high among all respondents, cul-
minating in high mean values for all these stakeholders. Differences occur, however, in
regard to their advocacy abilities: Here, community chiefs represent best with the highest
mean value whereas media organizations are not doing well in advocating communities’
interests from the respondents’ perspective. The numbers significantly drop in regard to
stakeholders’ advocacy skills in petroleum governance: Here, the mean values reduce to
half at least. Even paramount chiefs who score high in all other representation components
do not perform well.
The differentiation between general representation skills and representation abilities in
oil and gas replicates for the trust respondents place in the various stakeholders. Although
the results for NGOs have to be taken with caution because of the high drop-out rates,
they enjoy the highest mean trust, followed by media organizations and community chiefs.
The same actors outperform in regard to respondents’ trust in petroleum governance. To
make these results even more apparent, Table 6.10 adds up the scores for each stakeholder
in descending order.166
Table 6.10: Actors’ Ranking in Representation
Stakeholder Rank Score Rank
Community Chiefs 19.07 1
District Assembly (Wo-) Men 18.44 2
Paramount Chiefs 17.53 3
Members of Parliament 15.74 4
NGOs 13.56 5
District Chief Executives 12.27 6
Media 10.61 7
Source: Own data. Ranking without ‘mediation’ due to missing data.
Following four different ways of representing communities’ interests, community chiefs
165 As the answer to these two questions are not subdivided in paramount chiefs and community chiefs,
they receive the same rank.
166 For this purpose, the ranks were inversed so that the actors with the first rank get the highest score.
For example, in general commissioning District Assembly (Wo-) Men were most frequently mentioned
and hence occupy the first rank. It inverses to a score of 6.
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are the most important representatives for affected communities. District Assembly (Wo-
) Men follow closely as do paramount chiefs. Members of Parliament occupy the fourth
rank and dominate over NGOs and District Chief Executives. The media, in the eyes of
respondents, are least representing their interests.
This final result has a number of consequences: On the one hand, community chiefs –
and, more generally, – traditional authorities represent communities’ interest best. This is
an important result not only in regard to the discourses taking place in petroleum gover-
nance but considering the immanent debate in academia as to whether or not traditional
authorities can be viewed as mouthpiece of ordinary citizens in natural resource gover-
nance. If there is an actor group that can legitimately claim to represent communities’
interests along the gas pipeline, it is the traditional sector, with a priority on community
chiefs.
On the other hand, the results neglect NGOs an important means to seek influence in
petroleum governance. They loudly and repeatedly argue to ‘speak with the voice of the
people’ and deduce their right to be listened to and to play a role in petroleum governance
from this claim. The results of the survey contradict this argument. About one-third
of all respondents do not understand the term well enough to state their opinion and
among those to whom the term means something to, NGOs fall back behind traditional
authorities and state representatives. This problem may originate from NGOs’ failure
to recognize the relevance of communities’ problems in the petroleum sector. While
their discussion move on the macro level and serve the ‘standard jargons’ of development
cooperation, people demand for the solution of hands-on problems. Hence, if NGOs want
to act as a mouthpiece of communities, they first need to lay a foundation by making their
work better understandable to ordinary citizens. Second, they need to better listen to
people’s needs, to understand the relevance of problems and must revert to their founding
idea. Although this argument does not dispute the important role civil society plays
in Ghanaian politics – particularly as a counterweight to the vast executive powers –,
it brings to light a severe divide between the self-perception of NGOs on the one hand
and their anticipation among citizens on the other (see therefore also Vormawor and
Atuguba (2014)). Decisively, it cautions against an inversion of the argument that general
representation and representation in oil and gas are transferable.
6.3 Agendas in the Petroleum Sector
The argued detachment of NGOs from communities’ interests drives the questions which
goals NGOs and, more generally, all other petroleum actors pursue with their engagement
in petroleum governance beyond representing ‘the voice of the people’, to what extent
citizens’ interests and actors’ goals overlap, and which goals actors have been able to
realize so far. The subsequent section focuses on these questions.
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6.3.1 Actors’ Goals
Figure 6.4 depicts a number of two-mode networks based on the first goal the 29 network
actors indicated to pursue in petroleum governance. Two-mode networks (also called
‘bipartite graphs’) indicate how actors are tied to particular events. They derive their
name from dealing with two different sets of data, here actors on the one hand and goals
in petroleum governance on the other.
Overall, the 29 petroleum actors seek to realize 19 different goals. Due to this high
diversity and despite the previously discussed high interconnectivity of actors, several
components exist: Two bipartite graphs, five bipartite triads and twelve actors that do
not intersect with others in their major goal orientation.
Figure 6.4: Bipartite Graphs of Actors’ Agendas
Source: Own data. Dots represent actors, diamonds actors’ agendas.
The agendas range from very broad goals such as ensuring ‘transparency’ in the oil and
gas sector to more specific goals such as citizens’ ‘education’ or communities’ ‘participa-
tion’. Based on Section 3.3.1 (page 30), which argued that collaboration becomes likely
if actors share the same agendas in natural resource governance, the visualization of the
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first goal suggests that collaborative steering of petroleum resources among the 29 actors
is rather unlikely.
This result changes when not only one but three goals are included in the network anal-
ysis. The second bipartite graph (Figure 6.5) depicts the three major goals the interviewed
organizations are pursuing in oil and gas.
Figure 6.5: Agenda Network
Source: Own data retrieved from the question: “What are your three major goals in the oil and gas
sector?”. Light blue nodes depict general goals, dark blue nodes are linked to the citizens’
level. Nodes’ size implicates goals’ frequency (popularity). Network layout compiled with
visone’s quick layout button.
Through the inclusion of two more goals, the network becomes a fully connected bipar-
tite graph with no isolates (i. e., no actor that does not share any goal with another actor).
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Overall, the 29 actors try to reach 35 different goals in petroleum governance. Some of
these goals are highly interrelated: For example, in order to reach accountability in the
spending of petroleum revenues, transparency in the allocation of these revenues is nec-
essary. Similarly, the goal of reaching ‘good governance’ in the petroleum sector unites
transparency and accountability as much as ‘revenue management’ unites the goals of
implementing sound fiscal and sound financial policies.
As in the first bipartite graph, achieving transparency remains the most popular goal
and clusters eight actors: Accra-based NGOs, the German GIZ, the Norwegian Oil for
Development Program (OfD), the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MoE), and the
Public Interest Accountability Committee (PIAC). Realizing longterm environmental
protection is the second most frequent goal. At least three factors can explain why actors
put so much emphasis on these two goals: On the one hand, the Nigerian experiences of
gas flaring and oil spillages are a continuous reminder for all actors of how to not govern
petroleum resources. On the other hand, the mining activities in Ghana have led to high
environmental hazards as discussed in Section 5.1 (page 73). Additionally, stakeholders in
Ghana anticipate transparency as key to both environmental protection and best practices
in revenues’ governance.
The assumption that actors from similar sectors cluster around similar goals has to
be rejected based on these results. The argument that sector affiliation is suggestive of
goal orientation simply fails to characterize petroleum governance in Ghana. For exam-
ple, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on the national level (EPA-ACC) and
its sister on the local level (EPA-WR) do not share any goals in petroleum governance.
While the EPA-WR aims to achieve intergenerational equity, sustainable harnessing of
petroleum resources as well as public health and safety, the EPA-ACC aims to ensure that
the petroleum sector is developed efficiently with best environmental practices, that local
communities benefit and that they coexist peacefully with oil companies (‘mediation’).
With these goals, the national branch is located in the middle of the network whilst the
EPA-WR remains at the network’s boundaries. It only relates to the Fisheries Commission
(also based in Sekondi-Takoradi) in its aim to ensure sustainable extraction of petroleum
resources and with the Community Land and Development Foundation (COLANDEF),
an Accra-based NGO with a regional branch in Takoradi, in the aim of ensuring intergen-
erational equity. It is also counterintuitive that the goals of the regional branch tackle the
macro level whereas the national branch emphasizes localized goals. This explains why
the Environmental Protection Agency Accra (EPA-ACC) shares ties with local agents
such as the District Assembly Man, the Houses of Chiefs and the interviewed Paramount
Chief.
The graph also rejects the presumption that traditional authorities pursue coherent
goals. The interviewed Paramount Chief is very much focused on economic improvements:
achieving economic growth and boosting local content. Optimists would interpret this as
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a sign for traditional authorities’ eagerness to develop their areas and to make their
people benefit from the petroleum resources. Pessimists would rather interpret it as a
sign of greed for financial resources. Though, as a Paramount Chief, he is part of the
Western Region House of Chiefs (WR-HoC), he only shares one goal with the House, i.
e., environmental protection. And PCC – of which the Paramount Chief is a member as
well – is located at the opposite end of the network and does not share any common goals
with the Paramount Chief. An incoherence also characterizes the WR-HoC and PCC.
This result supports other authors’ finding that traditional authorities fail to streamline
their agendas and to coordinate their interests (Valsecchi 2007: 10-11). In turn, the
outcome rejects the assumption that homophile actors share similar goals.
The same becomes apparent in regard to the ten interviewed civil society organizations.
They indicate a diverse set of goals and consequently distribute across the network. The
CSPOG, funded to streamline the interests of civil society actors in regard to petroleum
governance in Ghana (see Section 6.1), shares more goals with donor agencies and public
authorities than with NGOs. Moreover, while Accra-based NGOs are all interrelated
through one or more goals, Western Regional NGOs indicate a diverse set of agendas and,
thus, do not form coherent subgroups which would enable them to collectively steer their
interests in petroleum governance. It further results in a divide between Accra-based
NGOs on the one hand and and local NGOs from the Takoradi area on the other. These
observations form an important result: actors from the traditional and civil society sector
fail to prioritize and coordinate their goals in petroleum governance.
Pulled together, the biggest agenda block concerns Ghanaian citizens. 19 actors in-
dicate a goal that is related to communities: Increase citizens’ ‘benefits’ from oil and
gas, foster their ‘education’ about it, ‘empower’ them to understand the sector, increase
their ‘participation’ in oil and gas activities, and ‘represent their interests’. This focus on
community-related goals re-emphasizes the overarching aspiration of all actors to either
be viewed as representatives of the ordinary citizenry or as averting harm from them.
Whether or not stakeholders are successful in implementing these goals, necessitates a
view back to the survey’s respondents.
6.3.2 Goal Attainment on the Local Level
First, increasing citizens’ benefits from the oil and gas discovery is a prominent goal among
petroleum stakeholders. The bipartite graph (Figure 6.5) clusters five actors, the District
Assembly Man, the radio station, public authorities (the EPA-ACC and the Petroleum
Commission (PC)) and the Accra-based NGO CEPIL. Within the sampled communities,
anticipated benefits remain yet low. While some view the construction of small devel-
opment projects like a water distribution stations or students’ scholarships financed by
Tullow Oil as beneficial, the hopes that the gas infrastructure would terminate in new job
opportunities got disappointed. Even though direct benefits (such as employment) are
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also missing because of the age bias in the sample, respondents particularly stated that
they hoped for indirect benefits such as more reliable electricity, better infrastructure and
benefits for the youth.
As Table 6.11 and 6.12 summarize, respondents think that Ghana benefitted partly from
the oil discovery but they do not replicate this feeling to their personal level. In regard
to benefits for the country, 20.42% openly state that they do not know enough about
Ghana’s potential benefits to give an answer. One quarter of the remaining interviewees
feel that Ghana benefitted ‘fairly’ or ‘very much’ while almost one-third strongly opposes.
The tendency in answering behavior is much clearer looking at personal benefits: Here,
almost all respondents – 88.29% – do not perceive any benefits in their everyday lives due
to the new resource wealth.
Table 6.11: Country Benefits from Oil & Gas
Frequency Percent




Very much 43 12.91
Don’t know 68 20.42
Total 333 100
Source: Own data. Answers derived from
question number 36.
Table 6.12: Personal Benefits from Oil & Gas
Frequency Percent




Very much 5 1.50
Don’t know - -
Total 333 100
Source: Own data. Answers derived from
question number 36.
Second, four network actors anticipate citizens’ education as a major goal in petroleum
governance (STAR-Ghana, the District Assembly Man, WERENGO, and the reporter
of the Daily Graphic). The importance of spreading information about the oil and gas
activities is anticipated by most stakeholders:
“Basically, people do not understand what is happening and that is why they
get angry. And they want to fight back. But once they understand these things, I
believe they will give support [...]” (Interview Transcript III, page 5).
The survey’s results, however, question stakeholders’ ability to reach this goal: Overall,
respondents do not feel well educated about the oil and gas activities taking place in
and around their communities. More than three-quarters (74.77%, n = 249) do not feel
informed ‘at all’ or only ‘little’ about the activities and when comparing different ways of
gathering information, personal contacts and radio – rather than the most visible network
actors – emerge as the most important channels. Newspapers like the Daily Graphic are
‘never’ used by the vast majority (84.11%, n = 254). Equally, respondents do neither
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approach politicians like the District Assembly Man nor NGOs like WERENGO to inform
themselves. There are, hence, two interpretations to conclude from stakeholders’ abilities
to educate citizens about oil and gas: Either actors do not take sufficient measures to
inform citizens or, if they do so, the information does not reach citizens to the degree
they feel well informed.
Strengthening the participation of local communities is the third citizen-related agenda
which only civil society actors and one media orgnization pursue: the three local NGOs
‘Friends of the Nation (FoN)’, COLANDEF, the ‘United Civil Society Organisations for
National Development (UCSOND)’, PCC as a hermaphrodite between organized tradi-
tional authority and NGO, and PenPlusBytes (PPB), an Accra-based media organization.
Although these organizations emphasize to “engage citizens in the oil and gas sector”
(PPB), to “enhance their participation” (PCC and UCSOND), to “ensure communities’
involvement in all decisions concerning oil and gas” (COLANDEF), and to aim for an “ac-
tive citizens’ participation in policy formulation and implementation” (FoN), there exists
a pivotal caveat within this aim: the gap between the articulation of the goal on the one
hand and a realistic strategy to implement it on the other. Promoting citizens’ participa-
tion is a laudable goal but organizations cannot sufficiently explain how, for example, an
“active participation in policy formulation and implementation” could take place. The
field observations and interviews let conclude that most NGOs view citizens engaged if
the NGOs themselves are invited and heard by the government or oil companies.
Citizens’ education and participation relate to citizens’ empowerment as a fourth goal
directly linked to citizens. Empowerment is one of the highly connotated terms in de-
velopment cooperation that became empty shells. To pin it down for this thesis, it is
understood as ‘internal efficacy’ which captures respondents’ assessment of potential in-
fluence due to own capacities (Diamond 1999: 161). Among all respondents, 79.87% (n
= 236) are convinced that they cannot influence petroleum governance ‘at all’, followed
by ‘little’ opportunities by 15.62% (n = 52). Considering the vast amount of power the
executive has and the lacking strategies of non-state actors for goal-implementation, re-
spondents’ assessment of their own capacities to influence petroleum governance seems
therefore more realistic than the goals of network actors to ‘actively include them in policy
formulation and implementation’.
Hence, the present results suggest that there is still room for improvement in regard
to actors’ goal attainment on the local level. So far, respondents barely perceive any
benefits from the developing petroleum industry and they do not feel well informed about
the changes taking place in and around their communities. Considering the indicated goals
of petroleum actors and their overarching aspiration to represent communities’ interests,
actors need to navigate their goals better, they need to use their relations to identify
like-minded partners and they need to pursue a long-term strategy in goal steering. The
chapter’s last section therefore investigates whether the basic structure of their network
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allows for such a navigation, identification and strategic goal steering.
6.4 Network Characteristics
Accordingly, this section presents an empirical description of the actors’ general network
(N = 29) and affords insights into how the network’s structure potentially promotes or
constrains collaborative steering in petroleum governance. Figure 6.6 depicts the network
with actors’ degree centralities (nodes’ sizes) and actors’ sector affiliation (nodes’ colors).
The graph is arranged in a centrality layout. In centrality layouts, nodes are arranged in
concentric circles according to an assigned attribute. Here, the attribute depicts actors’
influence as attributed by network alters (see therefore also Table 8.1, page 175). Nodes
closer to the center are viewed as more influential by their respective alters.
Figure 6.6: Actors’ Network by Attributive Power
Source: Own data. As the nodes’ size displays degree centrality, different colors rather than forms are
used to represent nodes’ sector affiliation. Graph retrieved with visone’s centrality layout algo-
rithm.
The main aim of this graph is to show that the overarching goal of including a wide
range of different actors in the petroleum sector works. The figure shows a fully connected
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network with no isolates, a dense core and few peripheral nodes. This becomes obvious
not so much because of the diverse set of actors visible in the network but because of the
high interconnectivity among them. Any assumption that nodes would cluster in sub-
groups (for example, national vs. regional organizations, or sectoral clusters) and would
only connect via few brokers, has to be rejected. Against the background of redistributive
justice as discussed in Chapter 2, the relations between both oil companies (Tullow Oil
and GNPC), national government agencies (e.g., PC and MoE), traditional authorities,
and local NGOs provide the opportunity to reduce conflict and to uptake local problems
efficiently to the national level.
The second aim of this graph is to visualize differences in relational and attributive
power as discussed in Section 3.3.3 (resource perspective vs. attribute approach vs. posi-
tional perspective). For example, FoN has the highest degree centrality (with 49 outgoing
and incoming ties) and therefore a large node, but actors only attribute moderate influ-
ence to it as it is located between the third and fourth centrality circle in the network.
In the reversed way, the MoF scores high in perceptions of its contacts but has only a
low degree centrality score (with 31 outgoing and incoming ties). Table 6.13 summarizes
those network measurements that are linked to natural resource governance in Section
3.3.4 and summarized in Table 3.1 (page 38).
Table 6.13: Summary of Contact Network
Network measurement Definition Statistics
Nodes Number of network actors. 29
Arcs Number of network ties. 470
Reciprocity Fraction of reciprocated ties from all ties. .5512
Transitivity Percentage of edge pairs (i,j) and (j,k) such
that (i,k) is also an edge (‘A friend of a
friends is my friend’).
.657
Density Ratio of the number of actual ties to the
maximum possible number of ties.
.746
Centralization (undirected nw) The concentration of edges around one single
node or a small group.
.3638
Diameter Shortest path between two nodes. If the
diameter is low, then all nodes are relatively
‘close’ to each other.
3
Average shortest path Average number of steps along the shortest
paths for all possible pairs of network nodes.
1.4261
EI-Index Measures the relative density of internal
connections within a social group compared
to the number of connections that group has




Source: Own data. For definitions and and links to natural resource governance see Table 3.1 and
Appendix 1.
Reciprocated exchanges are likely to build trust among actors and, through reciprocity,
actors are able to built up their reputation of being trustworthy. In parallel, high reci-
procity is argued to facilitate social control and to be helpful in monitoring deviant be-
havior of network actors. Transitivity, i. e., subgroups connecting three actors through
mutual ties, works in a similar direction: High transitivity indicates consistency in net-
work flows and the presence of collaborative groups. It is equally associated with trust as
an actor is likely to adopt the trust judgments made by his trusted partners (a friend of
a friend ...). In the network, both reciprocity and transitivity are slightly over the critical
score of .5 (Merrill-Matzner 2006: 86, see also Table 3.1 on page 38). The relatively high
transitivity (.687) is a first indication that actors in petroleum governance are connected
within subgroups which affords them the possibility to collaborate.
In natural resource governance, dense networks are linked to fast resource exchanges and
efficient diffusion of innovations but also to potential resource redundancy. In contrast,
loose networks benefit from a low risk of lock-ins and diverse governance practices. In
the present network, with D = .746, 74.60% of all possible ties are present and, indeed,
the qualitative data suggest that information – but also rumors – spread quickly among
actors in petroleum governance.
Network centralization measures the concentration of edges around one single node or
a small group. Higher numbers of centralization (≥ .5) indicate a greater likelihood that
one node is in ‘command and control’ whereas lower scores suggest a more equal distri-
bution of network flows.167 In the present network embedding, the degree centralization
is relatively low (mode(min): .3638, mode(max): .2725).168 This low centralization
poses challenges to collaboration as the network embedding lacks one or a few actors who
‘command and control’. The absence of ‘responsible’, central nodes may contribute to the
dominating confusion over responsibilities and over past multi-actor agreements.
In order to understand actors’ reachability,169 diameter and average path length are used
167 Consequently, a network has a degree centralization of 1 if all nodes are linked through only one node
and 0 if all nodes are interlinked with each other.
168 To retrieve network centralization, it is necessary to symmetrize the edges, i. e., to generate a
new network with undirected ties (present or absent) instead of directed ties (indicating sender and
addressee of a tie). The nwcommand nwsym offers two modes: mode(max) forms an undirected tie
when there is either a tie from node i to node j or a tie from node j to i. Contrary to this, mode(min)
forms an undirected tie only in case of reciprocal ties, i. e., when there is a tie from node i to node j
and a tie from j to i.
169 Network density, centralization and reachability are all indicators for network cohesion but determining
at which point a network is ‘cohesive’ is a “[...] tricky business [as] there is no absolute cut-off point
where you can say, for example, that below a certain density value the network is lacking in cohesion
and above another value the network is cohesive.” (Prell et al. 2010: 172). But in the present case, the
comparably high density, the low centralization and the easiness of reaching all nodes in the network
suggest that the network is comparably cohesive which, in turn, decreases the flexibility in adapting
to innovative ideas (as cohesion foster homophily rather than diversity).
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(see Table 3.1, page 38). In the network, all actors are apparently close to each other. On
average, it takes 1.4 intermediate nodes to reach all other nodes and the longest shortest
path accounts 3. This is problematic for collaborative steering as actors lack the access to
distant, i. e., to new resources and information. Because the interviewed actors are more
or less close with everyone who is, in turn, close with everyone else, new knowledge is
hardly disseminated. In contrast, long-lasting rumors persist due to high reachability.170
Finally, the EI-Index measures the relative density of internal connections within a
social group compared to the number of connections that group has to the external world
(Grund 2015). The index ranges from -1 (only within-group ties exist) to 1 (only between-
group ties exist) and is a mean to check for homophily patterns within a network. Here,
the EI-Index is used to test the tendencies of network actors to share predominantly ties
with actors from the same sector, i. e., public institutions with other public institutions,
local NGOs with other NGOs in the Western Region etc. (in short, intrasectoral vs.
intersectoral relating). As Table 6.13 indicates, the EI-Index is significant with a score of
.6766. This score rejects any homophile tendencies in the network. The interconnectivity
is high within and in-between sectors and suggests heterogeneity rather than homophily
in social relations in petroleum governance.
The diversity of sectors and relations within the network embedding affords actors a
number of opportunities: First, they have access to diverse knowledge and capital and
can easily get in touch with actors who are disconnected to them as all actors can reach
each other via a path length of maximum three. Second, due to the high number of in-
volved sectors and their placement on different ‘scales’ (local, national and international),
inter-sectoral and/or inter-scale collaboration is possible. Additionally, as government
institutions are not located at the network’s boundaries but integrated in and intertwined
with non-state actors, these non-state actors have the opportunity to control. Yet, the
network embedding also entails a number of potential constraints for collaborative agree-
ments: On the one hand, the low centralization indicates a potential lack of an efficient
coordinator to ‘make things happen’. This lack might explain why, for example, discus-
sions during stakeholders’ meetings, sooner or later, always reach the same few points
such as decreasing fish stocks or the number of priority areas the petroleum revenues are
to be spend.
Overall, the network embedding provides actors with the opportunity to collectively
steer petroleum resources and revenues first and foremost due to the interconnectivity of
actors across sector boundaries. The dense network structure and moderate reciprocity
and transitivity can further promote collaboration. However, the network embedding
lacks a coordinative core (low centralization) which can constrain collaboration. The
following chapter, “Resource Exchanges in Petroleum Governance”, will explore to what
170 The measurement components validates the graph: the network consists of only one component and
indicates strong cohesion or – put another way – absent network fragmentation.
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extent actors make use of this social capital for collaboration.
6.5 Summary
In sum, this sixth chapter introduces the overall network embedding in which actors re-
late and – potentially – collaborate with each other. Based on 29 interviews, the overall
network embedding consists of 99 nodes with 809 arcs. At least eight different sectors
interconnect across sector boundaries and intersect in the agreement that systematic, col-
laborative dialogues between all sectors are favorable over unilateral steering of petroleum
resources and revenues. The high number of actors, sectors and relations as well as their
interconnectivity (visualized in Figure 6.1, page 96), shows the complexity of actors’ in-
teractions in petroleum governance in Ghana. The graph further depicts the limitations
of this thesis as only 29 of at least 99 actors participated in the study.
Because of the overall network’s interconnectivity, coalition formation is a feasible op-
tion to balance the power of more influential actors (or of those perceived as more in-
fluential). While differing in their composition and scope, the three coalitions discussed
in Section 6.1 (page 98) share the central assumption that bundling resources leads to a
more profound voice in petroleum governance. But, as one interviewee noted, the core
problem lies in the fact that all start with a graceful idea without a thorough thought from
beginning to end. As a consequence, all three initiatives suffer from a delicate financial
situation due to outstanding membership fees or outstanding resource transfers from the
government in case of the PIAC. A further joint component is the inability of coalition
members to streamline their agendas within the coalitions. This becomes apparent in the
two bipartite graphs (Figure 6.4, page 127, and Figure 6.5, page 128).
The aspiration to represent or, at least, to acknowledge communities’ interests is a core
similarity that glues the 29 network actors together. While state representatives deduce
this aspiration from the electoral process, non-state actors deduce it from their antici-
pation as a counterweight to the executive’s dominance. Moreover, donor agencies and
private companies acknowledge the importance of citizens’ inclusion as a result of the
‘resource curse’ narrative. Yet, so far, research has ignored the important role that repre-
sentation plays both within actors’ interactions and within petroleum governance overall.
Among other things, the present survey is able to highlight a gap between general feelings
of being represented and the feeling of being represented in the oil and gas sector. This
novel result cautions against any inversion of the argument that actors who are gener-
ally well accepted as representatives in Ghanaian politics are automatically considered
as legitimate representatives in petroleum governance. As the feeling of being misrepre-
sented can have sincere consequences such as political deprivation or conflict, this divide
challenges all actors to better acknowledge communities’ interests.
Because of the importance to merge actors’ views with citizens’ perceptions, the chap-
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ter’s third section focuses on the goals actors currently pursue in petroleum governance.
The section first reveals the diversity of actors’ agendas and is able to show that ‘sectoral’
cliques, clustering around similar goals, do not exist in Ghana’s petroleum governance.
As much as the two branches of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) differ in
their indicated goals, so do traditional authorities. Results also identify a divide between
local NGOs in the Western Region and their sisters in Accra which share more goals
with donor agencies than with local NGOs. It remains to be seen in Chapter 7 to what
extent the different agendas translate into competing rather than collaborative behavior
in resource exchanges.
Besides transparency and environmental protection, a majority of actors aims to factor
in local communities in the Western Region or citizens as a a whole, notably in terms of
increasing their benefits from the petroleum industry, their education about it, their active
participation in it and their empowerment. While this focus re-emphasizes the important
role of representation in petroleum governance, the analysis of the survey results show that
several ways exist for actors to follow up on these goals: For example, survey respondents
barely perceive personal benefits resulting from the oil discovery and they also do not
feel ‘empowered’. Similarly – and this is a realistic point of entry for several actors –,
two-thirds of all interviewees do not feel well informed about the activities taking place in
and around their communities. Increasing such information, predominantly via radio as
the most popular mean for gathering news, is a feasible goal for all involved stakeholders.
Better inclusion could also be achieved in the course of meetings: While most respondents
who have participated in oil and gas related meetings are not very much convinced about
the usefulness of their participation, such meetings could be used to increase citizens’
knowledge about and interest in the developing petroleum sector.
The most important conclusion for realizing the goal of enhancing citizens’ engagement
is, yet, actors’ apparent lack of a clear strategy about how to increase it. Breaking it
down to a number of possible mechanisms – such as radio programs, meetings, etc. –
would be a necessary first step if petroleum actors really want to leave ‘development buzz
words’ behind and include citizens in petroleum governance.
The last section shows that due to their interconnectivity, the 29 actors have the oppor-
tunity for extensive collaboration in petroleum governance. Yet, the diversity of relations
and goals may evolve problematic if few actors are able to provide resources that are
valued by others. Even if the network is highly connected by knowing each other and
even if actors can identify like-minded partners, if network alters cannot provide others
with desired resources for exchange, such an exchange will not take place. This argument
forms the foundation for the following chapter which scrutinizes actors’ interactions based
on resource exchanges.
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Up to this point, the study looked at actors’ relations from the outside: It starts with dis-
cussing favorable preconditions for collaboratively steering the petroleum sector including
the argument that Ghana’s past experiences in mining drive today’s petroleum rapproche-
ment. The thesis then argues that the institutional setting and the policy environment
implemented in the petroleum sector give actors the opportunity (and legal mandate)
to collaborate, even in the institutionalized shape of the Public Interest Accountability
Committee (PIAC). Yet, the structural embedding also manifests vast executive powers,
dual roles and resulting unclear responsibilities of public institutions (e.g. between GNPC
and the MoE), and a lack of funding and knowledge of the latter (e.g., within the LVD).
Besides public institutions, the existence and institutionally embedded role of non-state
actors contribute to a diverse network embedding that is coined by high interconnectiv-
ity and density. Whilst such interconnected, dense network structures are theoretically
favorable for the aim of collaborative steering, the lack of goal prioritization, the absence
of a coordinating core and non-existing cohesive subgroups may undermine this aim to a
large degree. The fact that actors’ self-perception and communities’ attitudes in regard
to representation on the one hand, and actors’ agendas and communities’ interests on the
other diverge massively, further complicates the picture tremendously.
Analogous to the second box within the network embedding in Figure 3.1 (page 24),
the following chapter scrutinizes the third major research questions, i. e., to what extent
actors collaborate in petroleum governance through exchanging resources. The discussion
follows Blau’s (1964; 1968; 1977) definition of exchange as social actions that are con-
tingent on rewarding reactions from others and his differentiation between economic and
social exchanges.
The following means of collaboration in petroleum governance are investigated: invit-
ing others to meetings to discuss matters related to oil and gas, exchanging contacts,
undertaking joint advocacy activities in the petroleum sector, giving / receiving advice,
signing written agreements in regard to oil and gas, and exchanging material resources.
Whilst these forms of collaboration are not exclusive, they cover frequent collaborative
means indicated by petroleum actors. Moreover, they are a genuine attempt to unravel
the content of ‘collaboration’ in the petroleum sector.
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7.1 Relating Through Meetings
As discussed in Chapter 6, the diversity of actors in the petroleum sector and their inter-
connectivity afford actors with a number of opportunities: Access to diverse and distant
resources, inter-sectoral and inter-scale collaboration, and the formation of collaborative
subgroups to establish and foster systematic dialogue and trust. Within this embedding,
meetings are a popular means to interact in petroleum governance. Actors regularly use
meetings to discuss matters related to oil and gas, either in one-by-one meetings, small
groups, large conventions, or public forums such as the “National Forum on Oil and Gas”
scheduled directly after the oil discovery.
The following three networks give thorough insights into the exchange of meeting invi-
tations by petroleum stakeholders. The first network (Figure 7.1, page 141) investigates
how often actors invited each other to discuss matters on oil and gas in 2014 (outgoing
ties). The second network (Figure 7.2, page 142) sheds light on the number of times
interviewees were invited to such a meeting (incoming ties).171 The third network (Figure
7.3, page 145) depicts a network with confirmed ties only (i. e., only ties indicated by
both sender and addressee) as suggested by Prell (2012: 77).172
In the first network, arrows’ direction depicts the flow of meeting invitation and arrows’
thickness indicates the frequency of invitations. Nodes’ color assigns sector affiliation,
nodes’ weight out-degree centrality (sending invitations) and nodes’ height in-degree cen-
trality (receiving invitations). The first meeting network consists of one fully connected
graph and a fuzzy set of interconnections with 251 arcs among the 29 network alters. The
network’s density is moderate with D = .485 which means that 48.50% of all possible ties
are present in the network. The network’s centralization reaches, with Cmax = .4418,
173
almost the critical benchmark of ≥ 0.5 and indicates a moderate chance to coordinate
and synthesize flows of resources.
The Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MoE) has the highest degree centrality174 and
is therefore best able to coordinate multi-stakeholder meetings in petroleum governance.
Contrary to this, the dense network leaves no space for brokering in-between unconnected
actors, visible in the very low betweenness centralities of all actors.175 These low be-
tweenness centralities neglect actors to control the diffusion of meeting invitations or to
navigate potential conflicts between disconnected actors.
171 The questionnaire explicitly asked interviewees to indicate the number of inviting network partners
independently of whether they accepted such invitations.
172 All upcoming graphs are visualized with visone’s stress minimization method. The layout represents
graph-theoretic distances (i. e., shortest-path lengths) between nodes as well as possible with more
weight placed on representing error with respect to shorter distances than larger ones. Metric MDS
layout were first obtained as recommended by visone (Visone Team 2011).
173 To retrieve the network’s centralization, it was necessary to transform the directed links (edges) into
undirected links (arcs). See page 135 for an explanation.
174 For a definition of actors’ centrality measures see Appendix 2, page 198.
175 Tullow and FoN have, with cB = .116 each, the highest standardized betweenness centrality.
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Obstructive for natural resource governance is also the low level of reciprocity as reci-
procity is said to produce trust and to facilitate control and the monitoring of deviant
behavior, for example whether promises made during past meetings are met: From the
251 arcs, only 54 are mutual, whereas 143 ties are asymmetric (R = .2741). As the nodes’
heights in regard to public institutions on the national level show, all of them (the MoF,
the PC, the EPA and the PIAC) have higher in-degree than out-degree centralities, i. e.,
they receive (much) more ties than they send out. An exemption is the MoE with its
ability to coordinate. The same can consistently be observed for traditional authorities:
they receive much more invitations than they send out.
Figure 7.1: Relating By Inviting Others to Meeting
Source: Own data visualized with visone’s stress minization method. Arrows’ direction depicts flow of
meeting invitations and arrows’ thickness the frequency of invitations. Nodes’ color assigns sec-
tor affiliation, nodes’ weight indicates out-degree centrality (from min = 0 to max = 23), i. e.,
actors’ expansiveness in inviting others, and nodes’ height indicates in-degree centrality (from
min = 1 to max = 16), i. e., actors’ popularity as a meeting partner.
As the nodes’ size indicates, FoN expands – with 23 outgoing ties – as most active actor
across the network. Contrary to this, two actors – the Paramount Chief and PPB – do
not initiate any relation through meetings. But this does not mean that they are inac-
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tive: In fact, the Paramount Chief receives 13 meeting invitations and PPB at least six.
When it comes to popularity (in-degree centrality) and being connected to well-connected
alters (eigenvector centrality), the oil companies together with public authorities on the
national level dominate the picture and none of the NGOs scores high. Thus, while NGOs
are highly active through expansion, they are excluded from an ‘exclusive circle’ of the
most important decision-makers in petroleum governance. As the ties’ strengths indicate,
inviting others to meetings is a very frequently used form of exchange. The MoE and
the Environmental Protection Agency Western Region (EPA-WR) indicate most frequent
meetings with all of their alters.
The difference between expansiveness and popularity becomes more explicit in Figure
7.2 which visualizes the receipt of meeting invitations.
Figure 7.2: Relating By Receiving Invitations to Meetings
Source: Own data visualized with visone’s centrality layout. Arrows’ direction depicts flow of receiving
meeting invitations, nodes’ sizes in-degree centrality (from min = 1 to max = 15), i. e., actors’
popularity, and nodes’ color assigns sector affiliation (see legend Graph 7.1).
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The network resulting from being invited to meetings is less dense with 187 arcs but still
consists of one fully connected graph. Due to the fewer number of links, the network’s
density reduces to Din = .379. While it is argued that less dense networks are more
likely to include a central coordination authority, the network’s centralization minimizes
to Cmax = .3402. In consequence, meetings are unlikely to be coordinately planned and
initiated as no coordinative actor exists that could navigate and monitor the different
flows of invitations. Considering R = .2143, the chance to built trust due to reciprocated
exchanges is also low. The actor that views itself most prominent in receiving meeting
invitations is FoN. Contrary to this, public institutions on the regional level and other
local NGOs are rather excluded from meetings.
A problem that emerges from a comparative look on both networks is that source and
target of an invitation often do not merge: For example, PCC reports in the first network
that it never invited WERENGO to a meeting to discuss petroleum matters but in the
second network, WERENGO indicates that it was invited by PCC. The same is true
for other (alleged) dyads. Generating both outgoing and incoming ties during network
interviews allows to crosscheck the flow of invitations in the network. Whilst the resulting
network will also not represent the ‘true’ network structure, taking into consideration
the answers of two respondents (back and forth) instead of relying upon single answers
increases the likelihood that the indicated exchange actually occurred (and, methodically,
the reliability of networks as discussed in Chapter 4.4).
To confirm the flow of sending out and receiving invitations, both valued networks
are turned into unvalued networks (i.e., with binary variables) and compared with each
other. The procedure results in a correspondence of answer of 33.47%.176 In the resulting
network (Figure 7.3, page 145), ties are only present if both the convener and and the
invitee confirmed the alleged invitation. Table 7.1 summarizes how important network
statistics vary between these three networks.
The table clarifies the changes that occur if outgoing and incoming ties are crosschecked
with each other. From 251 allegedly issued invitations and 187 received invitations, only
83 invitations overlap. The corrected network therefore is frankly loose (D = .1022) and
the low centralization (Cmax = .1111) indicates that no actor exists that could efficiently
coordinate the network flows. The reciprocity stays more or less stable across all three
networks on a low level and triads, which are theoretically argued to be particularly useful
for collaboration as they constitute effective subgroups, even reduce to one (consisting of
the EPA, the PC and the MoE).177 Yet, the amount of inviting each other across sector
boundaries – visible in the high EI -Index (see page 136) – stays stable.
176 From the 251 alleged invitations in Network 7.1 (page 141), 83 are confirmed by alters in Network 7.2
(page 142), i. e., 33.47%.
177 Triads are here understood as mutual, positive ties linking three actors together (Prell 2012: 145).
This work abstains from differentiating between transitive intransitive or vacuously transitive triads.
For a discussion on such differences see Holland and Leinhardt (1971).
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Table 7.1: Summary of Collaboration Through Meeting Invitations
Outgoing Incoming Confirmed Ties Only
Directed true true true
Nodes 29 29 29
Ties 251 arcs 187 arcs 83 arcs
Density .3091 .2303 .1922
Centralization .4418 .3402 .1111
Reciprocity .2741 .2143 .2388
Triads 32 8 1
EI-Index .8079* .7926* .7833*
Source: Own data.
Figure 7.3 illustrates the tremendously changed structure of the meeting network with
confirmed ties only. Besides the different network measurements, it visualizes two addi-
tional details on graph level: Actors’ belonging to a so-called ‘strong network component’
(nodes’ color) and reciprocity in relations (black ties). In a component all actors are
connected to one another by at least one path. A strong component recognizes the direc-
tionality of ties and considers only reciprocated links for component formation. Strong
components are viewed as forming cohesive subgroups that adjust the behavior and values
of their members and are said to benefit collaboration (Prell 2012: 151ff). The network
entails two big ‘strong components’, one large green component with 14 actors and a
smaller blue with six actors (including the triad).
The blue component strongly supports the previous assessment that even though public
institutions relate with other actors, they still form a subgroup that is exclusively acces-
sible for the ‘big players’: the MoF, the MoE, the PC and GNPC. The component also
visualizes the importance of ensuring environmental protection for these players through
the inclusion of the EPA in this ‘elite circle’. As the MoE, the PC, and the EPA form a
triad, the network re-clarifies the effort of these three institutions in working together to
evade the Nigerian experiences of resource mismanagement, corruption and environmen-
tal destruction. With its focus on institutional capacity building, the OfD supports these
efforts. Because of the restriction to six nodes, the component actors have the oppor-
tunity to effectively coordinate themselves through meetings in which they synchronize
goals and interests.
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Figure 7.3: Meeting Network (confirmed ties only)
Source: Own data visualized with visone’s stress minimization method. Arrows’ direction depicts flow
of meeting invitations, black ties highlight reciprocated invitations, blue ties a triadic struc-
ture. Nodes’ color indicates strong components, nodes’ size out-degree centrality (min = 0,
max = 12).
The second green component mixes local with Accra-based NGOs, donors, traditional
authorities, and includes Tullow Oil as the most important contractor of the Jubilee
Field. With Tullow Friends of the Nation (FoN), the subgroup gets steered by the two
most active actors in issuing meeting invitations.178 With 14 actors, the component is
much bigger than the blue component. Both the size and the different agendas (see
Figure 6.5, page 128) make coordination in this component more complex. Contrary to
178 FoN indicates to have invited 23 of the 29 actors (with differing frequencies) to discuss matters on oil
and gas in 2014. 12 actors confirmed such an invitation. As only about half of the indicated invitations
got confirmed by invitees, it is feasible to assume that the FoN respondent tends to overestimate FoN’s
involvement in petroleum governance throughout all networks.
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the blue component in which actors pursue 13 relatively closely connected goals, actors
of the green multi-actor component aim to realize 22 goals which reach from revenue
management over corporate social responsibility to citizens’ education. The complexity
further grows as component members pursue opposing goals such as increasing benefits
for the whole country and promoting benefits exclusively for the Western Region.
While, for now, the fact that only 19.22% of all possible ties are present in the network
(D = .1922) sounds low, inviting others to meetings will emerge as the most important
means to collaborate in the following. This result supports the argument that holding
meetings is an important form of exchange in petroleum governance that serves at least
two distinct goals: To inform a diverse set of actors with the hope that they will broker
the information to their subordinates or their own networks; and to satisfy stakeholders’
demands of showcasing themselves.179 Whilst the latter goal emerged as a routinized
behavior (see Section 8.1.3, page 170), the first goal has not been reached as the poor
information and knowledge level of the survey’s respondents show.
Overall, the high interconnectivity among petroleum stakeholders in the general net-
work (D = .5788, see Table 6.13, page 134) and the 87 confirmed invitations to meetings
in the present network, may enable other forms of exchanges as petroleum actors have the
necessary social capital to collaborate with each other across sector boundaries. Whether
they also make use of this social capital is discussed in the following subsections.
7.2 Social Exchanges
The third chapter defines exchange as voluntary social interaction that is contingent on
rewarding reactions from others and that ceases when expected returns are not forth-
coming. Resources are defined as capabilities – possessions or behavioral skills – that
are valued by others and that unfold their potential (‘operating force’) only in a relation
to others who value them. Social exchange refers to two norms rather than an explicit
understanding of the ‘terms of trade’ as in economic exchanges: reciprocity, i. e., the
norm to get back to someone who has been beneficial in the past, and fairness.180 The
following section discusses three different forms of social exchanges separately and then
uses several network measurements to draw parallels and/or opposites between the three
networks. The network measurements are comparable as they refer to same-sized network
(i. e., with the same number of nodes).181 Yet, this step is taken at the expense of valued
ties: The corrected networks ‘only’ include directed, non-valued ties.182
179 This practice is further discussed as ‘eyes service’ in Section 8.1, page 165.
180 As fairness is, yet, subjective and difficult to elaborate empirically with SNA, it is excluded in the
following.
181 For problems of comparing networks with different sizes see Prell (2012: 99ff).
182 Deriving and validating also valued ties was simply impossible due to time constraints.
146
7.2 Social Exchanges
7.2.1 Keeping the Gate: Contact Exchanges
Exchanging contacts to approach unknown third parties (i.e., actual or potential resources
provided by social relations) was identified as a first aspect of social exchanges in the pre-
testing phase. Social capital has been discussed as an important source of influence in
the context of scarce tangible resources. Furthermore, providing others with a requested
contact can increase the recognition as a reliable and helpful collaboration partner. Most
importantly, such exchanges are able to boost the likelihood of triad formation which are
theoretically defined as a productive space for collaboration through increased trust and
better ways of intra-group control and norm compliance.
In order to scrutinize whether petroleum actors collaborate by exchanging contacts, in-
terviewees indicated the number of times they received a contact from their alters, related
to oil and gas, in the year 2014. To validate these answers, the subsequent questionnaire
item requested each respondent to replicate the number of times they provided others
with contacts. The first question leads to 131 ties while the second reveals 118 ties.
Figure 7.4 visualizes the 38 confirmed links among 22 actors, retrieving a correspondence
of answering behavior of 29.07%. Contrary to the general network and the meeting
networks, we find seven isolates.183 The set of isolates is intermixed with the MoF, PIAC
and the DA as public institutions, the GNPC as an oil company, KITE and UCSOND as
NGOs, and the Western Region House of Chiefs (WR-HoC).
In this network, nodes’ size shows the number of times an actor was asked to broker
between two disconnected actors by providing the necessary contact (in-degree centrality).
With six incoming ties each, Tullow and FoN are most central in providing contacts.
Hereby, FoN seeks out for contacts with the same amount of outgoing ties and, thus,
demands reciprocity from its alters.
Together with the Deutsche Gesellschaft fu¨r Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and
three NGOs, Tullow and FoN form a strong network component.184 This component is
interesting from several points of view: On the one hand, it unites the four most popular
actors when it comes to sharing social capital. On the other hand, it relates NGOs on the
local level (FoN and WERENGO) with NGOs on the national level (ACEP and CEPIL)
as well as actors from the private and donor sector. Thirdly, these actors constitute a
subgroup of the strong component in the meeting network (Figure 7.3, page 145). While
14 actors composed the strong component in the meeting network, the present component
reduces to a more efficient number of six. However, the component does not include any
triadic structure that could further boost trust and compliance. Qualitatively assessed,
the component members are those actors most engaged and visible in interactions.
183 Whilst all of the isolates indicated a request and / or provision of contacts by / of others, the respective
alters did not confirm this action.
184 Additionally, three components with two actors each exist: COLANDEF and STAR-Ghana, PPB
and the newspaper, as well as the MoE and the PC. For the sake of clarity, they were not colored
separately.
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Figure 7.4: Gatekeeping Network (confirmed ties only)
Source: Own data visualized with visone’s stress minimization method. Arrows’ direction depicts flow
of gatekeeping. Black ties highlight reciprocated exchanges of contacts. Nodes’ size depicts in-
degree centrality and nodes’ color the affiliation with strong components.
Overall, the petroleum actors exchange contacts only to a limited degree and barely
use it to collaborate with each other. Although all network actors exhibit considerable or
even high social capital (see Figure 6.1, page 96), they provide it in only 38 ‘confirmed’
occasions. The few links translate into a low density of D = .079. Of the 38 links, seven
are reciprocal and 24 asymmetric. The relatively balanced ratio of edges’ concentration
keeps the network’s centralization low with Cmax = .0966. When they need to get in
touch with someone they have not been in contact before, the most promising actors are
the local NGO FoN – which more an more emerges as a strong exception of simply being ‘a




7.2.2 Advocacy: Acoustic Cotton Candy
The idea of scrutinizing potential collaboration through advocacy activities emerged dur-
ing the time in the field. Observing the interactions and dialogues among various stake-
holders (beyond the ones represented here) necessitated to investigate to what extent
actors actually team up for advocacy and to what extent it only remains ‘acoustic cotton
candy’. It was also hoped to get a better understanding of what advocacy actually means
in Ghana’s petroleum sector: In this regard, while discussions about how to define it
remain blurry during interviews, stakeholders’ diverse perceptions intersect in the goal of
‘speaking with the voice of the oil-affected people’.
Inquiring whether others want to participate in advocacy activities results in 124 arcs
and the same number of relations exists in being asked to join an advocacy activity by
others. Figure 7.5 illustrates the confirmed network. The corrected advocacy network
consists of one large graph with 41 arcs (of which eleven are reciprocated) and nine
isolates.185 Accordingly, 33.06% of the original number of links are confirmed if checked
with both sender and addressee of a tie.
The density remains, again, low with D = .0704 but due to the centrality of FoN
and ACEP, the network’s centralization increases (Cmax = .2010) and give both actors
the possibility of coordinating advocacy activities at least a bit. While the figure only
depicts actors’ betweenness centrality – and shows that FoN, ACEP, and the WR-HoC
are the most central actors –, the same actors top all others also in regard to in-degree
centrality and degree centrality.186 Additionally, it was so far only assumed that these
actors are most central when it comes to advocacy activities but network measurements
bring proof. Indeed, it seems that if actors want to initiate advocacy activities, there is
no getting around ACEP and, more importantly, FoN.
FoN and ACEP are also part of two triads which helps them to increase control over
advocacy in petroleum governance. The third actor is the WR-HoC in the first triad and
the Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (CSPOG) in the second triad. But as the
different centrality measurements indicate, the strength of FoN and ACEP marginalizes
particularly the CSPOG in its effort to establish itself as an independent entity. This re-
emphasizes the problem that even though NGOs value the potential benefits of forming
coalitions, in the context of scarce resources and high self-esteem the (founding) members
of such coalitions still act as autonomous entities.
185 Three of the seven isolates indicated during the interview that they “do not do advocacy”: the PC, OfD
and the newspaper reporter. PIAC and the paramount chief are – as in the previous network – isolated
from all other nodes which may suggest potential flaws in the respondents’ answering behavior.
186 In regard to out-degree centrality, the MoE follows FoN and ACEP as most central actors before the
WR-HoC.
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Figure 7.5: Advocacy Network (confirmed ties only)
Source: Own data visualized with visone’s stress minimization method. Arrows’ direction depicts flow
of advocacy, black ties shows reciprocated advocacy initiatives, blue ties indicate a triadic struc-
ture. Nodes’ size depicts actors’ betweenness centrality.
These results confirm what Vormawor and Atuguba (2014: 62) call “no culture of corpo-
rate philanthropy” and what Section 6.1 discussed in regard to the challenges of coalition
formation in petroleum governance. And as the marginal betweenness centralities of
other coalition actors such as WERENGO (the coalition of civil society groups based in
the Western Region) or PCC (the coalition of Paramountcies of the eleven coastal dis-
tricts in the Western Region) show, this marginalization is not a singular problem to the
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CSPOG: All of these initiatives – founded to merge individual talents, to pool resources
and to represent ‘one voice’ – (so far) do not work out.
7.2.3 Advice: Obstacles to Aggregating Human Capital
In the context of scarce financial resources, diverse agendas (see Figure 6.5, page 128)
and distrusts induced by non-reciprocated or failed economic exchanges in the past, the
exchange of advice can perform several tasks. On the one hand, if tangible resources are
not available or not expedient, intangible resources through social exchanges can build
trust and productive alliances in a dyadic, triadic or larger structure. On the other hand,
advising each other can form the basis for future collaboration. Through exchanging
advice, actors can appropriate each other – even in the case of divergent or contradicting
interests –, or, at least, make their intentions clear to foster predicability of their behavior.
Finally, exchanging advice is imperative considering the short time of petroleum extraction
in Ghana and the complexity of governing natural resources as discussed in Section 2.1
(page 9). Whilst differing in their contents, all these factors have the potential to promote
collaboration in petroleum governance.
To find out whether petroleum stakeholders exchange advice, the network questionnaire
prompted respondents to indicate whom of their partners they asked for advice in regard
to oil and gas in the year 2014. Subsequently, and in order to validate the retrieved
information, interviewees memorized how often they were asked for advice by each of
their oil and gas contacts. As in the other networks, the singular networks (‘handing
out advice’, ‘receiving advice’) vary tremendously from the network that reviews answers.
Whereas the original networks consist of 101 arcs in handing out advice and even 126
arcs in receiving advice, the revised network is much more lucid with 31 arcs. Figure 7.6
visualizes the network.
The network comprises one large graph and eight isolates.187 With D = .038, the
network’s density is very low: Of all possible ties among network actors, only 3.8% are used
to collaborate through exchanging advice. This low density suggests a very limited spread
of advice and drives the argument that actors barely make use of their social capital to
foster their human capital. Of the 31 arcs present in the network, six arcs are reciprocated,
resulting in a reciprocity measure of R = .24. If reciprocity leads to trust, trust is unlikely
to form on the basis of advice exchanges in petroleum governance. Moreover, the very
low centralization (Cmax = .06) indicates challenges in solving simple tasks although the
high reachability gives actors the opportunity to access distant resources. Furthermore,
there are no triads that could boost the formation of trust.
187 While these isolates indicated to have handed out advice and receive it, the targets / senders of such
advices did not reciprocate.
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Figure 7.6: Advice Network (confirmed ties only)
Source: Own data visualized with visone’s stress minimization method. Arrows’ direction depicts flow
of advice, black ties show reciprocated advices. Nodes’ size depicts actors’ betweenness centra-
lity.
Hence, even though actors have diverse sets of knowledge and are highly interconnected
with each other, (new) information and explanations barely diffuse through advices in
the petroleum sector. While this is at least disadvantageous for petroleum governance,
the low level of advice exchanges might explain the various knowledge gaps that have
manifested themselves particularly among less powerful actors. Such knowledge gaps
appeared, for example, during the ‘Gas Flaring Education and Awareness Engagement’
for both traditional authorities and local NGOs (see Table 4.1, page 46). The need
to flare gas caught massive attention and anger among non-state actors as the Jubilee
Partners committed to a no-flaring policy before oil production started in 2010. Even
though Tullow Oil explained the reasons for the flaring in detail and emphasized the
third-party responsibility,188 a great number of NGOs continued their agenda of “making
188 Building the gas infrastructure necessary to transport gas from the Jubilee Field onshore lies in the
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noise” (personal conversation) rather than being open to the information disseminated.
Besides limited resources to inform themselves, a proactive attitude towards absorbing
necessary information often lacks, even though they could make use of the diverse links
they possess, for example to Tullow Oil.189 Hence, although all stakeholders seem to be
aware of the fact that they have different knowledge, different channels to communicate
this knowledge and, thus, could benefit from learning from each other, advice is rarely
used for collaboration.
On actors level, the EPA is the most prominent actor with the largest in-degree cen-
trality and was asked to give advice seven times. The MoE, ACEP and FoN follow, but
only with three times each. Contrary to this, important petroleum actors by law, for
example the PC or the MoF, are not central in advice exchanges. Similarly, Tullow Oil
is isolated as none of its indicated outgoing and incoming ties were confirmed by the
respective targets. This is surprising as Tullow actively invites others to ask for advice
or information about oil and gas. The most active actor in the network is – again – the
local NGO Friends of the Nation (FoN) which indicates to have reached out for advice
14 times, reduced to seven after the validation with the respective addressees’ answers.
The NGO also has the highest closeness centrality (cC = .19) and highest betweenness
centrality (cB = .089). FoN is only defeated when it comes to having influential advice
partners as it predominantly seeks advice from non-central actors. Here, the EPA stands
out by exchanging advice with important actors as does the MoE. On the ‘meso level’
(between graph and actors level), the advice network falls apart into two groups: NGOs
on the left and public institutions on the right side. This result is further discussed in
Section 8.1.2, “Othering” (page 168).
7.3 Economic Exchanges: Written Agreements and Resource
Sharing
Contrary to social exchange, economic exchange is understood to ground in an explicit
agreement about the ‘terms of trade’, negotiated before the exchange takes place. Eco-
nomic exchanges are therefore conceptually characterized by clarity and – as clarity re-
duces the necessity of trust – they are argued to be most likely among actors who have
not exchanged resources in the past.
responsibility of Ghana Gas / the Ghanaian state as the sole owner of gas resources. As they failed to
finish the gas pipeline on time, the Jubilee Partners were forced to flare gas to stabilize the oil fields.
See Meeting Transcript IV for further information.
189 Another characteristic common to such meetings is the fact that during the three-days information
meeting neither Ghana Gas (as the contractor) nor the Petroleum Commission (as regulator) or repre-
sentatives of the Ministry of Energy (as the owner of Ghana Gas) were present. The Jubilee Partners,
notably Tullow Oil, took the responsibility to inform the other stakeholders about consequences of gas
flaring even though the gas resources are solely owned by the Ghanaian state. See Meeting Transcript
IV for further information.
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To investigate economic exchanges in petroleum governance in Ghana, the network
interview includes two questions: On the one hand, interviewees indicate those actors
with which they “officially worked together”, based on a memorandum of understanding
or contract (i. e., a written agreement about the terms of trade).190 On the other hand,
they enumerated the number of times they formally handed out tangible resources (money,
staff, or office space) to each of their contacts and the number of times they received such
resources for activities in the petroleum sector from others.
The following two sections discuss the resulting network relations. They start with some
general remarks before focussing on important characteristics of each network. Again, the
discussion investigates ‘confirmed’ interactions and only refers to the ‘original’ networks
(incoming vs. outgoing ties) for background information. This step is necessary for a
purposeful analysis and for an increased reliability of statistics. It is also caused by the
deviation in the previous network and due to the lack of space.
7.3.1 Lack of Clarity in Agreements
The first network of economic exchanges support one major argument of this thesis: That
actors only relate rather than collaborate with each other. Figure 7.7 visualizes this
argument based on relations in written agreements. The network is fragmented in three
subgraphs, one dyad and eight isolates. The density of D = .047 shows that only 4.7%
of all possible relations rest upon agreements which clarify rights and obligations of a
partnership and which ensure predictability of expectations and responsibilities
The biggest subgraph is composed of several national and local NGOs that cluster
around the funding organization “Strengthening Transparency, Accountability and Re-
sponsiveness in Ghana (STAR-Ghana)” in a star graph. The graph exemplifies the order
of STAR-Ghana to coordinate funding to NGOs in the petroleum sector. Due to the
location in the middle of the graph, STAR-Ghana has – with cD = 18 –
191 the highest
degree centrality.192
STAR-Ghana’s high degree centrality, the inclusion of the GIZ in this subgraph and the
observation that only two NGOs (KITE and ACEP) uniformly indicate a joint agreement,
precipitate two important arguments: Firstly, it suggests that NGOs only enter written
agreements to gain funding and not to establish the exchange of other tangible or intangi-
ble resources on such agreements. Either, they trust each other enough in the obligation
to reciprocate, they do not see the necessity to settle collaboration on agreements or they
are not able to reach such agreements.
190 ‘Informal’ was defined as closed and invisible rather than open and transparent in Chapter 3.
191 These are 22.5% of all ties.
192 As the graph is undirected, out- and in-degree centrality are not calculated.
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Figure 7.7: Written Agreements (confirmed ties only)
Source: Own data visualized with visone’s stress minimization method. The links are undirected as
written agreements, by definition, are reciprocal. Similar colored nodes and ties indicate a
triadic structure. The extent of space between subgraphs is randomly generated.
Secondly, NGOs do not view their membership in intrasectoral, pooled organizations
(here, WERENGO and the CSPOG) as a form of formal agreement. This implication
is drawn from the lacking ties between NGOs: As the graph shows, both WERENGO
and the CSPOG – two organizations that were founded with the purpose of merging civil
society interests and that predefine an official membership structure including membership
fees – are isolates in the network, even though all NGOs are members of one or the other
coalition (or even both). The same interpretation occurs in regard to PCC as the merger
of traditional authorities and the Paramount Chief. A purely institutional analysis based
on desktop studies would have resulted in links between PCC, the Paramount Chief (who’s
155
7 Resource Exchanges in Petroleum Governance
a member of PCC) and the Western Region House of Chiefs (WR-HoC). Yet, the network
analysis contradict such a result.
Combined with the assessment in the previous chapter, it is suggested that due to
internal weaknesses, these merged organizations are not rewarding enough for members
to indicate them as economic exchange. This lacking sense of belonging perpetuates the
failure to lift these multi-actor initiatives on an institutionalized, self-funded level and to
put them in an effective stage for acting and interacting.
The second network subgraph is composed of the ‘big players’: the MoE as the oversight
body of all petroleum activities, the PC as the sole regulator of the industry, GNPC as the
national oil company and – connected through the GNPC – Tullow Oil. This is natural
insofar as their relations are formalized in the petroleum policies discussed in Section 5.3.2
(page 89). As shown in the meeting network, the organizations form again an ‘elite circle’
of important decision-makers and exclude non-state actors. An interviewee, representing
one of the smaller NGOs, confirms the problem of pinning down the ‘big players’ to sign
written agreements:
“What happened with them was: At the stadium of discussions, they suggest
to us that they needed to do consultations with their boards. Because for them
signing the memorandum of understanding – even though we had indicated earlier
that the memorandum of understanding was not necessarily legally binding – they
still felt that signing the memorandum means that they have committed themselves.
So they needed clearance of their respective boards [...] and that is still pending
(Transcript VIII, page 4)”.
The two remaining subgraphs depict a formal agreement between the Norwegian OfD,
the EPA and the MoF – visualizing the institutional capacity building programs of the OfD
(see Table 6.1, page 99) – and the membership of the Paramount Chief in the WR-HoC.
The observation of non-reciprocation of ties reoccurs in this network. While the ‘origi-
nal’ network retrieves 99 ties, we only find 20 agreements that are confirmed by both sender
and addressee of a tie. This is particularly challenging for an economic exchange that in-
herently builds upon reciprocity. It implies either inaccuracies in answering behavior or
different understandings about what constitutes a ‘formal agreement’ by interviewees –
even though the question was limited to memorandums of understanding or contracts.
It follows that even though economic exchanges are theoretically characterized by clarity
about the ‘terms of trade’, this clarity lacks among petroleum actors in Ghana. One step
further, it could suggest that it is not clarity that is missing but that rewards are not
forthcoming, which causes a number of actors to forget about or choose to deny written
agreements with others.
Overall, the first form of economic exchange remains low and is limited around those
actors that can provide financial resources. Whilst this is a self-explanatory cause, the
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normative discourses about merging capacities and collaboratively steering petroleum
resources and revenues draw a picture that clearly goes beyond financial resources. Con-
sidering the high interconnectivity and the proclaimed goal of all actors to collaboratively
govern the sector, raising interactions to a written level is either not a favorable or a
feasible option for the majority of actors.
7.3.2 Unilateral Transfers in Tangible Resource Exchanges
In order to investigate potential collaboration through the exchange of tangible resources,
respondents reported about the frequency of handing out and receiving such resources
from their partners in regard to oil and gas activities. In order to take local circumstances
into consideration, the term ‘tangible resources’ comprises financial resources as well as
staff or office space.193
The network in Figure 7.8 depicts directed, non-valued, confirmed ties: For example, the
interviewee of the MoF indicates that the MoF provided tangible resources to the PIAC
and the PIAC representative confirms that PIAC received resources from the MoF. The
high number of isolates (13 actors) vividly depicts the deviation of respondents’ answering
behavior about handing out and receiving resources. Compared to the interconnectivity
of the original networks (Dout = .187, Din = .135), the revised network scatters with
a very low density (Dcc = .042). From the 17 existing ties, no relation is mutual and
neither triads nor strong components exist. The network is only connected through two
nodes (PCC and ACEP) which receive resources but do not hand out any material to
other petroleum actors.
The figure highlights the central role of STAR-Ghana in economic exchanges and man-
ifests its successful role of providing NGOs with funds for development-related projects
in the petroleum sector. FoN is insofar interesting as its representative indicated a high
expansiveness of his organization in terms of handing out resources (in the ‘original’ net-
work the interviewee indicated 14 outgoing ties) but as the present network shows, only
three organizations – WERENGO, PCC and ACEP – confirm the receipt. The same is
apparent to the Accra-based NGO ACET: none of the indicated beneficiaries confirm the
receipt of resources and, consequently, the node is isolated at the network’s boundary.
Again, public institutions on the national level do not exchange with Ghanaian non-state
actors and are only connected via the GIZ. Another similarity to the preceding networks
is the exclusion of public institutions on the regional level.
193 Such tangible exchanges are frequently in use, for example in the form of local NGOs in the Western
Region ‘handing out’ their staff to conduct work for an NGO based in Accra. Just as frequently,
smaller NGOs use the office space of larger ones.
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Figure 7.8: Tangible Resource Exchanges (confirmed ties only)
Source: Own data visualized with visone’s stress minimization method. Nodes’ size depicts degree
centrality, i. e., an actors overall involvement. Ties’ direction indicates the source and target
(with arrowhead) of tangible resources.
Overall, the network of exchanging tangible resources is characterized by unilateral
(asymmetric) resource transfers rather than reciprocated exchanges. As none of the 17
ties is reciprocated, the network’s reciprocity is 0. The very low density (D = .042) is
disadvantageous for natural resource governance as resources are able to spread in a very
limited way. The longest shortest path (diameter) between two nodes is 8, indicating that
all nodes are relatively far away from each other. Together, these two statistics suggest a
low cohesion: Particularly if STAR-Ghana dropped out as resource provider, the network
would implode.
Comparing both observed forms of economic ‘exchanges’194 – written agreements and
material resource sharing – leads to a number of overlapping patterns, particularly in
regard to the outgoing ties of the donor organization STAR-Ghana.195 This result em-
phasizes the previously stated argument that economic exchanges in Ghana’s petroleum
194 Due to lacking reciprocity, it is better to use the term ‘transfers’.
195 Only two actors from the formal agreement network – FoN and CEPIL – are missing in the cross-
checked resource sharing network.
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sector build only on exchanging financial resources. At the same time, the SNA results
barely confirm the theoretical assumption that economic exchanges mainly occur between
actors who have not exchanged in the past. Even though STAR-Ghana was only formed
in 2010 and, thus, is a comparably young actor with which others have not exchanged
in the past, it seems more appropriate to trace the economic exchanges back to financial
resources and not the clarity about the terms of exchange.
Compared to the qualitative assessments in the field where actors recurrently empha-
sized their strong collaboration based on resource exchanges, the network results draw a
completely different picture. The amount of tangible resource transfers are very limited
with only 4.2% of potential channels used to transfer and/or exchange material resources
– even though the question explicitly included non-financial resources considering the
poor financial situation of most petroleum actors. While the meeting network was still
quite dense, the number of ties and, consequently, networks’ densities gradually declined
in the following means of collaborating. The following section summarizes the amount of
collaboration through exchanges with a comparative look on all networks.
7.4 Summary: Collaboration Through Exchanges?
Overall, the goal of regular interactions between different sectors is realized in Ghana.
Across all networks, actors relate with each other irrespective of sectors’ boundaries.
The network concept of homophily – “birds of a feather, stick together” – cannot be
confirmed according to the present data.196 The question remaining is how effective
they exchange in terms of their proclaimed goal to steer natural resource governance
collaboratively. A conclusive argument suggests that interactions among stakeholders in
petroleum governance have to be understood as relating rather than collaborating.
To understand this central argument, the chapter’s last section summarizes the previ-
ous results and sets them in relation with qualitative data gained by observations and
qualitative interviews. The discussion first compares the number of links, then discusses
the role of reciprocity and cohesive subgroups, and ends with three important network
measurements (density, centralization, and reachability). Table 7.2 (page 161) provides
an overview of these measurements across the different networks while Figure 7.9 (page
160) visualizes the multiplex relations among network alters.
196 The E-I Index is nearly one in all networks.
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Figure 7.9: Means of Collaboration (confirmed ties only)
Source: Own data visualized with visone’s stress minization method. Arrows’ direction depicts flow of
resource exchanges (except for agreements as reciprocal exchange by definition). Arrows’ color
visualizes means of collaboration. Nodes’ weight indicates out-degree centrality (from min = 0
to max = 40), i. e., actors’ expansiveness in collaboration. Nodes’ height shows in-degree cen-
trality (from min = 1 to max = 25), i. e., actors’ popularity in collaboration.
The meeting network entails the highest quantity of links (83), followed by advocacy-
related interactions (41 links), gatekeeping activities (38 links), advice exchanges (31
links), written agreements (20), and flows of tangible resources (17 links). The frequent
scheduling of meetings to discuss matters on oil and gas was a striking experience during
field research. Almost no week went by without such a meeting. Scheduling meetings
provides the opportunity to disseminate information, to literally ‘network’ and to relate to
each other. But collaboration goes beyond relating. This means that none of the meetings
attended culminated in sincere collaborative efforts on which participating stakeholders
jointly agreed. Rather, the meetings were used to stage claims and to accuse each other
of failures or mismanagement (see Section 8.1, page 165).
The survey’s results question the success of these meetings in regard to brokering infor-
mation to local communities as well. The vast majority of survey’s respondents (74.77%,
n = 249) do not feel informed ‘at all’ or only ‘little’ about the activities taking place
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in their immediate living environment. And if affected communities access information,
they use radio or personal contacts rather than seeking contact with petroleum actors.
Therefore, the use of meetings to accelerate collaboration among actors seems very limited
even though it is the most frequently means of actors to ‘collaborate’.
Table 7.2: Comparison of Means of Collaboration
Links Isolates Dyads Triads D C Dm ASP
Contact 470 0 167 334 .746 .3638 3 1.43
Meeting 83 0 16 1 .165 .1111 5 17.218
Advocacy 41 9 11 2 .070 .2010 4 9.289
Gatekeeping 38 0 7 0 .079 .0966 5 52.9
Advice 31 0 6 0 .062 .0606 7 62.83
Agreem. 20 7 20 2 .049 .2938 3 2.236
Resources 17 3 0 0 .042 . 8 .
Source: Own data retrieved from network data. N (number of nodes) = 29. D = networks’ density,
C = networks’ centralization, Dm = Diameter, ASP = Average Shortest Path indicating
cohesion.
In contrast, advocacy as a means to collaborate plays a strong role: The network’s
structure confirms the central role of FoN, ACEP and the WR-HoC as the single most
important players. To the contrary, new organizations like the CSPOG and PCC – both
founded with the purpose of challenging public authorities in petroleum governance –
remain in the shadow of these organizations. The advocacy interactions further divide
the network into Accra-based and Western Region-based organizations along questions of
redistributive matters (see Figure 7.5). This remark supports the argument that national
actors focus on the country level while regional actors strive for benefits exclusively in the
Western Region (see Figure 6.4). On the other hand, it supports the argument that civil
society actors compete rather than collaborate with each other.
Contrary to the two previous networks, the gatekeeping network is more dense due to
the absence of isolates: Each actor has received or distributed a contact related to oil and
gas. It is also the only network in which the CSPOG and WERENGO stand out a little
bit. Gatekeeping mainly takes place among those actors who share advocacy activities
and, consequently, tends to diverge between state and non-state actors.
Advice is barely used as a means to collaborate in the petroleum sector. Due to scarce
resources and the complexity arising from the ‘wickedness’ of natural resources, advice
is yet argued to be particularly fruitful for understanding opposing agendas, for building
trust particularly among those actors who do not share the same goals and, hence, for the
chance to collaborate. Another serious challenge is the fact that even though one large
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component exists, the network (see Figure 7.6) divides into two parts: NGOs on the left
side and public institutions, oil companies and media representatives on the right side.
Combined with results from the advocacy network, this not only means that NGOs only
share advice within their sector but they share advice only with those alters with whom
they engage in joint advocacy activities (or vice versa). They barely ask for advice from
those actors who are highly respected for their expertise in petroleum governance. This
lack of engagement could be the reason for the false rumors buzzing around the petroleum
sector and are repeatedly resumed by NGOs.
Written agreements are a relatively scarce form of exchange among petroleum actors
as well. Only 20 agreements exist of which nine are with STAR-Ghana, two with the
German GIZ and two with the Norwegian OfD program. Hence, 13 agreements (65%)
are unilateral transfers of financial resources by international donors. Topped with the
agreement between PIAC’s funding by the MoF, such financial transfers make up for
70% of economic exchanges. The remaining dyads are contract relations among central
public authorities that manage the petroleum sector as well as one dyad between the
interviewed Paramount Chief and the WR-HoC. It came by surprise that none of the
members of multi-actor initiatives (the CSPOG, PCC or WERENGO) mention their
memberships in these initiatives. It underlines a low sense of belonging, competition rather
than collaboration and the problems of such multi-actor initiatives to demonstrate their
usefulness. These challenges, of course, hinder collaborative steering, not only because the
authority of these multi-actor initiatives is undermined but as it shows that while members
want to benefit from collaborative arrangements, they fail to contribute to them.
The few tangible resources exchanged among petroleum actors is comprehensive consid-
ering the few resources most actors have at their disposal. Yet, stakeholders’ dialogues and
statements draw a completely different picture. While the ‘true’ amount of exchanging
tangible resources lies probably somewhere in the middle of both extremes, it necessi-
tates researchers to use multiple data collection methods if the research interest lies upon
multi-actor collaboration.
Besides the number of ties, reciprocity was argued to be inherent to exchange as a
social action that is contingent on rewarding reactions from others and that ceases when
these reactions are not forthcoming. Exchange theorists further argue that every relation
mediated through exchange carries three obligations: the obligation to give, the obligation
to receive and the obligation to reciprocate. The latter obligation, however, is seldom the
case in the present networks.197 While reciprocity is, with 167 ties, high in the general
(‘contact’) network, a clear distinction between ‘givers’ and ‘takers’ exists in, for example,
exchanging tangible resources (zero mutual ties). Though it could be argued that this
is caused by the scare resources actors from the civil society or traditional sector have
at their disposal, tangible resources explicitly include offices or personnel. Moreover,
197 The network of sharing written agreements is an exception by definition.
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reciprocity stays much below the critical benchmark of ≥ 0.5 in all other networks. These
low levels make the assumption that reciprocity causes trust, increases social control and
helps to monitor deviant behavior in Ghana’s petroleum governance very unlikely. Hence,
the mediate levels of trust that all actors are enjoying (x = 3.30, see Table 8.1, page 175) is
likely to result from personal assessments and perceptions rather than from reciprocated
or non-reciprocated exchanges as suggested by exchange theory.
In relation to that, the lack of collective steering may also result from the absence of
triads that are, by definition, the minimum precondition for cohesive subgroups. As Table
7.2 summarizes, only five triads exist across all confirmed networks and none of these five
triads reoccurs in the same constellation in two or more networks. Consequently, the triads
are neither coherent nor pervading. This absence hampers the realization of collective and
collaborative steering in at least two ways: On the one hand, triads or cohesive subgroups
across various forms of economic and social exchanges could ensure more reliability, more
trust and more effective pursuit of joint agendas. But so far, network alters seem to act
in a too erratic and too opportunistic way to engage in long-term collaborations. On the
other hand, the strong executive dominance as well as the ever-changing agendas of donor
institutions complicate the existence of such subgroups. Because of that, particularly
NGOs do not even have sufficient time to form subgroups, to work within them and
to perpetuate them if rewards are forthcoming. This problem occurred, for example,
in the case of the CSPOG: After a very successful start, funded by several donors, it
has remained inactive after resources depleted. Because of the larger structure of the
international donor system, NGOs are forced to act reactively (demand-driven) rather
than proactively.
The hypothesis that actors use the dense network structures – 74.50% of all possible
ties are present in the general ‘contact’ network – for fast and multiple resource exchanges
and the diffusion of knowledge or information, has to be rejected as well. In all networks
(see Table 7.2, page 161), the density lies below the critical benchmark of ≥ 0.5.
Moreover, the low centralization scores explain the difficulties of collaborative steering in
the absence of one or a few central actors who could coordinate agendas, past promises and
future scopes of action. This absence denies network alters the ability to solve simple tasks
such as keeping track with meeting outcomes and referring back on preceding meeting
conclusions. It further goes hand in hand with a lack of responsibility assignment and
accountability.
Finally, also the assumption that actors use their closeness to other actors (reachability)
for collaboration has to be rejected. Neither does the assumption that low reachability
would lead to the formation of efficient subgroups find confirmation.
In sum, an answer to the question if actors steer petroleum resources and deriving
revenues unilaterally, collaboratively or contentiously lies somewhere in the middle. Due
to the institutional design, state authorities collaborate with each other. However, the
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results also show that they limit the access to this ‘elite circle’ to companies and exclude
civil society and traditional authorities. The PIAC tries to do its best to collaboratively
steer petroleum resources and revenues but is constrained by the policy environment
which denies secure funding. This lack of funding has a negative effect on its agency to
position itself in the middle of network interactions. Traditional authorities are perceived
as weak actors by most stakeholders and are relatively inactive in network interactions.
However, they represent the interests of communities directly affected by the petroleum
sector best. This representation is a powerful resource for claiming and for taking influence
in petroleum governance, which traditional authorities, so far, do not sufficiently exploit.
NGOs steer overwhelmingly unilaterally and fail to streamline their agendas. Besides
their own failures, they pursue this rationale due to the lack of sustainable funding, which
forces them to compete rather than collaborate with each other. Moreover, the lacking
sense of belonging towards multi-actor initiatives undermines NGOs’ credibility in network
interactions. Finally, regional state and media representative are too absent from network
interactions to allow empirically funded judgements. In any case, as indicated by the
survey’s results, they do not fulfill their mandate to be local representatives and to broker
information.
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Petroleum Governance
The network analyses show how seldom the 29 actors use their interconnectivity to ex-
change resources such as advice, tangible resources or collaborative agreements. While
exchange theory would argue that exchanges do not occur due to the lack of desired
resources within the network, some network researchers argue that destructive network
practices may prevent such resource exchanges. As cited in Section 2.1.2 (page 13), schol-
ars such as Fuhse (2009), Hauck (2010) and McLean (1998) urge SNA researchers to look
beyond networks and include actors’ practices for a broader understanding of resource
governance.
Accordingly, the thesis’ last chapter identifies such network practices and puts them in
relation to the six different means of collaboration. In a subsequent step, this chapter sheds
light on the last box within the network embedding, i. e., power and trust as potential
exchange outcomes (see Figure 3.1, page 24). The chapter closes with a summary in
regard to unilateral, collaborative or contentious steering.
8.1 Network Practices: Knocking, Othering and Eye Service
The relational perspective on natural resource governance prompts researchers to identify
and investigate practices across group boundaries (see Section 2.2, page 17). Practices,
Section 3.3.2 (page 32) argues, are routinized types of behavior and are meaningful be-
cause they shape actors’ network interactions. A great variety of practices exist in Ghana
and Section 5.2.1 (page 77) provides insights into the effects of increasing partisan pol-
itics and the ‘gratitude’ practice of acquiring political offices. Here, I want to focus on
three concrete trends that shape actors’ interactions in the petroleum sector: ‘knocking’,
‘othering’ and ‘eye service’.
8.1.1 Knocking
Although the petroleum sector is certainly not the only sphere which embraces the practice
of ‘knocking’, it is a critical resource for traditional authorities in petroleum governance.
One interviewee summarizes the practice of ‘knocking’:
“[T]o acquire land, you have to ‘knock’. What we mean by ‘knock’: You send
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some schnapps to the chiefs [...] [and] when you go to the North we use kola.198
When you do the knocking, the elders will listen to you. The elders and the royal
family will meet and think about whether you can acquire the land. Because the
land is also distributed among the family. Maybe you and I are from the royal
family. And then my brother holds this land, your mother holds that land – so all
of our lands are taking together, but the chief will act on behalf of you and me to
do that. So when you knock, they listen to you and they give you time and after
the time they have met and thought about the type of land they can give to you
[...] you have to compensate them” [...] (Transcript I, page 5).
Hereby, ‘knocking’ is not only necessary to acquire land but more generally to raise a
concern in front of a chief. What can happen if the protocol of ‘knocking’ is not followed
– or, at least, if traditional authorities perceive or claim that it has not been followed
– became evident in the Ghana Gas pipeline project and has contributed to a mutual
distrust between public authorities and non-state actors including traditional authorities.
As previously discussed, the project was conflict-ridden from the start, including a delay
over 18 months. Besides the change of location, legal proceedings between the Omahen
of the Eastern Nzema Traditional Area (in trust of Atuabo and neighboring lands) and
Ghana Gas caused the delay. According to the Tufuhene,199 Ghana Gas only paid an
initial visit to the Traditional Council of the Eastern Nzema Traditional Area but did not
pay the necessary compensation:
“[...] we were happy [that] such a project was coming to our land. We knew
Dr. Sipa Yankey [CEO of Ghana Gas] and most especially the Energy Minister,
Armah Kofi Boah, were coming from the Nzema Land [...] We gave them that
respect. We told them they should finish with the first phase of the project, then
come to sit down with us for the due processes to begin, but now the project is at
the completion stage and nobody seems to care. The akpeteshie200 they gave to us
cannot guarantee their ownership of the land” (Business World 2014).
The resulting court proceedings revealed “[...] non-transparent business conduct among
the Ghana Gas leadership that the judges described as ‘shameful, extremely damaging to
our economy and ultimately unpatriotic’ ” (Fritsch and Poudineh 2015: 9). The judges’
description corresponds with the view that “[...] Ghana is going through dark hours of
politics. Mahama has a greed for power – both politically and electrically” (personal
198 ‘Kola’ is the fruit of the kola trees and used to welcome guests in various African countries.
199 The Tufuhene is a divisional chief who used to have oversight responsibilities on arms and war matters
in former times. Today he is often the next authority to the Omahen.
200 Akpeteshie is a local gin that visitors provide to chiefs – most often together with an envelope of money
(token) – in the southern parts of Ghana. The amount effectively paid is based on the financial or
social standing of the visitor. An interviewed Omahen once said that from a company everything less
than 500 GHS (around US$ 130) “is an insult” (personal conversation).
166
8.1 Network Practices: Knocking, Othering and Eye Service
conversation). The case took a dramatic turn when three sub-chiefs within the Eastern
Nzema Traditional Area also claimed ownership of the land against the Paramount Chief.
In the end, the Government expropriated the land and until today, the Paramount Chief
has not filed for a revision of the court’s decision (personal conversation).
The case is only one example in which traditions and oil business – both often accused
of being open to bribery and corruption – collide. A decisive detail is that ‘knocking’ takes
place behind closed curtains and consequently leaves room for (un-) justified accusations
and speculations. Accordingly, a bystander has the following opinion about what actually
happened between the Omahen of the Nzema East Traditional Area and Ghana Gas:
“[...] when the government came to construct the gas project, definitely the
government – or whoever – went to the chief and gave money and said: “Go to
your people and talk to them”. But the chief maybe did not extend that money or
whatever to the people. So the people will see that the progress is going on and
the chief may tell them “Oh it is for the benefit of the country and government will
bring money later”. Meanwhile he has taken the money for a long time. So when
the people rise, they rise against the government while the government thinks they
have settled everything through the chiefs. So traditional authorities are part of the
problem – but secretly.” (Interview Transcript I, page 17).
While only the involved parties know the actual events, the example reveals the com-
plexity in actors’ relations in petroleum governance: Secret arrangements, contradictions
over past exchanges, mistrust towards traditional authorities, and competition instead
of coordination or collaboration among traditional authorities themselves. Examples like
the apparent or actual misbehavior of the state-owned company reproduce distrust and
restraint on behalf of political and civil society actors to partner with each other in
petroleum governance.
In consideration of this practice, it is better understandable why the interviewed para-
mount chief remains at the boundaries or an isolate throughout the network graphs. Con-
trary to this, the Western Region House of Chiefs plays an important role in the advocacy
network in which it partners with the two most central NGOs in a triad and brokers to
the MoE. The House further is important in the advice network in which it provides
the necessary link to the MoE. Indeed, most chiefs in the Western Region are aware of
the narrow ridge they are moving on and especially the House’s leadership is eager to
sustain good relations with public authorities. But the House cannot impede each dyadic
interaction between private investors and traditional authorities and as discussions take
place behind closed curtains, ‘knocking’ automatically inserts stakeholders’ interactions
with a cloud of rumors, accusations and mistrust.
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8.1.2 Othering
A second practice coining actors’ interactions in petroleum governance is the strategy of
‘othering’, in particular the ‘othering’ between actors from the Western Region against
actors based in Accra. A thorough look back to the advocacy network (Figure 7.5, page
150) visualizes this othering as actors from the Western Region are located on top of the
network and actors from Accra are placed on the bottom.
‘Othering’ first explicitly emerged in the course of a petition initiated by eleven Para-
mountcies in the Western Region in 2010 in which the paramount chiefs claimed 10% of all
petroleum revenues for their region. As an “act of desperation” (Nana Kobina Nkethia,
Spokesman of the Western Region House of Chief) due to the longstanding marginalization
of the Western Region, the paramount chiefs tabled the petition to Parliament to ensure
“direct benefits for the people in the Western Region” from the oil discovery. The petition
attracted much attention and despite its neglect by Parliament, it still encourages disputes
about whether or not such regional claims are justified. Objectors particularly fear a
potential divide of the country and that leaders from other regions would follow, resulting
in claims, e.g., from the Brong Ahafo Region to receive revenue from the forest resources,
the Upper West Region from the country’s millet earnings or the Volta Region from fishing
revenues.201
In a personal conversation with one of the chiefs who initiated the petition, he identifies
three reasons for the failure of the petition that replicate the arguments of the network
models: (1) lacking communication and coordination among chiefs within the Western
Region, (2) no previous preparations and consultations with other stakeholders including
the government before the submission of the petition, and (3) wrong wording of the
petition which led to the rumor that the initiating chiefs claim the 10% for their own
stools rather than for the development of the Western Region as a whole.
The motivation for tabling the petition arose from the perception of traditional author-
ities in the Western Region that – in contrast to other actors outside the region – they
are not treated fairly:
“I would not say there is no fairness at all [in revenues’ spending] but government
has not been fair with the Western Region [...] Before the discovery of oil, the
[Western] Region contributed close to 60 percent to the national income. Because
almost every resource is here. So with the oil discovery, the region is feeding the
nation [...] But if you see that this region is feeding the nation, if you do not give
us the 10 percent, at least, we expect that there should be development! [...] In
2011 and 2012, what the Western Region got, was insignificant as compared to some
201 The underlying problem is, however, often overlooked: The fact that traditional authorities simply
followed an idea initiated by then Vice-President John Mahama himself. In his electoral campaign for
the NDC in 2008, he promised that an NDC-ruled government would follow upon the idea of ensuring
10% of petroleum revenues to the Western Region.
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other regions. The Eastern Region got 38 percent! 38 percent of the ABFA [Annual
Budget Funding Amount] (Interview Transcript I, page 14-15).
A second interviewee puts the ‘othering’ in regard to the government in Accra and
describes the thought that the central government does not even want the Western Region
to develop:
“The difference is that the Western Region is rich in resources but poor when
it comes to infrastructure. Money that should come to develop does not come [...]
We need to see whether it is our people who are representing us who are not good
or [whether] it is because the Government does not want us to develop. We need
to look at those things. We have not been able to understand why things are not
getting better. But one thing is for sure: That we do not have people who speak
for us” (Interview Transcript III, page 12-13).
Both citations explicitly frame the practice of ‘us’ (in the Western Region) vs. ‘them’
(in other regions or in Accra). It shapes network interactions insofar as it divides network
actors into two groups: Those who advocate for a special treatment of the Western
Region considering its natural resource wealth (including petroleum resources) and those
who defend natural resources as the property of the whole country, vested in the president
on behalf of the people of Ghana (as stipulated in Article 257, 6 in the Constitution).
Yet, the practice alienates only actors from the Western Region as Accra-based orga-
nizations do not see themselves as competitors. One representative of an NGO based in
Accra explains:
“What we have tended to do, anytime we have a project, is to collaborate with
our NGO friends [in the Western Region] [...] For example, when it has to do with
data collection, we collaborate[d] [...] And when we are going to the communities
[...], we outsource it [local NGOs], too. Because they do understand the thing. So it
should not be a problem if you see their roles as complementary and collaborative”
(Interview Transcript V, page 7).
Considering these statements and the emergence of the Platform of Coastal Communi-
ties (PCC) (see Section 6.1, page 98), ‘othering’ has to be understood as a power balanc-
ing pratice by actors in the Western Region who perceive themselves less connected and,
hence, less influential than actors in the capital who have a strategic advantage of being
geographically close to donor organizations and state institutions. The financial condi-
tions of most NGOs in Ghana, as it is the case with NGOs worldwide, highly depend
on their ability to win projects mostly financed by international donor agencies. While
various NGOs in Accra are well equipped with human and social capital, the NGOs in
the Western Region compete both with the bigger NGOs in Accra and their sisters in
the Western Region. Hence, the practice of ‘othering’ hampers collaborative steering in
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petroleum governance as it artificially infuses network interactions with a dynamic that
produces more problems than it solves and that distracts from more vital tasks like, for
example, acknowledging the challenges communities are facing.
8.1.3 Eye Service
Thirdly, the practice of ‘eye service’ helps to understand why overall, actors’ exchanges
have to be understood as relating rather than collaborating. ‘Eye service’ emerges from
at least two factors: The (superficial) eagerness of the government to include non-state
actors into petroleum governance from the start (see Section 5.1, page 73) and civil
society’s failures to have a long-term, joint strategy within petroleum governance. An
NGO employee brought up the term:
“With the institutional arrangement, mostly NGOs but also other stakeholders
are given the platform just to be heard and not necessarily have their inputs con-
sidered [...] The platform given is just part of what I call ‘eye service’, something
you do just to please but not because you really care [...] The main idea behind is
just to be seen, giving stakeholders a chance [to be seen] and [as government] to be
seen as carrying out due consultations” (Interview Transcrip X, page 1).
Though not using the same term, a second interviewee traces weaknesses in stakeholder
interactions back to the same practice:
“Actually, the true picture of the matter is: On the paper, you will see that there
are various stakeholders. But on the ground they are not well organized. That is the
true picture. For example, the local content idea was introduced so that Ghanaians
can participate fully in the oil and gas activities. So that we do not experience what
has happened in Nigeria and other oil producing countries [...] On the paper, you
see that maybe the traditional authorities have this role and the District Assemblies
have that role and so forth. But the control is solely from the central government
[...] On paper something like [collaboration] appears to exist. But in practice [...] I
do not see that” (Interview Transcript I, page 4-5).
The practice of ‘eye service’ is key insofar as it helps to understand the argument
of ‘relating vs. collaborating’. Although actors are highly interconnected and claim to
collaboratively steer petroleum resources, the government lacks the necessary will and non-
state actors lack the necessary strategy to collaborate. This interpretation is supported
by the results of the meeting networks which argued that even though NGOs do invite
and are invited by public authorities and oil companies, they are not part of the ‘elite
circle’. Moreover, the practice prompts state representatives to question the seriousness
of civil society and traditional authorities and, consequently, state actors are content with
providing a platform instead of really acknowledging and considering non-state actors’
inputs. In this regard, the practice of ‘eye service’ has perverted stakeholders’ interactions
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to a degree that, for example, participants in multi-actor meetings often do not expect
any outcomes.
In sum, the practice of ‘eye service’ has at least three causes and, in turn, consequences
for actors’ exchanges: First, it evolved from the public sector’s inability to act upon
NGO’s inputs and requests. This is the most visible on the district and regional level
where public authorities are ill-funded to such an extent that they are practically unable
to interact with other stakeholders sufficiently. Second, the NDC government since gain-
ing power has been particularly keen on staying the ‘golden boy’ of foreign aid and this
necessitates the inclusion of non-state actors. But below the surface, the inclusion does
not implicate that these voices are actually listened to. Third, non-state actors’ inability
to effectively coordinate themselves perpetuates the practice. The analysis of agreement
exchanges demonstrates that NGOs do not dedicate themselves to multi-stakeholder ini-
tiatives like WERENGO or the CSPOG. This lacking dedication limits the credibility
of such organizations. And on the assumption that reciprocity in relations leads to mu-
tual norms and trust, norms and trust are unlikely to form among petroleum actors as
they barely reciprocate exchanges. The network models, combined with qualitative data,
rather suggest that non-state actors find themselves in fierce competition and try to seek
influence by excelling themselves individually. This undermines collaborative efforts of
non-state actors, their role as reliable partners and, in turn, the effort to collaboratively
steer petroleum resources.
Insertion: Field Notes about ‘Knocking’, ‘Othering’ and ‘Eye Service’
The subsequent text box, written in the field in November 2014, implicitly discusses
all three practices. The notes are the result of attending a ‘community consultation
workshop’ in November 2014 in regard to the ‘Ghana 1000 Project’ in Aboadze (see Map
4.1, page 51). The ‘Ghana 1000 Project’ is an initiative to develop, construct and operate
a gas power plant from a offshore gas processing facility. The main investor is ‘Endeavor
Natural Gas’, a private company from the US. The text box is an extract of the notes
taken during my field research stay and aims to provide insights in how such ‘consultation’
workshops proceed. The notes are deliberately maintained without changes.
Trample on Institutions and Citizens
(written in November 2014)
Dumsor – that is how Ghanaians call their daily electricity experiences these months. Si-
multaneously it is a verbum non grata for President John Mahama and its Government.
Dumsor means ‘on-off’ in Akan, one of the local Ghanaian dialects, and describes the on-
going power-cuts hampering Ghana’s economy and citizens. Notwithstanding the discovery
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of offshore oil and gas resources in Ghanaian territory in 2007, the power-cuts have gotten
worse over the years. As natural gas can be used to produce power, it comes as no surprise
that President Mahama called the gas resources a ‘game-changer’ in the aim to become a
middle-income country by 2020. Unfortunately, in the Government’s ambition to raise the
nation’s welfare, institutions are often buried. The graveyard of institutions is prototypical
in Aboadze, an urban fishing community with about 10,000 inhabitants, located 20km away
from the new oil-city Takoradi. A report published by the Coastal Resource Center [a local
NGO] in 2010 identifies several challenges within Aboadze: environmental hazards such as
coastal erosion and declining fish catches, social pressures such as lack of capital, low school
enrollment and prevalence of teenage pregnancy as well as infrastructural problems, most
prominently an inadequate waste disposal.
What the report does not mention but what can be experienced by spending some time
in the community, is the high level of disappointment, deprivation and aggression among
community members and especially among young men. Although the community hosts
several facilities such as the Takoradi Thermal Power Station of the Volta River Authority
(VRA) since 1997 and the Aboadze Gas Plant of the Ghana National Gas Company since
2011, jobs, business opportunities and overall ‘development’ have not trickled down to the
community itself.
Consequently, without big surprise, emotions boiled over during ‘just another’ information
meeting at Aboadze on November 20. The host, a conglomerate of four different companies
mainly from the US, informed the community about the takeoff of another gas facility, the
Ghana 1000 Project, right next to Aboadze. Ironically, the investors called the event a
‘Public Consultative Workshop’ in which the Aboadze citizens ‘Have [their] Say!’. However,
being present at this meeting proved these words to be empty platitudes and taught us
a lot about what is currently happening in the natural resource sector of Ghana. Three
observations stand out as they happen, one way or the other, repeatedly at these kind of
meetings:
Firstly, there is the whitewashing of what is actually happening at such meetings. Calling
it a ‘consultative workshop’ appears ridiculous as ‘consultative’ includes at least a minimal
form of interaction between the one advising and the one being advised. However, during
the meeting, the nameless speaker simply read out a power point presentation. He for sure
did not fail to praise the benefits of the project: A ‘timely solution of power shortfalls’ as
the new power plant is planned to start operation in 2016; a ‘comprehensive fuel solution’
as the plant will use and then re-gasify imported liquid natural gas (LNG) stored at an
offshore floating station; and an ‘economic boost’ by powering the plant with liquid natural
gas instead of more expensive light crude oil. These are, of course, macro-economic benefits.
They seem rather unimportant for the audience of the meeting: most people probably do
not understand the technical terms thrown at them and as the already existing Volta River
Authority and Ghana Gas infrastructures have proven, the citizens in the town will not
benefit from the ‘economic boost’ and its ‘multiple positive impacts on Ghanaian economy’.
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Questions from the audience, for example where the liquid natural gas is imported from and
how this import affects the local gas production industry, were not granted the floor.
Secondly, the power of traditional authorities became obvious. After cutting off the
speaker in the middle of the presentation, the two Paramount Chiefs of the area took the
floor. Besides evaluating the content of their speeches, the most impressive thing to observe
was how they were able to direct the feelings of the audience, especially those of young
men. They took on when the chiefs allowed them and immediately stopped when they were
told to do so. However, the chiefs even-handedly failed to inform the audience about their
plan to meet the investors the next day behind closed curtains. “Even the most notorious
simpleton can imagine what happens on such off-the-record meetings”, the man next to me
comments.
Thirdly, the government and its respective regulation bodies such as the Ghana Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Petroleum Commission (PC) were absent. Like
they almost always are. By law these two bodies are commanded to regulate the oil and gas
sector whereby the EPA (founded in 1994) is responsible for environmental protection in
Ghana, prescribing standards and guidelines, issuing environmental permits and enforcing
compliance (see Act 490 for further details). Of particular importance are the Environmental
Assessment Regulations, 1999 (L.I. 1652) which outline the legal regulations of Environmen-
tal Impact Assessments (EIAs) by providing a list of ‘undertakings’ that require registration
and environmental permits (Schedule 1) and those of which an impact assessment report is
mandatory (Schedule 2). The process of evaluation and guidance normally takes between
12 and 18 months.
Unfortunately, environmental impact assessments are often more illusion than reality:
when juxtaposing the aim of the Ghana 1000 Project to produce power in 2016 with the lack
of necessary on- and offshore infrastructure, it becomes obvious that rules and regulations
will be stretched yet again. One of the investors even confessed this violation in an off-the-
record talk: the government urges the companies to finish the EIA by the end of February
2015 to start the construction process. As a consequence, the process is effectively reduced
to four out of the necessary nine to 15 months. He traces this back to the government’s
“desperate greed for power”, which – so they hope – will secure their success at the general
elections in 2016. The possible breach of law will entail particularly detrimental consequences
for the nearby Anlo Beach Wetlands covering the estuary of River Pra. Its mangroves,
lagoons and tidal salt are famous for their richness in bird and fish species. The wetlands
are already threatened by degradation resulting from over-exploitation of mangrove wood
for fish smoking, dumping of solid waste and bad fishing practices, and – as a local researcher
emphasizes – will further be damaged by the neighboring industries.
What can we learn from these three observations? On the one hand the ‘workshop’ was
the perfect location to study the main actors on the natural resource game board and their
engagement with each other: Foreign investors, traditional authorities, affected communities
and – despite their absence – state regulation bodies. The whitewashing exemplifies the
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inability of all tokens to call a spade a spade: On the other hand, the meeting shows that
most of the current developments in the gas sector take place under a veil of ignorance.
Both media and civil society actors seem to focus more on procedures within the oil rather
than the gas sector. The main focus of the discussion in Ghana still lies on how to prevent
the resource curse in terms of the offshore oil resources. This focus might be explained by
close-by Nigeria which is repeatedly used as a bad reference point, most of the times without
accounting for the several differences between both countries. As most Ghanaians know few
details about Nigeria’s oil industry in order to put its negative impacts into perspective,
actors from the public, private and civil society sector easily exploit the Nigerian failures to
hide their own ignorance and inabilities.
So who is to blame? Foreign investors who are trying to make profit? And who are both
legally and (more or less) normatively forced to preach the Corporate Social Responsibility
alphabet during such meetings just because they happen to operate in an African country?
Or are the traditional authorities the ones to blame because they frequently use their his-
torical legitimacy to get rich at expense of their prote´ge´s? Or are the people themselves to
blame as they allow companies and traditional authorities to exploit them and seemingly
fail to challenge what is happening behind closed curtains? Or civil society actors who get
carried away using their advocacy buzz words, their one-sided call upon companies to make
it up to those who are ‘negatively’ affected, and who paint a wrong picture of companies
as development agencies instead of acknowledging the main purpose of companies (i. e.,
making profit)?
It is probably a mixture of all. Maybe it is time to start with the remaining token: The
government allows investors to come to the country while almost urging them to break the
country’s laws. The government seems to be the one incapable of properly managing the
ongoing economy and electricity crisis and the one fooling its own people. There is a famous
proverb in Fante: Ason ebien koˆ a, nchea na w⊃br3 – When two elephants are fighting, it
is the grass that suffers. It almost fits to what is currently happening in Aboadze, just that
there are at least four elephants trampling on the grass.
8.2 Network Patterns
So far, it can be maintained that exchanges remain low among actors who aim or, at least,
claim to steer the petroleum sector collaboratively and that several network practices
employed by actors hamper collaboration. Beyond exchanges and practices, exchange
theorists and other scholars widely acknowledge the role of power and trust as potential
outcomes of and, in turn, input to economic and social exchanges. The question arising
is whether central actors in Ghana’s petroleum sector are actually perceived as more
powerful and well trusted.
174
8.2 Network Patterns
Table 8.1 summarizes network alters’ perceptions on different variants of these relational
patterns on a scale from 1 (low) to 5 (high). As interviewees only rated their network
contacts (and not actors they did not interact with), the scores are standardized by the
number of assessments received to make results comparable.
Table 8.1: Relational Strengths
Consult Coordinate Represent Liaison Influence Trust
EPA 3.67 2.29 2.29 2.57 4.07 3.53
PC 4.44 3.29 2.82 2.41 4.50 3.67
MoE 4.26 3.53 2.67 2.47 4.74 3.65
MoF 3.46 2.87 2.85 2.21 4.53 3.67
PIAC 3.68 3.05 3.35 3.37 4.00 3.84
DA 2.74 2.37 2.28 3.30 2.55 2.20
Fish Comm. 3.09 2.36 2.30 2.90 2.91 2.45
EPA-WR 2.50 3.00 2.00 2.50 2.00 (4.50)
Tullow 4.05 3.25 2.00 3.19 4.29 3.64
GNPC 4.24 3.50 2.69 3.18 4.35 3.78
GIZ 3.10 3.70 3.30 2.45 3.89 3.82
OfD 3.00 3.20 3.17 2.43 3.00 3.83
STAR-GH 4.07 4.27 3.69 2.92 3.85 3.73
House of Chiefs 2.87 2.53 2.21 3.31 3.07 2.56
Param. Chief 3.06 2.75 2.44 3.33 3.44 2.88
PCC 2.86 2.69 2.85 3.75 2.77 3.17
ACEP 4.00 3.39 3.16 2.75 3.90 4.05
ACET 2.86 3.29 3.14 2.86 3.14 3.25
CEPIL 3.33 3.00 2.90 2.64 2.92 3.33
CDD 3.36 3.08 2.83 2.38 3.15 3.54
CSPOG 3.63 3.20 3.38 3.20 3.00 3.44
KITE 3.75 3.25 3.18 3.08 2.79 3.21
COLANDEF 3.31 3.00 2.69 3.63 3.00 3.13
FoN 3.55 3.36 3.30 3.83 3.27 3.22
UCSOND 2.56 2.64 2.30 3.82 2.55 2.73
WERENGO 2.78 2.88 2.56 3.56 2.33 2.44
PPB 2.94 2.80 3.00 2.87 2.67 3.07
Radio 2.74 2.67 2.65 3.82 3.43 2.74
Newspaper 2.55 2.63 1.92 3.27 3.17 2.73
Mean 3.33 3.03 2.56 3.03 3.35 3.30
Source: Own data retrieved from attributional network data. N varies according to the number of
actors’ alters. The attributions to the EPA-WR should be cautiously interpreted as n = 2.
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(1) Consult indicates the ability of actors to answer questions about oil and gas with the
necessary expertise. The attributional data identifies, in descending order, the Petroleum
Commission (PC), the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MoE), GNPC, STAR-Ghana,
Tullow, and ACEP as actors who are valued for their expertise in oil and gas matters.
However, in the advice network (see Figure 7.6, page 152), they are inconsistently the
most popular actors (i. e., those with the highest in-degree centrality). For example, the
PC is the most reliable actor for consultations but has only two incoming ties in the advice
network (cI = .071). Besides the PC, the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (MoE) as a
central network actor and GNPC as another unobstrusive player in the network analysis
are viewed as useful to consult.
The PC and the EPA visualize the most obvious contrast between relational and at-
tribution network data. Among all 29 network actors, the PC has the highest scores
to consult on questions about oil and gas (and, hence, is located in the middle of the
network) but only two actors, the MoE and GNPC, asked the PC for advice in the year
2014. In stark contrast, six actors consulted the EPA to give advice in oil and gas but
the EPA is midrange on perceived expertise.
On the one hand, this suggests that even though the petroleum industry is comparably
immature in Ghana, key state actors in petroleum governance were able to acquire a high
level of expertise from the perspective of their exchange partners. On the other hand, the
result raises doubts to what extent exchanges led to these perceptions (as argued in the
theoretical chapter) and, in turn, to what extent stakeholders predicate their decision to
ask for advice on the assessment of alters’ competences. As Figure 7.6 (page 152) shows,
none of the three most valued actors are asked for advice with any distinction.
Figure 8.1 (page 177) expands this graph and graphically depicts differences between
relational and attributional data. The graph is arranged in a centrality layout which
locates actors with high perceived competence for giving advice in the middle of the




Figure 8.1: Advice Network By Consultation Skills
Source: Own data visualized with visone’s centrality layout method. Arrows’ direction depicts flow of
advice, nodes’ size indicates actors’ in-degree centrality. The reference category of the centrali-
ty layout are actors’ scores on their usefulness to consult about questions on oil and gas.
(2) Coordinate measures the ability of each network actor to coordinate (opposing)
interests among all others. Only due to their funding idea, the multi-actor pooling Public
Interest Accountability Committee (PIAC), the Platform of Coastal Communities (PCC),
the Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (CSPOG), and the Western Region Network
of NGOs (WERENGO) should outperform others in regard to this attribute as the whole
idea of initiating them was to coordinate interests. The network results in the previous
section, however, do not replicate this mission. If these actors are not isolated from net-
work alters, they have low to very low scores in betweenness centrality across all networks.
With 13.65%, WERENGO has the highest betweenness centrality in the gatekeeping net-
work.
Table 8.1 confirms the failure of these initiatives as all of them are not particularly
valued for their coordinative skills. The CSPOG still manages to do best among these
four actors but if compared to all other stakeholders, it is only midrange. A purely
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institutional assessment would have resulted in a strong coordinative role of the CSPOG
– given its right to nominate new civil society representatives for the PIAC – but the
network results cast doubts. The PCC, initiated by eleven traditional councils along the
Western Region’s coast to coordinate and represent the interests of coastal communities
and, implicitly, the interests of these eleven traditional leaders, is even located at the
lowest range. Both the relational and attributional data therefore support the previously
made inference that these multi-actor initiatives, so far, fail to meet their mandate. In
the context of scare resources and high competition, it is still the ‘mother bodies’ that
are in tune in petroleum interactions.
STAR-Ghana dominates the perception of network actors as a useful coordinator. While
STAR-Ghana is another multi-actor initiative, it deviates insofar as it was able to detach
itself from its ‘mother bodies’ and to emerge as an independent organization highly valued
across all sectors. Even though it was initiated by external actors, this external relation
does not demolish actors’ trust in STAR-Ghana.
This assessment might explain why STAR-Ghana ranks first when it comes to (3) rep-
resenting others’ interests. On average, respondents perceive STAR-Ghana to perform
best in neutrally representing their interests (e.g., during a meeting they cannot attend
themselves). Similarly, the PIAC is valued for representing others’ interests which sup-
ports the argument that if PIAC is able to overcome its financial difficulties, it could
emerge as a strong and unique actor in petroleum governance.
A more critical assessment is, yet, necessary in regard to the CSPOG: Although it ranks
on the third place in representation, the qualitative interviews and comments during the
network interviews suggest that here it is not an actual assessment by respondents but
rather wishful thinking: Even though most member organizations still stand behind the
general idea of one organization representing all member NGOs, they are aware that the
CSPOG has been inactive since years. As the formal agreement network vividly shows
(see Figure 7.7, page 155), they hence lack the necessary sense of belonging.
So far, those actors that dominate the network interactions have not been identified
as well consulting, coordinating or representing. This observation is particularly striking
when it comes to FoN as the dominant actor in most networks. But it changes in regard
to (4) liaison skills, i. e., to what extent actors are able to mediate resources (for example
information) to local communities in the Western Region. As expected, NGOs located
in the Western Region, together with radio stations, outperform all other actors. But
combined with the results of the survey along the Ghana Gas pipeline, this observation
creates more questions than it answers. In the survey sample, one-third of all respondents
do not feel able to answer questions about NGOs, either because they do not understand
the idea behind or as they do not perceive themselves knowledgable enough to answer
questions about them. And if they answer, they neither use NGOs to gather information
nor were they contacted by them to receive information. Contrary to this, network alters
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view them as singly most important brokers to reach out to local communities. As already
discussed in Section 3.3.1, this contradiction, again, suggests a detachment of petroleum
stakeholders from the citizens’ level including those organizations who claim to represent
communities’ interests in petroleum governance. Moreover, while radio is the single most
important reference point to gather information about oil and gas for local communities
and traditional authorities the most trusted actors, this representation is not acknowl-
edged by network actors. Thus, actors’ opinion on the macro level deviate decisively from
those they target on the micro level.
The various networks also do not comply with the (5) influence that actors assign
to others. In the eyes of the interviewed network alters, the MoE, the MoF, the PC
and the two leading oil companies (Tullow and GNPC) are the most influential actors in
petroleum governance. In their judgement of actors’ influence interviewees, thus, follow
the institutional design rather than their network involvements with these actors .
This finding is important in three consecutive ways: Theoretically, it brings the ‘at-
tributive’ approach to power closer to the ‘resource’ than to the ‘positional’ perspective
(see Section 3.3.3, page 33). While the different centrality measures almost exclusively
identify NGOs and donors as powerful actors, the institutional analysis and now the at-
tributive assessment suggest the various ministries and oil companies as most powerful.
Methodologically, it means that different ways of measuring power result in different out-
comes. The overlapping of the resource and attributional power approach challenges the
measurement of power in network analysis. Empirically, the contradiction between at-
tributional and relational power provokes the question to what extent the investigated
networks really bargain over governing the petroleum sector. In combination with the
practice of ‘eye service’, the results suggest that even though the public and the private
sector grapple with NGOs and traditional authorities, they do so superficially and within
their pre-defined arenas.
This conclusion first originates from state authorities’ agency to balance hierarchical
steering in the light of the executive dominance on the one hand and the necessity to
include non-state actors (to keep them and international donors on board) on the other.
And, second, the conclusion arises from non-state actors’ inabilities to better coordinate
and unify their interests to succeed in power balancing. Coalition formation is, so far, the
only strategy applied to balance power. As petroleum is the ‘new kid on the block’, most
NGOs lack the knowledge and expertise to balance power through making themselves
more attractive as exchange partners (‘giving status’). ‘Withdrawal’ is not an option as
too many (financial) resources exist which secure the survival of a lot of NGOs. To be able
to use ‘network extensions’, the overall network structure still rests too much on the old
‘giver-taker-syndrome’ of top-down development approaches, making NGOs too passive
to extend their networks proactively. And if they get proactive, they lose the necessary
resources – time, money, motivation and conviction – along the way as discussed in relation
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to the several multi-actor initiatives. NGOs therefore lack a long-term strategy to apply
other potential means of power balancing that would better position them against the
executive’s dominance.
Finally, if (6) trust is a precondition for entering social exchange relations, actors can
select trustworthy partners from almost all sectors that are engaged in petroleum gov-
ernance: From the public sector, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the
Western Region and the PIAC emerge as most trusted actors. While the results in regard
to the EPA-WR should be cautiously considered as their rank is based on the judgement
of only two former exchange partners, the PIAC is well-trusted across all actors. If actors
look for reliable partners among civil society actors, the Accra-based ACEP offers itself.
In parallel, all donor agencies are well trusted (in descending order: the OfD, GIZ and,
close behind, STAR-Ghana). From a development cooperation perspective, this finding
is particularly striking for STAR-Ghana, which was only founded in 2010 and which has
proven to be an important player in petroleum governance across networks. This should
push donors and multilateral agencies closer to the idea of investing in and particularly of
sustaining such multi-donor pool organizations instead of acting unilaterally.202 Because
of its tumultuous past and its comparably low engagement in different forms of collab-
oration, it is finally unexpected that GNPC is more trusted than Tullow Oil. The fact
that Tullow Oil is a foreign company while GNPC is the national oil company might have
primed respondents’ answering behavior to a certain degree.
8.3 Summary: Relating vs. Collaborating in Petroleum Governance
Overall, the three network practices hamper collaboration in the petroleum sector and
perpetuate superficial relating. The practice of ‘knocking’ leads actors to treat traditional
authorities with caution and it sustains their reputation of being corruptible. The prac-
tice of ‘othering’ artificially complicates collaborative steering between Western Region
based and Accra-based organizations. Though economic and social exchanges do exist,
local actors’ gaze whether they receive ‘fair’ outcomes often prompts local actors to focus
on attacking rather than attracting potential collaboration partners. The dominant role
of ‘eye service’ has perverted stakeholders’ interactions. The futility to reach binding
agreements with state authorities which are sanctionable in case of defection, the deli-
cate financial situation of non-state actors and the fear of coming off badly, provokes an
unproductive space for collaborative steering.
The mismatch between relational data on the one hand and attributive data on the
other is worth more investigation in future network studies. In sum, the combination
of relational and attributional data helps to understand the diversity of actors’ relations
in petroleum governance in more depth. Besides providing economic resources, donor
202 This step could also improve coherence in donor policies and strategies.
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organizations establish their participation in petroleum governance through coordination
and representation. They are viewed as neutral intermediaries by network alters and,
hence, are particularly powerful in social exchange networks. Civil society groups are
viewed as important liaison to local communities and are active in network bargains
over petroleum revenues in the first place. Yet, the survey data raise major doubts
whether NGOs are able to do justice as liaison managers. This disparity should not
only prompt NGOs to reconsider their strategies (particularly when it comes to “ground
work” on the community level) but should prompt all network alters to critically assess
the gaps between their perceptions and the perceptions of those immediately affected by
the developing petroleum industry.
Above all, relational and attributional data diverge to a large degree in the present
thesis. Actors that are particularly active in handing out advice to others are not seen
as useful partners to consult over oil and gas matters. Equally, high degree centralities




This thesis set out to understand collaboration in Ghana’s petroleum sector. The interest
in this topic was stimulated by development countries’ high stake in natural resources in
general (Barbier 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Lockwood 2010; Ostrom 1990) and in
petroleum resources in particular (Heilbrunn 2014; Ross 2001, 2006). In conveying a rela-
tional perspective on natural resource governance, the thesis abstains from romanticizing
how natural resource governance should work, but rather investigates how it works in the
concrete example of Ghana’s newly developed petroleum sector.
Conceptually, the thesis aims to contribute to the current lack of literature that asks
why actors collaborate in governing natural resources. In order to fill this gap, this study
uses arguments put forward by exchange theory which maintains that exchanges forge
relations, maintain social bonds, and consequently are the core element of collaboration.
Methodologically, the thesis adds to the application of Social Network Analysis (SNA)
in development research. According to literature, SNA provides the possibility to target
a wide spectrum of development-related questions: Scholars use SNA to track interna-
tional trade networks (Mahutga 2006; Walther 2014); investigate migration patterns (Ver-
tovec 2003); understand international relations (Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery
2009; Kahler 2009; Maoz 2011); study the spread of epidemics (Wonodi 2012); scrutinize
international terrorism (Brams, Mutlu, and Ramirez 2006; Everton 2011; Perliger and
Pedahzur 2011); or investigate the reactivity of social systems in disaster management
(ODI 2009). The present thesis is situated at the intersection of natural resource gover-
nance and multi-actors approaches. Most importantly, the study advances SNA research
by extracting both outgoing and incoming ties and, by that, raising doubts about the va-
lidity of network data. It further accelerates the discussion of ethics in network research
and agitates the benefits of mixed-methods approaches by combining structural network
measurements with the investigation of network practices.
Empirically, the study is set against the backdrop of a growing interest in Ghana’s
petroleum industry (Boohene and Peprah 2011; Eduful and Hooper 2015; Osei-Tutu 2012;
Sakyi et al. 2012; Veit and Excell 2015). It advances existing studies by examining the
chances and challenges of horizontal governance through multi-actor approaches (Bier-
mann et al. 2008; Buchanan 2013; Sreide and Truex 2013; Warner 2005). To this end,
the thesis presents novel primary data that were collected during a ten month research
stay in Ghana’s Western Region which neighbors the offshore petroleum fields. The data
combines qualitative information gathered by observations and semi-structured interviews
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with quantitative data gained through survey questionnaires and network interviews.
These data are novel in two distinct ways: The survey data give unique insights into
the anticipation of representation by people directly affected by the developing petroleum
industry. The network data are the first empirical reflection of different means of collabo-
ration among those actors who aim to steer petroleum resources and revenues. Contrary
to other network data sets that either tackle collaboration as a binary variable (Prell,
Hubacek, and Reed 2009) or focus on collaboration within distinct governance sectors
(for example state authorities, Wonodi 2012), the present network data include six differ-
ent means of collaboration across eight different sectors.
Through this novel research design, the thesis answers three main research questions:
(1) Which actors in Ghana’s petroleum sector (aim to) steer petroleum resources and
revenues? (2) Which of these actors do affected communities perceive as representatives
of their interests? And (3) to what extent do these actors attain their proclaimed goal to
collaboratively govern the petroleum sector? The subsequent section summarizes the key
answers to these questions based on Graph 9.1 (page 185).
9.1 Summary of Key Results
Ghana combines several characteristics discussed as favorable for collaborative steering
by literature: On the one hand, all actors share the core belief that jointly governing
the petroleum sector exceeds vertical steering. This core belief became apparent shortly
after the oil discovery when the government scheduled the “National Forum on Oil and
Gas” and when the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, Act 815 (PRMA) institution-
alized the Public Interest Accountability Committee (PIAC) as a multi-actor platform
entitled to control and advise the government in managing the petroleum sector. On
the other hand, actors share the opinion that high environmental and safety standards,
transparency in revenues’ allocation and distribution, and citizens’ inclusion in the sector
are pivotal pillars of successful petroleum governance. To a large degree, this opinion is a
consequence of the collateral consequences of mining for the environment, the lack of law
enforcement in the mining sector, the failure to integrate the mining supply chain into the
national economy, and the exclusion of key stakeholders (most importantly, mining com-
munities) from governing processes. Moreover, the proclaimed goal to avoid the infamous
‘resource curse’ unites all actors. Being confronted with environmental destruction, civil
rights violations and rampant corruption in other resource-rich countries such as Nigeria,
Equatorial Guinea or the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the need to avert the ‘re-
source curse’ is the lowest common denominator for all actors in petroleum governance.
These shared experiences and beliefs favor the collaborative governance of the petroleum
sector by all actors involved.
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Figure 9.1: Summary of Empirical Results
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In addition, the institutional framework that embeds actors’ relations and interactions
features a number of characteristics discussed as advantageous for multi-actor collabo-
ration by literature: The democratic regime and Ghana’s reputation as a ‘role model’
democracy play a decisive role in petroleum governance as they define the legal margins
of public institutions; back the role of traditional authorities; provide civil society with
scopes of action; enable the media to freely report about advances and challenges in the
petroleum sector; provide private investors with stable political conditions; and attract
donor agencies wanting Ghana to be the positive exception of an ‘African oil state’. With
the legal transfer of decision-making power to the regional and local levels, development
literature further suggests that Ghana is better able to use the petroleum wealth inclu-
sively and to better enforce rules than centralized state.
In contrast to these characteristics, the empirical results suggest that day-to-day ex-
changes in petroleum governance are marked by executive dominance, an increasing politi-
cization of non-partisan local elections and lack of awareness among local communities
about the functions of civil society. The executive dominance constrains horizontal col-
laboration in the petroleum sector as state institutions on the local and regional level as
well as non-state actors often remain at the boundaries of those networks that make de-
cisive petroleum-related decisions. It appears that these exclusive networks are reserved
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for state institutions on the national level and the private sector. The politicization of
non-partisan elections infuses petroleum decisions with party affiliations and divides both
petroleum actors and citizenry along the two dominant party lines. The ignorance about
the role of civil society among local communities challenges collaborative petroleum gov-
ernance as it queries the assumption that through the inclusion of civil society, citizens
are included in petroleum governance. In consequence, even though Ghana is evading the
‘resource curse’, actors’ daily interactions scratch at the smooth image the institutional
setting is drawing in regard to the petroleum sector.
The ambitious policy environment further complicates actors’ interactions: Although
Ghana is deservedly praised for the policies put in place to govern the sector, these
policies are often unclear about institutional responsibilities, lack implementation and
give the executive the opportunity to steer resources and revenues unilaterally rather
than collaboratively. In particular, the Petroleum Revenue Management Act, Act 815
(PRMA) suffers from several weaknesses such as loopholes for the government to withhold
information, arbitrary fiscal standards and – most importantly for actors’ networks –
unclear financial backing of the PIAC as the multi-actor platform that is entitled to
advise and control the government. The lack of economic and human capital, de facto,
neglects the PIAC to fulfill its tasks and gives reason to believe that the government
pushes superficial relating rather than horizontal collaborating.
The overall network structure that embeds actors’ relations is diverse and complex but
actors’ general interconnectivity across sector boundaries affords the opportunity to col-
laboratively steer petroleum resources and revenues: Based on 29 interviews, the overall
network consists of 99 nodes with 809 arcs from at least eight different sectors. This inter-
connectivity produces a dense overall network in which resources can spread rapidly across
sector boundaries. Besides the interconnectivity, moderate reciprocity and transitivity as
well as high reachability within the network embedding favor actors’ collaboration.
Within this network embedding and in accordance with Emerson (1962) as well as Cook
and Gillmore (1984), coalition formation was then identified as the most popular means
to balance power by actors who perceive themselves as less influential in petroleum gov-
ernance, and discussed in regard to the formation of three new coalitions (the Platform of
Coastal Communities (PCC), the Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (CSPOG) and
the Public Interest Accountability Committee (PIAC)). While different in composition
and scope, they all arise from the belief that bundling resources leads to a more profound
voice in petroleum governance. However, the PCC and the CSPOG (and older initiatives
such as the Western Region Network of NGOs (WERENGO)) suffer from a lack of ded-
ication of their members who compete rather than share the scarce resources they have,
and who fail to streamline their agendas in petroleum governance. This behavior damages
their reliability as exchange partners and hampers collaboration.
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All network actors scrutinized in this thesis aim and claim to ‘speak with the voice of
the people’ or, at least, to govern the petroleum sector ‘for the benefits of the people’. The
investigation of representation contributes to research in three main ways. The survey
results firstly suggest that traditional authorities, most importantly community chiefs,
represent the interests of communities best. This finding is important not only in regard
to the discourses taking place in petroleum governance but also concerns the immanent
debate in academia whether or not traditional authorities can be viewed as mouthpiece
of ordinary citizens.
Secondly, this finding questions the legitimacy of civil society groups’ claims to represent
the interest of communities. Aggravated by the lacking awareness of communities about
the function of NGOs in general and the work of individual NGOs in particular, this novel
insight calls into question the means of NGOs to seek influence in petroleum governance
as ‘they are with the people’. In combination with the investigation of NGOs’ goals in
petroleum governance on the one hand and affected communities’ interests on the other,
the thesis argues that NGOs have so far failed to recognize the relevance of communities’
problems. While their discussions move on the macro level and serve the ‘standard jargons’
of development cooperation (e.g., transparency and accountability), affected communities
still face hands-on problems such as access to proper sanitation and – in light of such
challenges – do not perceive the petroleum as a distinct burden they are facing.
Thirdly, the gap between general feelings of being represented and the feeling of being
represented in the oil and gas sector is a novel result of this thesis. This divide cautions
against any inversion of the argument that actors who are generally well-accepted as
representatives in Ghanaian politics are automatically considered as representatives in
petroleum governance.
In light of the decisive role of claiming representation, it comes as no surprise that a
majority of actors identify citizen-related goals as a desirable achievement in petroleum
governance. In fact, the majority aims to factor in local communities in the Western Re-
gion or citizens as a whole, notably in terms of increasing their benefits from the petroleum
industry, their education about it, and their active participation and empowerment in it.
Although these goals re-emphasize the articulated goal of including citizens in the develop-
ing industry, the analysis of the survey results show that respondents barely perceive any
personal benefits in the oil discovery and that they also do not feel ‘empowered’. Similar,
most interviewees criticize lacking information about the petroleum activities. Based on
these results, the study maintains that actors were so far unable to realize citizens-related
goals.
Overall, collaboration through resource exchanges differs according to the exchanged
resource: meetings and joint advocacy activities are the most frequently exchanged re-
sources. Advocacy makes NGOs and the Western Regional House of Chiefs to central
players within the networks. Contrary to this, new organizations like the CSPOG and
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PCC – both founded with the purpose of challenging public authorities in petroleum gov-
ernance – remain in the shadow of these organizations. The advocacy interactions further
divide the network into Accra-based and Western Region-based organizations along ques-
tions of redistributive matters. This structural observation finds support in the network
practice of ‘othering’ which troubles collaborative steering through the infusion of rivalry
between Accra-based and Western Regional organizations.
Exchanging advice is barely used to collectively steer petroleum governance. Due to
scarce resources and the complexity that arises from the ‘wickedness’ of natural resources,
advice is yet argued to be particularly fruitful for understanding opposing agendas, for
building trust and, thus, for the chance to collaborate. Written agreements are barely
used as well. Among the 20 agreements, 14 are enforced institutionally or agreed upon
with donor agencies. While such agreements are not particularly beneficial to collabora-
tive steering, the non-mentioning of the various actors who are members of multi-actor
platforms (such as WERENGO or the CSPOG) underlines the little sense of belonging
to such collaborative initiatives and the competition rather than collaboration among ac-
tors. This, of course, hinders collaborative steering, not only because the authority of
these multi-actor initiatives is undermined, but also because it shows that while members
want to benefit from collaborative arrangements, they are not able or willing to contribute
to them.
On network level, the various exchange networks show very low levels of reciprocity and
transitivity as well as a lack of subgroups. These three measurements are indications for
the trouble of governing the petroleum resources collaboratively. Moreover, the networks’
low centralization scores explain the difficulties of collaborative steering in the absence
of one or a few central actors who could coordinate agendas, enforce past promises and
coincide in future scopes of action. This absence denies network alters the ability to
solve simple tasks such as keeping track with meeting outcomes and referring back on
preceding meetings’ conclusions. It further goes hand in hand with a lack of responsibility
assignment. Moreover, the assumption that low reachability would lead to the formation
of efficient subgroups lacks confirmation in the data gathered for this thesis.
In the end, the combination of relational and attributive data reveals a mismatch in
regard to power and trust: On the one hand, while NGOs dominate networks as the most
central actors according to network measurements, state institutions are viewed as most
powerful actors by network alters. On the other hand, actors who enjoy the highest trust
as reliable advisors are not prominent in the advice network. And third, while civil society
are viewed as most important intermediaries to broker information to local communities
by network alters, they do not do justice to this assigned role in the eyes of communities.
In conclusion, the thesis identifies several network factors that hamper the collective
steering of petroleum resources and revenues in Ghana: Firstly, incongruent advocacy ac-
tivities over redistributive questions split civil society in Accra-based and Western Region-
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based organizations. Secondly, NGOs compete for the scarce resources available rather
than collaborate effectively. This divide and competition hamper collaborative initiatives
like the CSPOG and undermine NGOs’ credibility as reliable exchange. Thirdly, actors
lack the ability to transform their social capital, i. e., their interconnectivity, to enhance
their human capital, i. e., their knowledge about oil and gas matters. Fourthly, the
lack of reciprocal relations minimizes the chances that actors enhance their trust in each
other. Fifthly, actors lack cohesive triads and / or subgroups across exchange networks
which would provide trusted environments to facilitate collaboration; and sixthly, the
low density and centralization of networks complicate effective resource diffusion and the
coordination of joint strategies.
9.2 Limitations of Empirical Results
Even though the thesis provides a first systematic assessment of collaboration in Ghana’s
petroleum sector with the help of primary data, it has some caveats that are necessary
to consider in regard to the just summarized findings. At first, my status as an outsider
limits the validity of this work as it coined the quality and quantity of the data gained in
the field. Most importantly, it might have primed the answering behavior of respondents
towards keeping past exchanges secret, overemphasizing their role in petroleum governance
or giving insincere answers.
Further, the question why I had deemed it necessary or at least, valuable, to research
natural resource governance in Ghana and the feeling of being betwixt in multiple roles
made me increasingly weary of my work and of the way I interpret and communicate
results. For example, the paradigm that NGOs are automatically ‘good’ or the hospitality
of interviewees during field research made me hesitant about discussing the more critical
results of the survey and network data.
The survey results first and foremost picture the situation in the sample communities
along the Ghana Gas pipeline and voice the concerns of the 333 survey participants. As
every survey that works with sampling, the present study does not cover all parts of
the population equally. The discrete definition of ‘being affected’ further led to a strong
age bias induced by the fact that most farmers in Ghana are elderly people. This bias
should caution against transferring central results, e.g. the role and work of NGOs, to
a general anticipation of them across Ghana. Moreover, the Western Region is a unique
case with its long history of natural resource extraction and the comparably high density
of development projects and actors.
Even though providing unique insights into the structure and organisation of actors’
day-to-day collaboration in the petroleum sector, the collection of social network data also
entails some caveats. As the sixth chapter shows, the empirical results build upon inter-
viewing only 29 actors of at least 99 actors active in Ghana’s petroleum sector. Hereby,
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the near impossibility to gain complete network ties is a problem that troubles most net-
work studies in development research because of the complexities of development itself.
Consequently, the results of the different networks give only a snapshot about relations,
processes and practices in petroleum governance in Ghana. Moreover, the network nodes
represent organizations and not individuals. As the present study shows, interviewing
organizations increases the likelihood of contradicting answers and it is impossible to es-
timate the chance of identifying the most appropriate interview partner. At the same
time, the contradictory answers may originate from respondents’ tendency to make them-
selves more involved (more ‘important’) in network interviews, potentially guided by the
idea that “[g]iving is, indeed, more blessed than receiving” (Blau 1968: 453), or by the
fallacy that interviewees (intentionally or unintentionally) fail to report about receiving
resources. These caveats trouble the sensitive network data in this research. Finally, the
research design was not able to capture negative ties adequately. This problem may re-
sult from SNA’s general bias towards positive ties and implicates that SNA’s explanatory
power is very limited in understanding contestation among actors. Yet, such contestation
is as much as obvious in interaction as it is the case for collaboration.
Besides challenges in the data collection process, the SNA falls short on investigating
the networks on actors level in detail. Such a focus on the actors level would have
contributed to a more pronounced picture of specific actors who facilitate or constrain
collaborative steering in Ghana’s petroleum sector. Additionally, most network analyses
forego valued ties. The unexpected deviations in the answering behavior of respondents in
regard to the (non-) exchange of resources made it necessary to resort to using unvalued
ties. Finally, this thesis treats unreciprocated ties as a methodological problem rather than
a theoretical phenomenon. This opposes the approach of researchers such as Thurner,
Stoiber, and Weinmann (2005) and Pappi, Knoke, and Bisson (1993) who argue that
unreciprocated ties arise from power imbalances between actors and are, hence, interesting
while investigating networks.
9.3 Contribution to Current Research
Despite these limitations, the thesis contributes both to research about the developing
petroleum industry in Ghana and the study of social networks. With its relational research
design and the unique data sets, the thesis adds to literature about oil and gas in Ghana in
five distinct ways: Firstly, the focus on relations illuminates petroleum governance from a
completely new angle. Contrary to the various studies that portray the potential dangers
of the ‘resource curse’ in Ghana (Kopin´ski, Polus, and Tycholiz 2013; Mitchell 2012; Ross
1999), the focus on relations extracts what is going on in petroleum governance (rather
that what should (not) be going on).
190
9.3 Contribution to Current Research
Secondly, the thesis cautions against normative arguments that civil society is an au-
tomate counterbalance to the ‘resource curse’. Hardly any recent publications tackle the
role of civil society critically, i. e., go beyond the rather simplistic argument that civil
society is important in avoiding the ‘resource curse’ (Heller 2013). Contrary to this, the
present study identifies several challenges that civil society groups need to overcome if
they want to play a proactive role and become a reliable partner in petroleum governance.
In this regard, the present findings add new data and supporting empirical observations
to Vormawor’s (2014: 93) argument that civil society organizations in Ghana fall short
of strategic thinking and action and rule out collaboration through competing with each
other.
The focus on relations thirdly moves the attention away from the socio-economic and
ecological changes taking place in communities along the coast in the Western Region
(Boohene and Peprah 2011; Eduful and Hooper 2015; Osei-Tutu 2012; Sakyi et al. 2012).
Rather, it provides a link between communities’ and petroleum actors’ levels through the
mechanism of representation. By scrutinizing representation, the thesis provides novel
insights into the experiences of communities and particularly cautions against the inver-
sion of the argument that actors who are generally well accepted as representatives in
Ghanaian politics are also able to represent well in the petroleum sector.
Fourthly, while many studies ask how actors can theoretically collaborate in natural
resource governance (Ansell and Gash 2008; Bodin and Crona 2008; Davies and White
2012; Sreide and Truex 2013) or whether or not actors do collaborate (Lienert, Schnetzer,
and Ingold 2013; Prell, Hubacek, and Reed 2007; Ramirez-Sanchez 2011), the conceptual
approach of this thesis establishes arguments why actors should collaborate and the em-
pirical data show how actors collaborate across six variants of exchange. In this regard,
the thesis is able to show the necessity to go beyond simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ questions in
collaborative settings.
Fifthly, the collection of a primary network data and the application of SNA visualizes
the complex reality of actors’ relations and interactions much beyond the analysis of in-
stitutional arrangements. Contrary to the various studies that target the legal framework
institutionalized to govern Ghana’s petroleum sector (Banful 2013; Gary 2009; Gyampo
2010), the network analysis reveals who really acts and interacts. Moreover, through the
relational focus, the research design avoids the artificial trap of differing between ‘formal’
and ‘informal’ institutions.
Besides contributions to current research about oil and gas in Ghana, the thesis adds
to the study of social networks and the application of SNA. On the one hand, it shows
the benefits of first getting an idea of the overall network embedding before limiting the
network’s boundary in a second step. This enables researchers to get unique insights
into the chances and challenges of multi-actors approaches. In this regard, the thesis
differs from studies by, for example, Wonodi (2012) who concentrates on networks within
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a pre-defined sector (the federal level of three Nigerian cities).
On the other hand, in minimizing the fallacies of respondents’ answering behavior, the
thesis sensitizes for data validity in network studies. Instead of only asking unidirectional
resource exchanges, the network interviews asked respondents to report both about their
outgoing and incoming ties. With this research design, the thesis was able to calculate
an average confirmed correspondence of answers of maximum 30%. This comparably low
percentage should push network researchers to critically question their data if they extract
network data in the field.
By mixing quantitative methods with qualitative approaches, the thesis also shows
the benefits of mixed-method approaches in SNA. For example, the lack of cohesive
subgroups across networks and the competition among civil society groups in Ghana’s
petroleum sector are barely understandable without having insights into the practices of
‘othering’ and ‘eye services’. Therefore, the study contributes to recent research about
network practices (Fuhse 2009; Mische 2011; Pachucki and Breiger 2010).
In a similar vein, the thesis intrigues to understanding contestation among actors in
natural resource governance. While SNA is useful to narrow down collaborative structures,
it has tremendous problems to investigate contentious patterns, i. e., negative ties (Everett
and Borgatti 2005; Wasserman and Faust 1994). The thesis aimed to filling this research
gap by including the question ‘With which of your contacts / partners are you currently
not intending to collaborate in the year 2015?’. Only three out of 29 participants gave
an answer to this questions. All others indicate that they cannot answer this question
prospective as they would “of course collaborate in the future if the opportunity arises”. In
consequence, this study gives reasons to focus on contestation empirically and, inherently,
on extracting negative ties.
Finally, the thesis refreshes discussions about ethics in SNA (Borgatti and Molina 2003;
Breiger 2005; Kadushin 2005; Klovdahl 2005) by evaluating ethical dilemmas in regard to
an empirical example and on the foundation of gathering primary network data. Not only
does the thesis pose critical questions about who owns network data (the sender of a tie;
the sender and addressees; or researchers themselves) but it also discusses how certain
data and comments have to be withhold – on expense of clear arguments – in order to
protect respondents’ identities.
9.4 Implications for Future Action and Research
Overall, as much as the idea of natural resource governance compels as an alternative to
hierarchical steering by government, this thesis suggests that it is not as simple as develop-
ment actors, researchers and practitioners claim it to be. Key preconditions for collabora-
tive steering in natural resource governance are that powerful actor abstain from steering
unilaterally, that less powerful actors provide necessary resources for power-balancing
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strategies, and that the latter credibly show the ability of being reliable partners in gov-
erning natural resources. Moreover, it is critical that multi-actor approaches define ‘smart’
goals, i. e., goals which are specific, measurable, assignable, realistic and time-related, and
which move beyond ‘standard jargons’ of international development cooperation. Finally,
collaboration in complex actor-settings necessitates at least one trusted, neutrally per-
ceived, and central actor which coordinates interest, streamlines agendas, keeps strategies
on track, and maintains the overview.
In Ghana, the Public Interest Accountability Committee (PIAC) could become such a
facilitating coordinator and, thus, could serve as a role model for other extractive coun-
tries. The PIAC inherently unites the several interest groups and, as a public institution,
brings in the Ghanaian state with its dominant role in governing petroleum resources. Its
innovative set-up is unique in Africa and as the results show, it enjoys a good reputation
among all petroleum actors.
Yet, various factors need to change before the PIAC can play this coordinative role in
Ghana and become a role-model for other extractive countries: First, a revision of the
Petroleum Revenue Management Act, Act 815 (PRMA) is necessary as the law has, so far,
failed to regulate resource transfers to the PIAC institutionally. Second, the government
needs to actually release these resources for PIAC’s everyday work as well as for calling
in experts for advice. Otherwise, the practice of ‘eye service’ – superficial inclusion but
actual exclusion of non-state actors from governance decisions – will persist. Third, the
PIAC needs to invest these resources in training its members, in knowledge generation and
in knowledge dissemination. This approach could be the key for credible ‘status giving’
to balance the power of the executive. It is, fourth, crucial that the PIAC activates the
social capital it inherently possesses by reaching out more actively to other petroleum
actors and, potentially, the citizens directly. On an extended scope and fifth, donors
need to respect the assigned role of institutions like the PIAC and should not spoil its
network interactions. Yet, this currently occurs in regard to the UK-funded ‘Western
Region Coastal Foundation (WRCF)’ which seeks to take up the idea of collaboratively
governing the petroleum resources.203 If donor agencies are really keen to turn words into
action and commit themselves to ‘bottom-up’ collaboration on ‘eye level’, they would
do better if supporting ‘home-grown’ institutions like the PIAC in Ghana and other
developing countries.
In the broader scope of development cooperation, another lesson to be draw from this
thesis is the potential of multi-donor pooled organizations. Preceding other initiatives
203 The WRCF aims to build a dialogue platform in the logic of the PIAC but with the inclusion of
the private sector. In the opinion of several interviewees, the initiative lacks the experience, cultural
knowledge and social capital to implement such an ambitious project, and it is perceived as an alien
phenomenon, which has been designed on a drawing-border in London instead of including Ghanaian




from 2010 onwards, STAR-Ghana has proven its effectiveness in disseminating financial
resources. But more importantly, STAR-Ghana is fully integrated across the different
networks and fully recognized as a partner by all network actors. As the attributive
network data show, it is highly valued for its coordinating skills and knowledge in oil and
gas, and is trusted across all sectors. For development cooperation this means that donors
should pool resources more often, not only to make their interventions more coherent to
each other but also to lift the “giver-taker-burden” from development funds beneficiaries.
Due to these critical points, this thesis suggests several implications for future research
about natural resource governance in Ghana and beyond: On the one hand, scholars
should critically – and not normatively – scrutinize collaborative approaches in natural
resource governance. This implicates the necessity to go beyond the questions whether or
not actors collaborate or why they should collaborate, and to ask how they collaborate.
Strictly speaking, simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ questions about collaboration are insufficient to
understand multi-actor governance structures. Such an approach, on the other hand,
calls for more researchers who gain and extract primary network data and who make
SNA a more useful approach for development research. From a methodological point of
view, the recurrent inconsistencies in the original networks (a maximum of 30% of claimed
relations are confirmed by both sender and addressee of a tie) suggest the urgent need
to include some form of ‘monitoring and evaluation’ instrument, for example by gaining
both outgoing and incoming ties as done in the present thesis.
Future research should also focus on extending the discussions about how to generate
high quality SNA data and on effectively designing and administering SNA questionnaires.
A follow-up study with the same questionnaire and interviewees could generate longitu-
dinal data and contribute to the emergent discussions about long-term relations. All this
will not only push SNA literature but can help to improve our current understanding of
unilateral, collaborative or contentious natural resource governance.
Additionally, the task of gaining and investigating negative ties provides several avenues
for future research. While their existence is at hand – considering the numerous conflicting
relations among actors (in natural resource governance) worldwide –, research needs more
efforts to extract such data. A promising approach could be to focus on small networks
that would allow to build deep trust relations between researchers and network alters.
This trust could increase the possibility to retrieve negative ties.
Finally, the mismatch between relational data on the one hand and attributive data on
the other is worth more investigation in future network studies. As shown in this study,
the combination of relational and attributional data helps to understand the diversity of
actors’ relations in petroleum governance in more depth.
Empirically, the present research urges scientists to keep track of the tremendous
changes taking place in Ghana after the first discovery of oil in commercial quantities
as the government’s hunger for oil revenues has only just begun. Since 2007, 25 further
194
9.4 Implications for Future Action and Research
discoveries have been made and projects such as the Offshore Cape Three Point (OCTP)
Project, close to the Ivorian border, bear potential for conflict: Because of unclear mar-
itime borders and, therefore, an ill-defined ownership of the offshore petroleum fields,
this discovery has tremendous conflict potential between Ghana and the Coˆte d’Ivoire –
offshore and onshore.204
The various problems and legal violations discussed in regard to the Ghana Gas Pipeline
encourage a critical observation of the upcoming explorations and developments. Up to
date, government officials repeat the promises made after the Jubilee discovery: more
development for neighboring communities, employment for all, secure energy provision,
and, consequently, tremendous benefits for the whole country. The present work raises
serious doubts on the validity of such promises as they are clearly not an automatic ac-
companiment of oil and gas production. In consequence, future research should cautiously
retrace the changes taking place on the community level. Even for natural resources as
a unique source of opportunity, the crux of the matter will be to include citizens in the
new developments.
204 The dispute over ownership between Ghana and Coˆte d’Ivoire has reached the International Tribunale
for the Law of the Sea and necessitated talks between both countries in Geneva. The fact that these
talks were brokered by the former UN-Secretary General Kofi Annan underlines the significance of




1 Definition of Important Graph-Level Measurements
Concept Definition
Brokerage Connecting at least two disconnected nodes.
Reciprocity Reciprocity is the fraction of dyads that are reciprocated,
out of those dyads with at least one non-zero tie.
Transitivity Measures completed triads, i. e., the percentage of edge
pairs (i,j ) and (j,k) such that (i,k) is also an edge (‘A friend
of a friend is my friend’). Correlates with social density.
Density The ratio of the number of edges in a network to the max-
imum possible number of edges.
Centralization The concentration of edges around one single node or a
small group.
Reachability Shortest path between two nodes. If the diameter is low,
then all nodes are relatively ‘close’ to each other and, thus,
the network can be viewed as cohesive.
Source: Own graph based on Janssen (2006), Merrill-Matzner (2006) and
Prell et al. (2010).
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2 Definition of Actors’ Centrality Measures
Measurement Link to Power
Degree No. of direct connections Actors’ involvement; ‘in-the-know’
In-degree No. of in-coming (received) ties Actors’ prestige / popularity
Out-degree No. of out-going (sent) ties Actors’ expansiveness
Closeness Distance (shortest path) between
nodes
Actors’ independence
Eigenvector Sum of an actor’s links to others,
weighted by their degree centrality
Relating to well-connected actors
Betweenness No. of times a node links two discon-
nected nodes via the shortest path
Brokering in-between disconnected ac-
tors; potential influence over network’s
flows
Source: Own graph based on Janssen (2006), Merrill-Matzner (2006) and Prell et al. (2010).
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my! study! to! gain! a! PhD! degree.! It! is! financially! supported! by! the! Friedrich! Ebert! Foundation,! a!
German!foundation!which!aims!at!strengthening!democratic!values.!
Aim*of*the*Study*
In! my! current! research,! I! am! trying! to! find! out! which! actors! are! involved! in! the! oil! resource!
management! in!Ghana.!Furthermore! I!would! like! to!explore!how! these!actors! interact!and!which!












agree! or! reject! audio! recording.! If! you! agree! to! it,! I! will! preserve! confidentiality! in! terms! of! your!




I!will!use! the! findings!of! this! study! to!write!my!PhD!dissertation!and! to!publish!papers! in! relevant!
academic!and!nonTacademic! journals! inside!and!outside!Ghana.!Names!of!none!of! the! informants!
will!be!mentioned!in!the!publications!and!I!ensure!confidentiality!and!your!anonymity!at!all!stages!of!
the!research!process.!!





Johanna!Rapp! ! ! !
H/No.!PT.!168/1! ! Tel:! +233!50!35!07!281!
Sawmill,!Takoradi!! ! Email:! johanna_rapp@gmx.de!
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4 Survey: Participant Information Sheet
HOUSEHOLD	  QUESTIONNAIRE	  	  
The	  Western	  Corridor	  Gas	  Infrastructure	  Development	  Project	  
–	  
Responsibilities,	  Power	  and	  Legitimacy	  of	  Policy	  Implementers	  
as	  seen	  by	  Affected	  Farmers	  and	  Land	  Owners	  in	  Ghana’s	  Western	  Region	  
	  
	  
Participation	  Information	  Sheet	  
	  
First	   let	   me	   thank	   you	   for	   your	   time	   and	   kindness	   to	   participate	   in	   this	   survey	   to	   help	   me	   with	   my	  
research.	  My	  name	  is	  Johanna	  Rapp	  and	  I	  am	  a	  PhD	  student	  at	  the	  Center	  for	  Development	  Research	  at	  
the	  University	   of	  Bonn,	  Germany.	   I	   have	   completed	  my	  master	   degree	   in	  Political	   Science	   in	   2012.	  My	  
current	  research	  here	  in	  Ghana	  is	  part	  of	  my	  aim	  to	  gain	  a	  PhD	  degree.	  It	   is	  financially	  supported	  by	  the	  
German	  Friedrich	  Ebert	  Foundation	  and	  supported	  by	  the	  University	  of	  Accra,	  Ghana.	  
	  
	  
Aim	  of	  the	  Study	  
I	   am	   trying	   to	   find	   out	   whether	   and	   how	   communities,	   government	   representatives,	   companies,	  
NGOs/CSOs	  and	  traditional	   leaders	  are	  communicating	  and	  collaborating	  with	  each	  other	  within	  the	  Oil	  
and	  Gas	  Sector.	  Today,	   I	  want	  to	  find	  out	  how	  the	  recently	  constructed	  Gas	  infrastructure	  is	   influencing	  
your	   livelihood.	   I	  am	  also	   interested	  in	  your	  opinion	  about	  the	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Sector	   in	  general,	  how	  much	  
you	  trust	  different	  actors	  and	  your	  satisfaction	  with	  the	  way	  the	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  resources	  are	  managed.	  The	  
survey	  will	  take	  about	  50-­‐60	  minutes.	  	  
	  
Right	  to	  Refuse	  or	  Withdraw	  and	  Benefits	  of	  Participation	  
I	   want	   to	   emphasize	   that	   you	   do	   not	   have	   to	   participate	   in	   this	   survey.	   You	   are	   free	   to	  withdraw	   your	  
consent	   and	   discontinue	   answering	   the	   questions	   at	   any	   time.	   Further,	   the	   participation	   has	   no	   direct	  
benefits	  for	  you	  besides	  my	  appreciation	  and	  gratefulness.	  Also	  there	  are	  no	  right	  or	  wrong	  answers.	  I	  am	  
interested	  in	  your	  personal	  and	  individual	  opinion	  on	  this	  topic.	  	  
	  
Confidentiality	  
I	  assure	  you	  that	  your	  identity	  and	  everything	  you	  will	  tell	  is	  confidential.	  No	  unauthorized	  person	  will	  have	  
access	   to	   the	   questionnaires	   and	   your	   answers.	   All	   your	   identifying	   information	   (name,	   address,	   phone	  
number)	  will	  be	  kept	  strictly	  confidential.	  	  
	  
Use	  of	  Information	  
I	  will	  use	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  study	  to	  write	  my	  PhD	  dissertation	  and	  to	  publish	  papers	  in	  relevant	  academic	  
and	  non-­‐academic	  journals	  inside	  and	  outside	  Ghana.	  I	  will	  not	  mention	  any	  names	  in	  the	  publications	  and	  





Contact	  Details	  Ghana	  
Johanna	  Rapp	  
Sawmill,	  Lagos	  Town	  
Takoradi,	  Western	  Region	  
Tel:	  	   +233	  50	  35	  07	  281	  
E-­‐Mail:	   johanna_rapp@gmx.de	  
Contact	  Details	  Germany	  
Johanna	  Rapp	  
Center	  for	  Development	  Research	  (ZEF)	  
University	  of	  Bonn	  
Tel.:	   +49	  176	  642	  55	  871	  
E-­‐Mail:	   johanna_rapp@gmx.de	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DATEINTR! Day! Month! Year!























Married!! 1! Single! 5!
Contemporary!union! 2! Other,!please#specify:!___________________! 9!
Divorced!/!separated! 3! Don’t!know! 997!







No!(Migrant)! 0! Don’t!know! 997!











Economic!reasons!! 1! Other,!please#specify:!___________________! 9!
Personal!reasons! 2! Don’t!know! 997!
Political!reasons! 3! Refuse!to!answer! 998!
Medical!reasons! 4! Not!applicable! 999!
!
5.+What+is+your+highest+level+of+education?+[Do#not#read#out#response#options.#Tick#corresponding#box.]# +
No!formal!schooling! 1! Bachelor!Degree!! 6!
Informal!schooling!only!(incl.!Koranic)! 2! Master!Degree! 7!
Primary!School! 3! Other,#please#specify:#!__________________! 9!
Junior!High!School! 4! Don’t!know! 997!
Senior!High!School!! 5! Refuse!to!answer! 998!
!
6.+What+is+your+major+occupation?+[Do#not#read#out#response#options.#Choose#corresponding#box.]+
Farmer!! 1! Unemployed! 7!
Fisher!/!Fishmonger! 2! Retired! 8!
Trader! 3! Other![please#specify:]__________________# 9!
Artisan![please#specify:]___________________# 4! Don’t!know! 997!
Professional![please#specify:]_______________! 5! Refuse!to!answer! 998!





















…!the!economic!condition!of!Ghana!currently?! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
…!the!economic!condition!of!Ghana!before!
the!discovery!of!Oil!and!Gas?!
! ! ! ! ! ! !
…!your!personal!living!condition!currently?! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
…!your!personal!living!condition!before!the!
discovery!of!Oil!and!Gas?!

























































The!President! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Your!Member!of!Parliament! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Your!District’s!Chief!Executive! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Your!District!Assembly!(Woe)Man!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
The!Paramount!Chief!of!your!area! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Your!Community!Chief!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
NGOs!/!CSOs! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !






















Most!Ghanaians!can!be!trusted.! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
These!days!you!have!to!be!alert!or!some!Ghanae
ians!are!likely!to!take!advantage!of!you.!
! ! ! ! ! ! !
Most!Ghanaians!are!willing!to!help!if!needed.! ! ! ! ! ! ! !












































…!your!Member!of!Parliament?! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
…!your!District’s!Chief!Executive! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
…!your!District!Assembly!(Woe)!Man?! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
…!the!Paramount!Chief!of!your!area! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
…!your!Community!Chief!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
…!NGO!/!CSO?! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !





























































































































































































































































































…!listening!to!the!radio?! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
…!watching!TV?! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
…!reading!newspaper?!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
…!talking!to!a!Politician?! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
…!talking!to!the!Ghana!Gas!Liaison!
!!!!!Manager!/!‘Community!Rep’?!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
…!talking!to!the!Paramount!Chief?! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
…!talking!to!your!Community!Chief?! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
…!talking!to!a!NGO!/!CSO!Representative?! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !






















































No! 0! Refuse!to!answer! 998!
Yes,!please#specify:#______________________! 1! Not!applicable! 999!
Don’t!know!/!Not!sure! 997!
+






Private!Sector! 2! Don’t!know!/!Not!sure! 997!
Traditional!Sector! 3! Refuse!to!answer! 998!





























































































































! ! ! ! ! ! !
…!have!you!personally!benefitted!from!the!Oil!
&!Gas!resources!so!far?!


















Your!Member!of!Parliament! ! ! ! ! !
Your!District’s!Chief!Executive! ! ! ! ! !
Your!District!Assembly!(Woe)!Men! ! ! ! ! !
Ghana!Gas!Official!Representative![not#Liaison#Manager#/#‘Community#Rep’]# ! ! ! ! !
The!Paramount!Chief!of!your!area! ! ! ! ! !
NGO!/!CSO!Representative,!please#specify:#__________________________! ! ! ! ! !
Media!Representative! ! ! ! ! !
























Your!Member!of!Parliament! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Your!District’s!Chief!Executive! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Your!District!Assembly!(Woe)!Man! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Ghana!Gas!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
The!Paramount!Chief!of!your!area! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Your!Community!Chief! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
NGOs!/!CSOs! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !






















The!President! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Your!Member!of!Parliament! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Your!District’s!Chief!Executive! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Your!District!Assembly!(Woe)Man! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Ghana!Gas! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
The!Paramount!Chief!of!your!area! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Your!Community!Chief! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
NGOs!/!CSOs! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !




























The!President! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Your!Member!of!Parliament! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Your!District’s!Chief!Executive! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Your!District!Assembly!(Woe)Man!! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Ghana!Gas! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
The!Paramount!Chief!of!your!area! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Your!Community!Chief! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
NGOs!/!CSOs! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !





















The!Paramount!Chief! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Your!Community!Chief! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
NGO!/!CSO! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !



























The!Paramount!Chief! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Your!Community!Chief! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
NGO!/!CSO! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
































! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
NGOs!/!CSOs!are!necessary!to!control!
what!the!Government!is!doing.!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Media!are!necessary!to!control!what!the!
Government!is!doing.!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Traditional!Leaders!are!useful!to!mediate!
between!the!citizens!and!the!Government.!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
NGOs!/!CSOs!are!useful!to!mediate!bee
tween!the!citizens!and!the!Government.!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
Media!are!useful!to!intermediate!between!
the!citizens!and!the!Government.!
































































Ahanta!Youth!Association! ! ! ! ! !
African!Centre!for!Energy!Policy!(ACEP)! ! ! ! ! !
Association!of!Small!Scale!Industry!–!Nzema!East!(ASSI)! ! ! ! ! !
Centre!for!Public!Interest!Law!(CEPIL)! ! ! ! ! !
Centre!for!Society!and!Community!Advancement!(CESCA)! ! ! ! ! !
Community,!Land!&!Development!Foundation!(COLANDEF)! ! ! ! ! !
Friends!of!the!Nation!(FoN)! ! ! ! ! !
Ghana!Civil!Society!Platform!on!Oil!and!Gas+ ! ! ! ! !
Ghana!National!Canoe!Fishermen’s!Council!–!WR!(GNFC)!! ! ! ! ! !
Ghana!Wildlife!Society!(GWS)! ! ! ! ! !
Integrated!Action!of!Development!Initiatives!(IADI)! ! ! ! ! !
Kumasi!Institute!of!Technology,!Energy!and!Environment!(KITE)! ! ! ! ! !
Network!for!Women’s!Rights!in!Ghana!(NETRIGHT)! ! ! ! ! !
Nzema!Youth!Association! ! ! ! ! !
Platform!for!Coastal!Communities!(PCC)! ! ! ! ! !
United!Civil!Society!Organization!Nzema!East!District!(UCSOND)!! ! ! ! ! !
Western!Region!Network!for!NGOs!(WERENGO)! ! ! ! ! !






















First	 let	 me	 thank	 you	 for	 your	 time	 and	 kindness	 to	 participate	 in	 this	 survey	 to	 help	 me	 with	 my	
research.	My	name	is	Johanna	Rapp	and	I	am	a	PhD	student	at	the	Center	for	Development	Research	at	






My	research	has	 two	major	parts:	Firstly,	 I	 am	trying	 to	 find	out	how	 farmers	and	 landowners	who	 lost	
crops	or	 land	due	 to	 the	Ghana	Gas	pipeline	construction	perceive	 the	current	developments	 in	 the	Oil	
and	Gas	Sector	and	whom	of	the	various	policy-implementers	(“stakeholder”)	they	trust.	Therefore,	I	am	
conducting	a	household	survey	in	the	seven	affected	districts.	Secondly,	I	am	trying	to	find	out	whether	





I	 want	 to	 emphasize	 that	 you	 do	 not	 have	 to	 participate	 in	 this	 survey.	 You	 are	 free	 to	withdraw	 your	
















































1. In	 the	year	2014,	with	which	of	 the	 following	actors2	have	you	 interacted	with,	by	 face-to-face	





















collaborate	 in	 advocacy	activities	 (campaigns,	 promoting	 strategies,	 collecting	data)	 related	 to	
Oil	and	Gas?		
8. How	many	times,	in	the	year	2014,	have	you	been	asked	from	each	of	your	contacts	/	partners	for	




9. How	many	 times,	 in	 the	 year	 2014,	 have	 you	 handed	 out	 your	 own	 resources	 (financial,	 staff,	
office	space)	to	each	of	your	contacts	/	partners	for	activities	related	to	Oil	and	Gas?	
	







8 Social Network Analysis: Roster of Network Actors






























































	 Ghana	Journalist	Association	(GJA)		 		 		
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Others	 Auditor	General	Department	(AGD)		 Security	Agencies	(Maritime,	Navy,	etc.)		 Enterprise	Development	Centre	(EDC)		 Kwame	Nkrumah	University	of	Science	and	Technology	(KNUST)		 		 		
218


















	 Q1	 Q2	 Q3	 Q4	 Q5	 Q6	 Q7	 Q8	 Q9	 Q10	 Q11	 Q12	 Q13	 Q14	 Q15	 Q16	 Q17	 Q18	 Q19	
EPA	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
PC	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
MoE	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
MoF	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
MLGRD	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
PSCoE	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
PIAC	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
MPs	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
GRA	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
DevPlan	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
DCEs	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
DAs	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
FishCom	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
HoC	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
PCs	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
CCs	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
QMs	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Tullow	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
GNPC	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
VRA	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Kosmos	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
ENI	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
EMP	Forum	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
DANIDA	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
DFID	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
GIZ	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
JICA	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
NORAD	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		
220
	
	 Q1	 Q2	 Q3	 Q4	 Q5	 Q6	 Q7	 Q8	 Q9	 Q10	 Q11	 Q12	 Q13	 Q14	 Q15	 Q16	 Q17	 Q18	 Q19	
SDC	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
USAID	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
STAR-GH	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
CARE	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
IBIS	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
IUCN	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
KASA	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
NRGI	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Oxfam	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
ACEP	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
ACET	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
CEPIL	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
CDD	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Platform	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
ISODEC	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
KITE	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
SEND	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
COLANDEF	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
GNCFC	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
FoN	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
PCC	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
UCSOND	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
WERENGO	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
PPB	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Radio	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
IFEJ	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
GJA	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
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	 Q1	 Q2	 Q3	 Q4	 Q5	 Q6	 Q7	 Q8	 Q9	 Q10	 Q11	 Q12	 Q13	 Q14	 Q15	 Q16	 Q17	 Q18	 Q19	
EU	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
WB	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
AGD	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Sec.	Ag.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
EDC	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
KNUST	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
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